.gitea/workflows/ci.yaml

@@ -335,6 +335,9 @@ jobs:
           # for the server-side confidential code exchange — a SEPARATE VK app from the Mini
           # App above. One VK ID "Web" app serves every contour -> unprefixed secret.
           GATEWAY_VK_ID_CLIENT_SECRET: ${{ secrets.GATEWAY_VK_ID_CLIENT_SECRET }}
+          # Planted honeytoken bearer: presenting it flags the caller (logs + a ban metric on
+          # test where the IP ban is off; a 24h IP ban on prod). Per-contour secret; empty = trap off.
+          GATEWAY_HONEYTOKEN: ${{ secrets.TEST_GATEWAY_HONEYTOKEN }}
           # Signs the finished-game export download URLs (backend + compose interpolation).
           EXPORT_SIGN_KEY: ${{ secrets.TEST_EXPORT_SIGN_KEY }}
           # Transactional email via the shared Selectel relay: one account for every

.gitea/workflows/prod-deploy.yaml

@@ -98,6 +98,9 @@ jobs:
       # derived from PUBLIC_BASE_URL in deploy/write-prod-env.sh.
       VITE_VK_APP_ID: ${{ vars.VITE_VK_APP_ID }}
       GATEWAY_VK_ID_CLIENT_SECRET: ${{ secrets.GATEWAY_VK_ID_CLIENT_SECRET }}
+      # Planted honeytoken bearer: presenting it earns a 24h IP ban + a high-severity alarm.
+      # Per-contour secret; empty = trap off. Rendered by deploy/write-prod-env.sh.
+      GATEWAY_HONEYTOKEN: ${{ secrets.PROD_GATEWAY_HONEYTOKEN }}
       # Signs the finished-game export download URLs (backend BACKEND_EXPORT_SIGN_KEY).
       EXPORT_SIGN_KEY: ${{ secrets.PROD_EXPORT_SIGN_KEY }}
       # Transactional email via the shared Selectel relay (confirm-codes): one account for

.gitea/workflows/prod-rollback.yaml

@@ -63,6 +63,7 @@ jobs:
       GATEWAY_VK_APP_SECRET: ${{ secrets.GATEWAY_VK_APP_SECRET }}
       VITE_VK_APP_ID: ${{ vars.VITE_VK_APP_ID }}
       GATEWAY_VK_ID_CLIENT_SECRET: ${{ secrets.GATEWAY_VK_ID_CLIENT_SECRET }}
+      GATEWAY_HONEYTOKEN: ${{ secrets.PROD_GATEWAY_HONEYTOKEN }}
       EXPORT_SIGN_KEY: ${{ secrets.PROD_EXPORT_SIGN_KEY }}
       SMTP_RELAY_USER: ${{ secrets.SMTP_RELAY_USER }}
       SMTP_RELAY_PASS: ${{ secrets.SMTP_RELAY_PASS }}

deploy/.env.example

@@ -108,3 +108,10 @@ GATEWAY_VK_APP_SECRET=
 # the confidential OAuth 2.1 code exchange under this protected key. The app id + redirect URL
 # come from VITE_VK_APP_ID / VITE_VK_ID_REDIRECT_URL above. All three empty disables link.vk.*.
 GATEWAY_VK_ID_CLIENT_SECRET=
+
+# --- Gateway anti-abuse ------------------------------------------------------
+# Planted honeytoken bearer value: any request presenting it is flagged — a 24h IP ban
+# where the IP ban is on (prod), logs + a ban metric otherwise (test). Plant the value
+# somewhere an attacker would find it; empty disables the trap. Gitea
+# TEST_/PROD_GATEWAY_HONEYTOKEN (secret).
+GATEWAY_HONEYTOKEN=

