Ilia Denisov
041106d623
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Add a prod-only, in-memory IP ban enforced at the edge, fed by three signals:
sustained rate-limiter rejections (the IP-keyed public/email/admin classes — the
user class stays the backend soft-flag's concern), a honeypot decoy-path hit (the
contour caddy tags decoys with X-Scrabble-Honeypot and routes them to the gateway),
and a honeytoken (a planted bearer, GATEWAY_HONEYTOKEN). A banned IP is refused with
429 by the abuseGuard middleware before any work — covering the Connect edge, the
live stream and the static SPA/landing the per-op limiter never gated.
The ban is off by default: it keys by the real client IP the shared-NAT test contour
does not expose, so a ban there would be self-inflicted; detection still logs in the
contour, only the ban action is gated (GATEWAY_ABUSE_BAN_ENABLED). Rejection bans last
GATEWAY_ABUSE_BAN_DURATION; tripwire/honeytoken hits are near-zero-false-positive and
earn longer fixed bans. Each ban increments gateway_abuse_banned_total{reason}.
Operators see and lift active bans on the admin console's Throttled page; the gateway
syncs its active set to the backend every 30s (POST /api/v1/internal/bans/sync,
backend/internal/banview) and applies the operator unbans the response returns.
PRERELEASE phase AG. Docs baked into ARCHITECTURE / FUNCTIONAL (+ru) / both READMEs.
154 lines
9.2 KiB
Markdown
154 lines
9.2 KiB
Markdown
# gateway
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The Scrabble platform's only public ingress (module `scrabble/gateway`). It
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terminates the client's **Connect-RPC + FlatBuffers** traffic over HTTP/2
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cleartext (`h2c`), authenticates the originating credential, mints/resolves a
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thin opaque session, rate-limits, injects `X-User-ID` when forwarding to the
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backend over REST/JSON, and bridges the backend's gRPC push stream to each
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client's in-app live channel. It **embeds the static UI build** (`go:embed`, baked
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in by the gateway image's node stage) and serves a **landing page** at `/` and the game
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**SPA** at `/app/` (web) and `/telegram/` (the Mini App) — the single-origin model.
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Hash-named `/assets/*` are served `immutable`; the HTML shells are `no-cache`. It can also serve the
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backend's admin console at `/_gm` behind HTTP Basic-Auth for a local non-caddy run;
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in the deployed contour the front caddy owns `/_gm` (see
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[`../deploy`](../deploy)). See
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[`../docs/ARCHITECTURE.md`](../docs/ARCHITECTURE.md) §2, §3, §10, §12, §13.
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## Package layout
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```
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cmd/gateway/ # main: config -> backend client -> session cache ->
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# push hub -> Connect h2c server (+ admin) -> serve
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proto/edge/v1/ # Connect envelope contract (committed generated Go)
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internal/config/ # GATEWAY_* env config
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internal/backendclient/ # typed REST client (+ X-User-ID) and push gRPC client
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internal/session/ # in-memory session cache (LRU/TTL, backend fallback)
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internal/ratelimit/ # token-bucket limiter (golang.org/x/time/rate) + the rejection tracker + the temporary IP banlist
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internal/connector/ # gRPC client to the Telegram connector (initData validate, out-of-app push) + routing
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internal/push/ # live-event fan-out hub (per-user client streams)
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internal/transcode/ # FlatBuffers<->REST bridge + message_type registry
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internal/connectsrv/ # the Connect Gateway service over h2c (+ the in-memory active_users gauge)
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internal/admin/ # Basic-Auth reverse proxy mounting the backend admin console at /_gm (verbatim)
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internal/webui/ # embedded UI build (go:embed dist): landing at /, SPA at /app/ + /telegram/
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```
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The FlatBuffers payloads and the backend push proto are the shared wire
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contracts in [`../pkg`](../pkg).
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## Transport contract
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A single `Gateway` Connect service: `Execute(message_type, payload, request_id)`
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for unary operations and `Subscribe` for the live stream. The `payload` bytes are
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FlatBuffers tables (`scrabble/pkg/fbs`); the gateway transcodes them to and from
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the backend's JSON. The session token rides in `Authorization: Bearer`; `auth.*`
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operations are unauthenticated and return the minted token. A unary domain
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outcome rides back in `ExecuteResponse.result_code` (HTTP 200); only edge
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failures become Connect error codes.
