Files
scrabble-game/gateway/internal/config/config.go
T
Ilia Denisov a8f78c7880
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feat(offline): implicit net-state model, two-tier version gate, unified lobby
Land the offline-model redesign (ANDROID_PLAN.md O1-O7): replace the explicit offline toggle with a single detected net-state machine, unify the lobby, and add a two-tier client-version gate. Contour-safe: both version vars empty => dormant, and the wire change is additive, so web/pwa/vk/tg behaviour is unchanged unless the gate is deliberately configured.

O1 pure net-state reducer (test-first). O2 reactive store + event wiring (connection/offline become thin shims; +@capacitor/network). O3 remove the offline toggle + migrate the pref. O4 two-tier gate: hard update_required degrades to an offline Update/Play-offline notice (not terminal); soft GATEWAY_RECOMMENDED_CLIENT_VERSION -> X-Update-Recommended nudge. O5 unified lobby (device-local + greyed-from-cache server games; self-set identity; closes G-step-0). O6 create flows (with-friends online/offline segment + offline dict guard). O7 docs (ARCHITECTURE, FUNCTIONAL +_ru, TESTING, deploy/README).

Also disable the manual android-build CI workflow for now (rename to .disabled); the Android APK release comes later.

Tests: gateway go green, svelte-check 0/0, vitest 617, e2e 122/122 (chromium + webkit).
2026-07-13 01:51:32 +02:00

447 lines
18 KiB
Go

// Package config loads and validates the gateway's runtime configuration from
// the process environment. Every variable is prefixed GATEWAY_.
package config
import (
"fmt"
"os"
"strconv"
"strings"
"time"
"scrabble/gateway/internal/clientver"
pkgtel "scrabble/pkg/telemetry"
)
// Config holds the gateway's runtime configuration.
type Config struct {
// HTTPAddr is the public Connect/h2c listener address (host:port). It also
// serves the admin console at /_gm when admin credentials are configured.
HTTPAddr string
// LogLevel is the zap log level: "debug", "info", "warn" or "error".
LogLevel string
// BackendHTTPURL is the base URL of the backend REST API (gateway -> backend).
BackendHTTPURL string
// BackendGRPCAddr is the backend push gRPC address the gateway subscribes to.
BackendGRPCAddr string
// BackendTimeout bounds a single backend REST call.
BackendTimeout time.Duration
// AdminUser and AdminPassword are the Basic-Auth credentials the gateway
// checks before proxying admin traffic to the backend. Empty disables admin.
AdminUser string
AdminPassword string
// ValidatorAddr is the gRPC address of the Telegram validator side-service (home,
// plaintext, internal). The gateway calls it to validate Mini App initData and
// Login Widget data. Empty disables the telegram auth path.
ValidatorAddr string
// VKAppSecret is the VK Mini App protected ("secure") key. The gateway verifies the
// VK launch-parameter signature in-process under it (a pure offline HMAC, no VK API
// round-trip). Empty disables the VK auth path (auth.vk is then unregistered).
VKAppSecret string
// VKID configures the VK ID web login used to link a VK identity from a browser
// (the confidential OAuth 2.1 code exchange against id.vk.com). It belongs to a
// separate VK "Web" app from VKAppSecret's Mini App, so its credentials are distinct.
// Any field empty disables the VK web-link ops (link.vk.*).
VKID VKIDConfig
// BotLink configures the reverse mTLS channel to the remote Telegram bot. An
// empty BotLink.Addr disables the bot channel (out-of-app push and admin relay).
BotLink BotLinkConfig
// SessionTTL bounds how long a resolved session stays cached; SessionCacheMax
// caps the number of cached sessions.
SessionTTL time.Duration
SessionCacheMax int
// PushHeartbeatInterval is the idle keep-alive cadence on a client live stream.
PushHeartbeatInterval time.Duration
// MaxBodyBytes caps one inbound request body on the public listener and one
// Connect message read; oversized requests are refused without buffering.
MaxBodyBytes int
// MinClientVersion, when non-empty, is the lowest client version (MAJOR.MINOR.PATCH)
// the edge serves. A client reporting an older X-Client-Version is turned away with an
// "update required" signal before its payload is decoded. Empty leaves the gate dormant
// (every client is served) — the default for web-only deployments.
MinClientVersion string
// RecommendedClientVersion, when non-empty, is the version below which a served client is nudged
// to update — a non-blocking "update available" signal (the X-Update-Recommended response header)
// on gated responses; the call still succeeds. It must be at least MinClientVersion. Empty leaves
// the soft tier off (the default); it does not affect the hard MinClientVersion gate.
