Files
scrabble-game/backend/internal/server/handlers_auth.go
T
Ilia Denisov ef2c2d1eb9
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feat(account): seed the time zone from the client's detected offset at creation
A new account's time_zone defaulted to 'UTC' until the player saved a profile, so the
robot's sleep window and the turn-timeout away-window sweeper — both anchored to the
account zone via account.ResolveZone — ran on UTC for every fresh player, skewing
robot-game timing until a manual Settings save. Seed the zone at creation instead, from
the client's detected "±HH:MM" offset.

- Carry browser_tz on the three account-creating auth requests (TelegramLoginRequest,
  GuestLoginRequest, EmailRequestRequest — the email account is provisioned at the
  code-request step, not at login) through the fbs envelope (+ Go/TS codegen), the
  gateway transcode + backend client, and the backend auth handlers into
  ProvisionTelegram / ProvisionGuest / ProvisionEmail.
- create() now writes time_zone explicitly: the validated detected offset, or 'UTC'
  (equal to the column default) when absent or malformed — deterministic, never guessed.
  The column is already NOT NULL DEFAULT 'UTC', so no migration is needed and existing
  accounts keep 'UTC'. An existing account is never overwritten on re-login.
- A detected zero offset is stored as "+00:00" (the zone is known and equals UTC),
  distinct from the "UTC" default that means "unknown" — which the feedback console's
  three-zone Filed display already reflects.
- Guard the guest handler against an empty payload (the bootstrap historically carried
  none) so it degrades to no-seed rather than panicking in GetRootAs*.
- Tests: zone seeding across Telegram/guest/email plus the "+00:00"/malformed/empty
  cases and the not-overwrite rule; codec round-trip for the three auth encoders.
  ARCHITECTURE + FUNCTIONAL(+ru) updated.
2026-06-22 18:43:24 +02:00