deploy/README.md

@@ -111,6 +111,7 @@ without it Docker's resolver handles `otelcol`, `gateway` and `api.telegram.org`
 | `VITE_VK_ID_REDIRECT_URL` | derived | _(empty)_ | VK ID trusted redirect URL — must match the app's registered redirect exactly. The deploy derives `PUBLIC_BASE_URL + /app/` (used by the SPA and as the gateway's exchange `redirect_uri`); set it only for a local run. |
 | `GATEWAY_VK_APP_SECRET` | secret (shared) | _(empty)_ | The VK Mini App's protected key (`client_secret`): the gateway verifies the launch-parameter signature in-process under it (offline HMAC, no VK API call). Empty disables the VK auth path (`auth.vk`). One VK Mini App for all contours. |
 | `GATEWAY_VK_ID_CLIENT_SECRET` | secret (shared) | _(empty)_ | The VK ID "Web" app's protected key (`client_secret`) for the gateway's server-side confidential code exchange. A SEPARATE VK app from `GATEWAY_VK_APP_SECRET` (the Mini App). One VK ID "Web" app for all contours. |
+| `GATEWAY_HONEYTOKEN` | secret | _(empty)_ | Planted honeytoken bearer value: presenting it earns a 24h IP ban + a high-severity alarm where the IP ban is on (prod), or logs + a `gateway_abuse_banned_total{reason="honeytoken"}` metric (test, ban off). Plant the value somewhere an attacker would find it; empty disables the trap. Per-contour `TEST_`/`PROD_GATEWAY_HONEYTOKEN`. |
 | `VITE_GATEWAY_URL` | variable | _(empty)_ | UI build-arg: gateway origin; empty = same-origin (the usual single-origin deploy). |
 | `SMTP_RELAY_HOST` | variable (shared) | _(empty)_ | Selectel SMTP relay host for confirm-code email. Empty leaves the backend on the log mailer (email disabled) — the contour still boots. One relay for every contour (limit 100 msgs / 5 min). |
 | `SMTP_RELAY_PORT` | variable (shared) | `465` | Relay port. No client certificate is needed (the server cert is validated against the system roots). |
@@ -232,8 +233,9 @@ VITE_VK_APP_LINK, VITE_VK_APP_ID`. **Derived from `PUBLIC_BASE_URL` at deploy**
 **`PROD_` Gitea set** (per-contour, mirrors `TEST_`, mapped onto the unprefixed names above)
 — secrets:
 `PROD_{POSTGRES_PASSWORD, GM_BASICAUTH_HASH, GRAFANA_ADMIN_PASSWORD, TELEGRAM_BOT_TOKEN,
-TELEGRAM_PROMO_BOT_TOKEN, EXPORT_SIGN_KEY, REGISTRY_PASSWORD, SSH_KEY, SSH_KNOWN_HOSTS, BOTLINK_CA,
-BOTLINK_GATEWAY_CERT, BOTLINK_GATEWAY_KEY, BOTLINK_BOT_CERT, BOTLINK_BOT_KEY}`; variables:
+TELEGRAM_PROMO_BOT_TOKEN, EXPORT_SIGN_KEY, GATEWAY_HONEYTOKEN, REGISTRY_PASSWORD, SSH_KEY,
+SSH_KNOWN_HOSTS, BOTLINK_CA, BOTLINK_GATEWAY_CERT, BOTLINK_GATEWAY_KEY, BOTLINK_BOT_CERT,
+BOTLINK_BOT_KEY}`; variables:
 `PROD_{REGISTRY_USER, MAIN_HOST, TG_HOST, CADDY_SITE_ADDRESS, GM_BASICAUTH_USER, LOG_LEVEL,
 TELEGRAM_GAME_CHANNEL_ID, TELEGRAM_CHAT_ID, TELEGRAM_SUPPORT_CHAT_ID, TELEGRAM_BOT_USERNAME,
 VITE_TELEGRAM_BOT_ID, VITE_TELEGRAM_LINK, VITE_TELEGRAM_GAME_CHANNEL_NAME, SMTP_RELAY_FROM,

deploy/docker-compose.yml

@@ -231,8 +231,8 @@ services:
       # in prod — the test contour arrives as one shared NAT address, so a ban there
       # would be self-inflicted (the honeypot still logs). The prod deploy forces it on
       # in env.sh (deploy/write-prod-env.sh), not via a Gitea variable. GATEWAY_HONEYTOKEN
-      # is the planted bearer trap; it is currently unset on every contour (no Gitea entry
-      # feeds it), so the trap is inert until an operator wires a secret.
+      # is the planted bearer trap, fed from the per-contour TEST_/PROD_GATEWAY_HONEYTOKEN
+      # secret; empty (unset secret) leaves the trap off.
       GATEWAY_ABUSE_BAN_ENABLED: ${GATEWAY_ABUSE_BAN_ENABLED:-false}
       GATEWAY_HONEYTOKEN: ${GATEWAY_HONEYTOKEN:-}
       GATEWAY_LOG_LEVEL: ${LOG_LEVEL:-info}

deploy/write-prod-env.sh

@@ -71,5 +71,6 @@ export SERVICE_EMAIL='$SERVICE_EMAIL'
 export GRAFANA_SMTP_PORT='$GRAFANA_SMTP_PORT'
 export GF_SMTP_ENABLED='$GF_SMTP_ENABLED'
 export PUBLIC_BASE_URL='$PUBLIC_BASE_URL'
+export GATEWAY_HONEYTOKEN='$GATEWAY_HONEYTOKEN'
 export GATEWAY_ABUSE_BAN_ENABLED='true'
 EOF