RecommendedClientVersion string
// RateLimit configures the in-memory anti-abuse limiter.
RateLimit RateLimitConfig
// Abuse configures the temporary IP ban and the honeytoken (prod-only).
Abuse AbuseConfig
// Blocklist configures the community IP blocklist (Spamhaus DROP) enforced at the edge (prod-only).
Blocklist BlocklistConfig
// Telemetry configures the OpenTelemetry providers (shared bootstrap).
Telemetry pkgtel.Config
}
// BotLinkConfig configures the gateway's reverse bot-link: the mTLS listener the
// remote Telegram bot dials, the plaintext listener the backend admin relay calls,
// and the mTLS material. The main host is already public, so exposing the bot-link
// listener on a dedicated port adds no static IP; the channel is guarded solely by
// mTLS (the bot has no fixed address to allow-list).
type BotLinkConfig struct {
// Addr is the mTLS gRPC listener the bot dials (e.g. ":9443"). Empty disables
// the whole bot channel.
Addr string
// RelayAddr is the plaintext internal gRPC listener that serves the backend
// admin SendToUser/SendToGameChannel relay (e.g. ":9092"). Empty disables it.
RelayAddr string
// CertFile, KeyFile and CAFile are the gateway server certificate, its key and
// the CA bundle that signs the accepted bot client certificates. Required when
// Addr is set.
CertFile string
KeyFile string
CAFile string
// SendTimeout bounds the admin relay's wait for the bot Ack before reporting
// the send as not delivered.
SendTimeout time.Duration
}
// RateLimitConfig holds the token-bucket limits per class. Public and admin are
// keyed per client IP; the authenticated class is keyed per user id; the email
// sub-limit guards the costly email-code path per IP.
type RateLimitConfig struct {
PublicPerMinute int
PublicBurst int
UserPerMinute int
UserBurst int
AdminPerMinute int
AdminBurst int
EmailPer10Min int
EmailBurst int
}
// AbuseConfig configures the gateway's temporary IP ban (fail2ban-style) and the
// honeytoken trap. BanEnabled gates the ban action and is off by default: it is
// only safe where the real client IP is visible (i.e. in prod, not behind the
// shared-NAT test contour). Detection of honeypot/honeytoken hits is logged
// regardless of BanEnabled — only the ban action is gated.
type AbuseConfig struct {
// BanEnabled turns the IP ban on. Off by default (prod-only).
BanEnabled bool
// BanThreshold is the rate-limiter rejection count within BanWindow that bans
// a client IP.
BanThreshold int
// BanWindow is the rolling window the rejection strikes accumulate over.
BanWindow time.Duration
// BanDuration is the length of a rejection-earned ban (tripwire and honeytoken
// bans use their own, longer, fixed durations).
BanDuration time.Duration
// Honeytoken, when non-empty, is a planted bearer value: presenting it bans the
// caller and raises a high-severity alarm. Empty disables the trap.
Honeytoken string
}
// Defaults applied when the corresponding environment variable is unset.
const (
defaultAbuseBanThreshold = 100
defaultAbuseBanWindow = 2 * time.Minute
defaultAbuseBanDuration = 15 * time.Minute
defaultHTTPAddr = ":8081"
defaultLogLevel = "info"
defaultBackendHTTPURL = "http://localhost:8080"
defaultBackendGRPCAddr = "localhost:9090"
defaultBackendTimeout = 5 * time.Second
defaultSessionTTL = 10 * time.Minute
defaultSessionCacheMax = 50000
defaultPushHeartbeatInterval = 10 * time.Second // under the ~15 s edge idle timeout
defaultServiceName = "scrabble-gateway"
defaultBotLinkSendTimeout = 5 * time.Second
)
// DefaultMaxBodyBytes is the default request-body cap (GATEWAY_MAX_BODY_BYTES):
// 1 MiB — far above any legitimate edge payload (drafts and chat are a few KB)
// yet small enough to stop a cheap memory-amplification upload.
const DefaultMaxBodyBytes = 1 << 20
// DefaultRateLimit returns the built-in anti-abuse limits.
func DefaultRateLimit() RateLimitConfig {
return RateLimitConfig{
PublicPerMinute: 30, PublicBurst: 10,
// Per-user (not per-IP): one user may run several devices, each holding a
// Subscribe stream and reloading state on every live event, so the authenticated
// budget is generous (a per-user cap cannot DoS the service). It is raised
// because multi-device play tripped the old 120/40.