220 lines
7.7 KiB
Go

package server
import (
"errors"
"net/http"
"github.com/gin-gonic/gin"
"github.com/google/uuid"
"scrabble/backend/internal/account"
)
// The /api/v1/internal/sessions/* endpoints are gateway-only: the gateway has
// already validated the originating credential (Telegram initData, an email
// code, or a guest bootstrap) and forwards the result here to provision the
// account and mint the opaque session. The backend trusts the gateway on this
// segment (docs/ARCHITECTURE.md §12).
// telegramAuthRequest carries the identity the connector extracted from a
// validated initData payload. Username, FirstName and LanguageCode seed a
// brand-new account's display name and language; BrowserTZ (the client's detected
// "±HH:MM" UTC offset) seeds its time zone (first contact only).
type telegramAuthRequest struct {
ExternalID string `json:"external_id"`
Username string `json:"username"`
FirstName string `json:"first_name"`
LanguageCode string `json:"language_code"`
BrowserTZ string `json:"browser_tz"`
}
// handleTelegramAuth provisions (or finds) the account bound to a Telegram
// identity and mints a session for it, seeding a new account's display name and
// language from the supplied Telegram fields (first contact only).
func (s *Server) handleTelegramAuth(c *gin.Context) {
var req telegramAuthRequest
if err := c.ShouldBindJSON(&req); err != nil || req.ExternalID == "" {
abortBadRequest(c, "external_id is required")
return
}
acc, created, err := s.accounts.ProvisionTelegram(c.Request.Context(), req.ExternalID, req.LanguageCode, req.Username, req.FirstName, req.BrowserTZ)
if err != nil {
s.abortErr(c, err)
return
}
if created {
// First registration: re-evaluate moderated-chat write access, so a user who
// joined the chat before registering is granted on the spot (no chat_member
// event fires on registration).
s.publishChatAccessChange(acc.ID)
}
s.mintSession(c, acc)
}
// pushTargetRequest asks for a user's out-of-app push routing data by account id.
type pushTargetRequest struct {
UserID string `json:"user_id"`
}
// pushTargetResponse carries what the gateway needs to route an out-of-app push:
// the recipient's Telegram external_id (empty when they have no Telegram
// identity, e.g. a guest or email-only account), the language the single bot renders
// the message in (the account's interface language), and whether they confined
// notifications to the in-app stream.
type pushTargetResponse struct {
ExternalID string `json:"external_id"`
Language string `json:"language"`
NotificationsInAppOnly bool `json:"notifications_in_app_only"`
}
// handlePushTarget resolves a user id to the data the gateway needs to deliver an
// out-of-app Telegram notification — the gateway-only internal counterpart of the
// in-app push stream. A user with no Telegram identity yields an empty external_id,
// which the gateway treats as "no out-of-app channel".
func (s *Server) handlePushTarget(c *gin.Context) {
var req pushTargetRequest
if err := c.ShouldBindJSON(&req); err != nil || req.UserID == "" {
abortBadRequest(c, "user_id is required")
return
}
uid, err := uuid.Parse(req.UserID)
if err != nil {
abortBadRequest(c, "user_id must be a uuid")
return
}
acc, err := s.accounts.GetByID(c.Request.Context(), uid)
if err != nil {
s.abortErr(c, err)
return
}
ext, err := s.accounts.IdentityExternalID(c.Request.Context(), uid, account.KindTelegram)
if err != nil && !errors.Is(err, account.ErrNotFound) {
s.abortErr(c, err)
return
}
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, pushTargetResponse{
ExternalID: ext,
Language: acc.PreferredLanguage,
NotificationsInAppOnly: acc.NotificationsInAppOnly,
})
}
// guestAuthRequest carries the guest bootstrap's optional time-zone seed: BrowserTZ
// (the client's detected "±HH:MM" UTC offset) is written to the new guest account's
// time zone, so robot timing is anchored to the player's zone from the first game.
type guestAuthRequest struct {
BrowserTZ string `json:"browser_tz"`
}
// handleGuestAuth provisions a fresh ephemeral guest account and mints a session,
// seeding its time zone from the optional detected browser offset.
func (s *Server) handleGuestAuth(c *gin.Context) {
// The body is optional: an absent or malformed one simply yields no time-zone seed
// (the account keeps the UTC default), so a bind error must not fail the bootstrap.
var req guestAuthRequest
_ = c.ShouldBindJSON(&req)
acc, err := s.accounts.ProvisionGuest(c.Request.Context(), req.BrowserTZ)
if err != nil {
s.abortErr(c, err)
return
}
s.mintSession(c, acc)
}
// emailRequest is an email-login code request. BrowserTZ (the client's detected
// "±HH:MM" UTC offset) seeds the time zone of an account provisioned here on first
// contact (the email account is created at the request step, not at login).
type emailRequest struct {
Email string `json:"email"`
BrowserTZ string `json:"browser_tz"`
}
// handleEmailRequest issues a login confirm-code to the email. It always reports
// success once the address is well-formed, so the response does not reveal
// whether an account already exists.
func (s *Server) handleEmailRequest(c *gin.Context) {
var req emailRequest
if err := c.ShouldBindJSON(&req); err != nil || req.Email == "" {
abortBadRequest(c, "email is required")
return
}
if _, err := s.emails.RequestLoginCode(c.Request.Context(), req.Email, req.BrowserTZ); err != nil {
s.abortErr(c, err)
return
}
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, okResponse{OK: true})
}
// emailLoginRequest verifies an email login code.
type emailLoginRequest struct {
Email string `json:"email"`
Code string `json:"code"`
}
// handleEmailLogin verifies the code and mints a session for the owning account.
func (s *Server) handleEmailLogin(c *gin.Context) {
var req emailLoginRequest
if err := c.ShouldBindJSON(&req); err != nil || req.Email == "" || req.Code == "" {
abortBadRequest(c, "email and code are required")
return
}
acc, err := s.emails.LoginWithCode(c.Request.Context(), req.Email, req.Code)
if err != nil {
s.abortErr(c, err)
return
}
s.mintSession(c, acc)
}
// tokenRequest carries an opaque session token.
type tokenRequest struct {
Token string `json:"token"`
}
// handleResolveSession resolves a token to its account id. The gateway calls it
// on a session-cache miss.
func (s *Server) handleResolveSession(c *gin.Context) {
var req tokenRequest
if err := c.ShouldBindJSON(&req); err != nil || req.Token == "" {
abortBadRequest(c, "token is required")
return
}
sess, err := s.sessions.Resolve(c.Request.Context(), req.Token)
if err != nil {
s.abortErr(c, err)
return
}
// is_guest is best-effort: a transient account read must not fail an otherwise
// valid resolve (the auth hot path), so a read error falls back to false; the
// per-operation backend gate remains the authoritative guest check.
resp := resolveResponse{UserID: sess.AccountID.String()}
if acc, err := s.accounts.GetByID(c.Request.Context(), sess.AccountID); err == nil {
resp.IsGuest = acc.IsGuest
}
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, resp)
}
// handleRevokeSession revokes the session for a token (idempotent).
func (s *Server) handleRevokeSession(c *gin.Context) {
var req tokenRequest
if err := c.ShouldBindJSON(&req); err != nil || req.Token == "" {
abortBadRequest(c, "token is required")
return
}
if err := s.sessions.Revoke(c.Request.Context(), req.Token); err != nil {
s.abortErr(c, err)
return
}
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, okResponse{OK: true})
}
// mintSession creates a session for acc and writes the credential response.
func (s *Server) mintSession(c *gin.Context, acc account.Account) {
token, _, err := s.sessions.Create(c.Request.Context(), acc.ID)
if err != nil {
s.abortErr(c, err)
return
}
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, sessionResponseFor(token, acc))
}