Ilia Denisov
860cfeb30f
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The gateway and bot run on distroless nonroot (UID 65532) and bind-mount the cert dir read-only, but gen-certs.sh wrote the keys 0600 (owner-only, the deploy user), so both crash-looped at boot with "open /certs/*.key: permission denied" and the deploy probe correctly failed (the contour's gateway was down). The .crt files were already 0644 (openssl default); make the leaf keys 0644 too so UID 65532 can read them. These are ephemeral TEST certificates regenerated every deploy on the trusted runner; prod keys come from PROD_ secrets. The CA private key stays 0600 (containers never read it).
69 lines
2.8 KiB
Bash
Executable File
69 lines
2.8 KiB
Bash
Executable File
#!/usr/bin/env bash
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# Generate the bot-link mTLS material for the TEST contour: a private CA, a gateway
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# server leaf and a bot client leaf. The gateway requires the leaf + the bot the
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# client leaf to bring up the reverse bot-link; the CA signs both so each peer trusts
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# only the other.
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#
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# Production certificates come from PROD_ secrets, NOT this script. Private keys never
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# leave the host/secrets; deploy/certs/ is gitignored. The script is idempotent: it
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# reuses an existing CA + leaves unless --force is passed (rotation re-mints the
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# leaves from the same long-lived CA).
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#
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# Usage:
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# deploy/gen-certs.sh [--force] [dir]
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# Env:
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# BOTLINK_GATEWAY_NAME gateway certificate SAN/CN (default: gateway, the compose
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# service name the bot dials in the test contour)
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set -euo pipefail
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force=0
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dir=""
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for arg in "$@"; do
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case "$arg" in
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--force) force=1 ;;
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*) dir="$arg" ;;
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esac
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done
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dir="${dir:-$(cd "$(dirname "$0")" && pwd)/certs}"
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gw_name="${BOTLINK_GATEWAY_NAME:-gateway}"
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mkdir -p "$dir"
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cd "$dir"
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if [[ -f gateway.crt && -f bot.crt && "$force" -ne 1 ]]; then
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echo "gen-certs: certificates already present in $dir (use --force to rotate the leaves)"
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exit 0
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fi
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# CA: long-lived (10y), reused across leaf rotations.
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if [[ ! -f ca.crt || ! -f ca.key ]]; then
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openssl req -x509 -newkey ec -pkeyopt ec_paramgen_curve:prime256v1 -nodes \
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-keyout ca.key -out ca.crt -days 3650 -subj "/CN=scrabble-botlink-ca"
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echo "gen-certs: created CA"
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fi
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# Gateway server leaf (SAN matches the name the bot dials).
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openssl req -newkey ec -pkeyopt ec_paramgen_curve:prime256v1 -nodes \
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-keyout gateway.key -out gateway.csr -subj "/CN=${gw_name}"
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openssl x509 -req -in gateway.csr -CA ca.crt -CAkey ca.key -CAcreateserial \
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-out gateway.crt -days 825 \
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-extfile <(printf "subjectAltName=DNS:%s,DNS:localhost\nextendedKeyUsage=serverAuth\nkeyUsage=critical,digitalSignature\n" "$gw_name")
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# Bot client leaf.
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openssl req -newkey ec -pkeyopt ec_paramgen_curve:prime256v1 -nodes \
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-keyout bot.key -out bot.csr -subj "/CN=scrabble-bot"
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openssl x509 -req -in bot.csr -CA ca.crt -CAkey ca.key -CAcreateserial \
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-out bot.crt -days 825 \
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-extfile <(printf "extendedKeyUsage=clientAuth\nkeyUsage=critical,digitalSignature\n")
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rm -f gateway.csr bot.csr ca.srl
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# The gateway and bot run on distroless **nonroot** (UID 65532) and bind-mount this
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# dir read-only; a key owned by the deploy user must still be readable by that UID, so
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# the leaves are world-readable (0644, like the .crt files). These are ephemeral
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# TEST certificates regenerated every deploy on the trusted runner host; production
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# keys come from PROD_ secrets, not this script. The CA key never enters a container —
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# keep it owner-only.
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chmod 644 ./ca.crt ./gateway.crt ./gateway.key ./bot.crt ./bot.key
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chmod 600 ./ca.key
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echo "gen-certs: wrote ca.crt, gateway.crt/key (CN=${gw_name}), bot.crt/key to $dir"
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