UserPerMinute: 300, UserBurst: 80,
AdminPerMinute: 60, AdminBurst: 20,
EmailPer10Min: 5, EmailBurst: 2,
}
}
// DefaultAbuse returns the built-in anti-abuse settings: the ban disabled
// (prod-only) with the agreed thresholds, and no honeytoken.
func DefaultAbuse() AbuseConfig {
return AbuseConfig{
BanEnabled: false,
BanThreshold: defaultAbuseBanThreshold,
BanWindow: defaultAbuseBanWindow,
BanDuration: defaultAbuseBanDuration,
}
}
// BlocklistConfig configures the community IP blocklist (a curated CIDR feed such as Spamhaus DROP)
// enforced at the edge alongside the fail2ban ban. Disabled by default and prod-only, for the same
// reason as the ban: it is only safe where the real client IP is visible (not behind the shared-NAT
// test contour). Only IPv4 is matched.
type BlocklistConfig struct {
// Enabled turns edge blocklisting on. Off by default (prod-only).
Enabled bool
// URL is the CIDR feed to fetch (e.g. the Spamhaus DROP list). Required when Enabled; the
// operator sets it explicitly so no feed URL is assumed.
URL string
// Refresh is how often the feed is re-fetched.
Refresh time.Duration
// MaxStaleness is how long a stale feed (no successful refresh) is tolerated before it is dropped
// (fail-open — a legitimate client is never blocked on a frozen feed).
MaxStaleness time.Duration
// Allow is the never-block set: CIDRs or bare IPs (own infrastructure, monitoring, known-good) that
// the feed can never block. Parsed at startup.
Allow []string
}
// Blocklist defaults; the feed URL has no default (the operator sets it).
const (
defaultBlocklistRefresh = 6 * time.Hour
defaultBlocklistMaxStaleness = 48 * time.Hour
)
// DefaultBlocklist returns the built-in blocklist settings: disabled (prod-only), no feed URL, and
// the agreed refresh / staleness windows.
func DefaultBlocklist() BlocklistConfig {
return BlocklistConfig{
Enabled: false,
Refresh: defaultBlocklistRefresh,
MaxStaleness: defaultBlocklistMaxStaleness,
}
}
// VKIDConfig holds the VK ID web-login credentials for the confidential
// authorization-code exchange. AppID is the VK "Web" app's client id; ClientSecret is
// its protected key; RedirectURI must exactly match the trusted redirect URL registered
// with the app and the one the frontend uses. All three are required to enable the flow.
type VKIDConfig struct {
AppID string
ClientSecret string
RedirectURI string
}
// Enabled reports whether VK ID web login is fully configured. When false the gateway
// leaves the VK web-link ops (link.vk.*) unregistered.
func (c VKIDConfig) Enabled() bool {
return c.AppID != "" && c.ClientSecret != "" && c.RedirectURI != ""
}
// Load reads the configuration from the environment, applies defaults, and
// validates the result.
func Load() (Config, error) {
var err error
c := Config{
HTTPAddr: envOr("GATEWAY_HTTP_ADDR", defaultHTTPAddr),
LogLevel: envOr("GATEWAY_LOG_LEVEL", defaultLogLevel),
BackendHTTPURL: envOr("GATEWAY_BACKEND_HTTP_URL", defaultBackendHTTPURL),
BackendGRPCAddr: envOr("GATEWAY_BACKEND_GRPC_ADDR", defaultBackendGRPCAddr),
AdminUser: os.Getenv("GATEWAY_ADMIN_USER"),
AdminPassword: os.Getenv("GATEWAY_ADMIN_PASSWORD"),
ValidatorAddr: os.Getenv("GATEWAY_VALIDATOR_ADDR"),
VKAppSecret: os.Getenv("GATEWAY_VK_APP_SECRET"),
MinClientVersion: os.Getenv("GATEWAY_MIN_CLIENT_VERSION"),