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`auth.telegram` validates the Mini App `initData` by calling the **Telegram validator**
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(`GATEWAY_VALIDATOR_ADDR`), which holds the bot token (HMAC); out-of-app push for
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recipients with no live in-app stream goes to the remote **bot** over the reverse **mTLS
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bot-link** (`GATEWAY_BOTLINK_ADDR`, fire-and-forget), and the backend admin broadcasts
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arrive on the gateway's plaintext **relay** (`GATEWAY_BOTLINK_RELAY_ADDR`) which forwards
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them down the same link and awaits the bot's ack (ARCHITECTURE.md §10/§12). When
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`GATEWAY_VALIDATOR_ADDR` is unset Telegram auth is disabled; when `GATEWAY_BOTLINK_ADDR`
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is unset the bot channel (out-of-app push + admin relay) is disabled.
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The message-type catalog: `auth.telegram`, `auth.guest`,
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`auth.email.request`, `auth.email.login`, `profile.get`, `game.submit_play`,
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`game.state`, `lobby.enqueue`, `lobby.poll`, `chat.post`, `chat.read` and the play-loop ops;
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live events
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`your_turn`, `opponent_moved`, `chat_message`, `nudge`, `match_found` (the game events —
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and `game_over`/`notify` — carry the state delta the client applies without a `game.state`
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refetch). The social/account/history ops —
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`friends.*` (list/incoming/request/respond/cancel/unfriend/code.issue/code.redeem),
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`blocks.*`, `invitation.*` (list/create/accept/decline/cancel), `profile.update`,
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`stats.get`, `game.gcg`, and the `notify` live event — go through the identical
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transcode pattern (`transcode_social.go`). Account linking & merge
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— `link.email.request/confirm/merge` and `link.telegram.confirm/merge`
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(`transcode_link.go`); the telegram ops validate the **Login Widget** payload via the
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validator (`ValidateLoginWidget`) and forward the trusted `external_id`. These
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**superseded** the former `email.bind.*` ops, which were removed.
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## Configuration
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| Variable | Default | Notes |
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| --- | --- | --- |
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| `GATEWAY_HTTP_ADDR` | `:8081` | public Connect/h2c listener (also serves the admin console at `/_gm`) |
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| `GATEWAY_LOG_LEVEL` | `info` | zap level |
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| `GATEWAY_BACKEND_HTTP_URL` | `http://localhost:8080` | backend REST base URL |
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| `GATEWAY_BACKEND_GRPC_ADDR` | `localhost:9090` | backend push gRPC address |
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| `GATEWAY_BACKEND_TIMEOUT` | `5s` | per backend REST call |
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| `GATEWAY_ADMIN_USER` / `GATEWAY_ADMIN_PASSWORD` | unset | enable + guard the admin console at `/_gm` |
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| `GATEWAY_VALIDATOR_ADDR` | unset | Telegram validator gRPC address (enables initData / Login Widget validation) |
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| `GATEWAY_BOTLINK_ADDR` | unset | reverse mTLS bot-link listener the remote bot dials (enables out-of-app push + admin relay) |
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| `GATEWAY_BOTLINK_RELAY_ADDR` | unset | plaintext internal listener serving the backend admin `SendToUser`/`SendToGameChannel` relay |
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| `GATEWAY_BOTLINK_TLS_CERT` / `_KEY` / `_CA` | unset | gateway server cert, its key, and the CA that signs accepted bot client certs (required when `GATEWAY_BOTLINK_ADDR` is set) |
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| `GATEWAY_BOTLINK_SEND_TIMEOUT` | `5s` | admin relay wait for the bot ack before reporting not-delivered |
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| `GATEWAY_SESSION_TTL` | `10m` | cached session lifetime |
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| `GATEWAY_SESSION_CACHE_MAX` | `50000` | cached session cap |
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| `GATEWAY_PUSH_HEARTBEAT_INTERVAL` | `10s` | live-stream keep-alive (an immediate heartbeat also fires on open, under the ~15s edge idle timeout) |
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| `GATEWAY_MAX_BODY_BYTES` | `1048576` | caps one request body and one Connect message read; an oversized Execute is refused with `resource_exhausted` |
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| `GATEWAY_ABUSE_BAN_ENABLED` | `false` | enable the temporary IP ban (prod-only — keys by real client IP, off in the shared-NAT test contour) |