RecommendedClientVersion: os.Getenv("GATEWAY_RECOMMENDED_CLIENT_VERSION"),
VKID: VKIDConfig{
AppID: os.Getenv("GATEWAY_VK_ID_APP_ID"),
ClientSecret: os.Getenv("GATEWAY_VK_ID_CLIENT_SECRET"),
RedirectURI: os.Getenv("GATEWAY_VK_ID_REDIRECT_URL"),
},
SessionCacheMax: defaultSessionCacheMax,
RateLimit: DefaultRateLimit(),
Abuse: DefaultAbuse(),
Blocklist: DefaultBlocklist(),
BotLink: BotLinkConfig{
Addr: os.Getenv("GATEWAY_BOTLINK_ADDR"),
RelayAddr: os.Getenv("GATEWAY_BOTLINK_RELAY_ADDR"),
CertFile: os.Getenv("GATEWAY_BOTLINK_TLS_CERT"),
KeyFile: os.Getenv("GATEWAY_BOTLINK_TLS_KEY"),
CAFile: os.Getenv("GATEWAY_BOTLINK_TLS_CA"),
},
}
tel := pkgtel.DefaultConfig(defaultServiceName)
tel.ServiceName = envOr("GATEWAY_SERVICE_NAME", tel.ServiceName)
tel.TracesExporter = envOr("GATEWAY_OTEL_TRACES_EXPORTER", tel.TracesExporter)
tel.MetricsExporter = envOr("GATEWAY_OTEL_METRICS_EXPORTER", tel.MetricsExporter)
c.Telemetry = tel
if c.BackendTimeout, err = envDuration("GATEWAY_BACKEND_TIMEOUT", defaultBackendTimeout); err != nil {
return Config{}, err
}
if c.SessionTTL, err = envDuration("GATEWAY_SESSION_TTL", defaultSessionTTL); err != nil {
return Config{}, err
}
if c.SessionCacheMax, err = envInt("GATEWAY_SESSION_CACHE_MAX", defaultSessionCacheMax); err != nil {
return Config{}, err
}
if c.PushHeartbeatInterval, err = envDuration("GATEWAY_PUSH_HEARTBEAT_INTERVAL", defaultPushHeartbeatInterval); err != nil {
return Config{}, err
}
if c.MaxBodyBytes, err = envInt("GATEWAY_MAX_BODY_BYTES", DefaultMaxBodyBytes); err != nil {
return Config{}, err
}
c.Abuse.Honeytoken = os.Getenv("GATEWAY_HONEYTOKEN")
if c.Abuse.BanEnabled, err = envBool("GATEWAY_ABUSE_BAN_ENABLED", c.Abuse.BanEnabled); err != nil {
return Config{}, err
}
if c.Abuse.BanThreshold, err = envInt("GATEWAY_ABUSE_BAN_THRESHOLD", c.Abuse.BanThreshold); err != nil {
return Config{}, err
}
if c.Abuse.BanWindow, err = envDuration("GATEWAY_ABUSE_BAN_WINDOW", c.Abuse.BanWindow); err != nil {
return Config{}, err
}
if c.Abuse.BanDuration, err = envDuration("GATEWAY_ABUSE_BAN_DURATION", c.Abuse.BanDuration); err != nil {
return Config{}, err
}
if c.Blocklist.Enabled, err = envBool("GATEWAY_BLOCKLIST_ENABLED", c.Blocklist.Enabled); err != nil {
return Config{}, err
}
c.Blocklist.URL = os.Getenv("GATEWAY_BLOCKLIST_URL")
if c.Blocklist.Refresh, err = envDuration("GATEWAY_BLOCKLIST_REFRESH", c.Blocklist.Refresh); err != nil {
return Config{}, err
}
if c.Blocklist.MaxStaleness, err = envDuration("GATEWAY_BLOCKLIST_MAX_STALENESS", c.Blocklist.MaxStaleness); err != nil {
return Config{}, err
}
c.Blocklist.Allow = splitList(os.Getenv("GATEWAY_BLOCKLIST_ALLOW"))
if c.BotLink.SendTimeout, err = envDuration("GATEWAY_BOTLINK_SEND_TIMEOUT", defaultBotLinkSendTimeout); err != nil {
return Config{}, err
}
if err := c.validate(); err != nil {
return Config{}, err
}
return c, nil
}
// BotLinkEnabled reports whether the reverse bot-link channel is configured.
func (c Config) BotLinkEnabled() bool { return c.BotLink.Addr != "" }
// AdminEnabled reports whether the admin console proxy should be mounted (both
// Basic-Auth credentials are configured).
func (c Config) AdminEnabled() bool {
return c.AdminUser != "" && c.AdminPassword != ""
}
// validate reports whether the configuration values are acceptable.