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| `GATEWAY_ABUSE_BAN_THRESHOLD` | `100` | rate-limiter rejections within the window that ban an IP |
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| `GATEWAY_ABUSE_BAN_WINDOW` | `2m` | rolling window the rejection strikes accumulate over |
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| `GATEWAY_ABUSE_BAN_DURATION` | `15m` | length of a rejection-earned ban (tripwire 1h, honeytoken 24h are fixed) |
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| `GATEWAY_HONEYTOKEN` | unset | planted bearer value; presenting it bans the caller and raises an alarm |
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| `GATEWAY_SERVICE_NAME` | `scrabble-gateway` | OpenTelemetry `service.name` |
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| `GATEWAY_OTEL_TRACES_EXPORTER` | `none` | `none`, `stdout` or `otlp` (gRPC; endpoint from `OTEL_EXPORTER_OTLP_*`) |
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| `GATEWAY_OTEL_METRICS_EXPORTER` | `none` | `none`, `stdout` or `otlp` |
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Rate-limit defaults (built-in): public 30/min·IP (burst 10), authenticated
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300/min·user (burst 80, sized for multi-device play), admin
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60/min·IP (burst 20, guarding the `/_gm` mount ahead of its Basic-Auth),
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email-code 5/10 min·IP (burst 2).
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Every rejection increments `gateway_rate_limited_total{class}`
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(`user`/`public`/`email`/`admin`) and logs one Debug line; a reporter drains the
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per-key rejection tracker every 30 s, emits a Warn summary per throttled key and
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posts the report to the backend (`/api/v1/internal/ratelimit/report`), feeding
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the admin console's throttled view and the high-rate auto-flag.
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Temporary IP ban (prod-only, `GATEWAY_ABUSE_BAN_ENABLED`): a fail2ban-style block
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keyed by client IP, fed by sustained rate-limiter rejections (the IP-keyed classes),
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a **honeypot** decoy-path hit (the contour caddy tags decoy paths with
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`X-Scrabble-Honeypot`), and a **honeytoken** (`GATEWAY_HONEYTOKEN`). A banned IP is
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refused with 429 by the `abuseGuard` edge middleware before any work — covering the
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Connect edge, the live stream and the static SPA/landing. Each ban increments
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`gateway_abuse_banned_total{reason}` (`rejections`/`tripwire`/`honeytoken`). The ban
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is in-memory (resets on restart); it is **off by default** because it keys by the real
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client IP, which the shared-NAT test contour does not expose (detection still logs
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there, only the ban action is gated). The gateway syncs its active set to the backend
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every 30 s (`/api/v1/internal/bans/sync`) for the console's **Active IP bans** panel
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and applies the operator unbans the response returns.
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## Run
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```sh
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GATEWAY_BACKEND_HTTP_URL=http://localhost:8080 \
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GATEWAY_BACKEND_GRPC_ADDR=localhost:9090 \
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go run ./gateway/cmd/gateway # Connect edge on :8081
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```
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## Generated code
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The Connect envelope Go is committed under `proto/edge/v1`. Regenerate after
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editing the `.proto` (dev-time, like `backend/cmd/jetgen`):
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```sh
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make -C gateway tools # go install protoc-gen-go + protoc-gen-connect-go
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make -C gateway gen # buf generate (local plugins)
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```
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The FlatBuffers payloads are generated in [`../pkg`](../pkg) (`make -C pkg fbs`).
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## Tests
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```sh
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go test -count=1 ./gateway/...
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```
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All gateway tests are hermetic: no real network, a fake backend (`httptest`) and
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credential fixtures. There is no integration (Docker) suite — the gateway holds
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no database.
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