func (c Config) validate() error {
switch c.LogLevel {
case "debug", "info", "warn", "error":
default:
return fmt.Errorf("config: invalid GATEWAY_LOG_LEVEL %q", c.LogLevel)
}
if c.HTTPAddr == "" {
return fmt.Errorf("config: GATEWAY_HTTP_ADDR must not be empty")
}
if c.BackendHTTPURL == "" {
return fmt.Errorf("config: GATEWAY_BACKEND_HTTP_URL must not be empty")
}
if c.BackendGRPCAddr == "" {
return fmt.Errorf("config: GATEWAY_BACKEND_GRPC_ADDR must not be empty")
}
if c.MaxBodyBytes <= 0 {
return fmt.Errorf("config: GATEWAY_MAX_BODY_BYTES must be positive")
}
if c.MinClientVersion != "" {
if _, ok := clientver.Parse(c.MinClientVersion); !ok {
return fmt.Errorf("config: GATEWAY_MIN_CLIENT_VERSION %q is not a MAJOR.MINOR.PATCH version", c.MinClientVersion)
}
}
if c.RecommendedClientVersion != "" {
rec, ok := clientver.Parse(c.RecommendedClientVersion)
if !ok {
return fmt.Errorf("config: GATEWAY_RECOMMENDED_CLIENT_VERSION %q is not a MAJOR.MINOR.PATCH version", c.RecommendedClientVersion)
}
// The soft tier must sit at or above the hard minimum: a recommended below the minimum is a
// misconfiguration (every client below min is already turned away). An empty/unparseable
// minimum imposes no lower bound, so the recommended may stand alone.
if min, ok := clientver.Parse(c.MinClientVersion); ok && clientver.Less(rec, min) {
return fmt.Errorf("config: GATEWAY_RECOMMENDED_CLIENT_VERSION %q must be >= GATEWAY_MIN_CLIENT_VERSION %q", c.RecommendedClientVersion, c.MinClientVersion)
}
}
if c.Abuse.BanEnabled && (c.Abuse.BanThreshold <= 0 || c.Abuse.BanWindow <= 0 || c.Abuse.BanDuration <= 0) {
return fmt.Errorf("config: GATEWAY_ABUSE_BAN_THRESHOLD/_WINDOW/_DURATION must be positive when GATEWAY_ABUSE_BAN_ENABLED")
}
if c.Blocklist.Enabled && (c.Blocklist.URL == "" || c.Blocklist.Refresh <= 0 || c.Blocklist.MaxStaleness <= 0) {
return fmt.Errorf("config: GATEWAY_BLOCKLIST_URL must be set and _REFRESH/_MAX_STALENESS positive when GATEWAY_BLOCKLIST_ENABLED")
}
if c.BotLink.Addr != "" {
if c.BotLink.CertFile == "" || c.BotLink.KeyFile == "" || c.BotLink.CAFile == "" {
return fmt.Errorf("config: GATEWAY_BOTLINK_ADDR requires GATEWAY_BOTLINK_TLS_CERT, _KEY and _CA")
}
}
if err := c.Telemetry.Validate(); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("config: %w", err)
}
return nil
}
// envOr returns the value of the environment variable named key, or fallback
// when the variable is unset or empty.
func envOr(key, fallback string) string {
if v := os.Getenv(key); v != "" {
return v
}
return fallback
}
// splitList splits a comma-separated environment value into trimmed, non-empty items.
func splitList(v string) []string {
if v == "" {
return nil
}
parts := strings.Split(v, ",")
out := make([]string, 0, len(parts))
for _, p := range parts {
if p = strings.TrimSpace(p); p != "" {
out = append(out, p)
}
}
return out
}
// envBool parses the environment variable named key as a bool, returning fallback
// when it is unset and an error when it is set but malformed.
func envBool(key string, fallback bool) (bool, error) {
v := os.Getenv(key)
if v == "" {
return fallback, nil
}
b, err := strconv.ParseBool(v)
if err != nil {
return false, fmt.Errorf("config: %s: %w", key, err)
}
return b, nil
}
// envInt parses the environment variable named key as an int, returning fallback
// when it is unset and an error when it is set but malformed.
func envInt(key string, fallback int) (int, error) {
v := os.Getenv(key)
if v == "" {
return fallback, nil
}
n, err := strconv.Atoi(v)
if err != nil {
return 0, fmt.Errorf("config: %s: %w", key, err)
}
return n, nil
}
// envDuration parses the environment variable named key as a Go duration,
// returning fallback when it is unset and an error when it is set but malformed.
func envDuration(key string, fallback time.Duration) (time.Duration, error) {
v := os.Getenv(key)
if v == "" {
return fallback, nil
}
d, err := time.ParseDuration(v)
if err != nil {
return 0, fmt.Errorf("config: %s: %w", key, err)
}
return d, nil
}