Files
scrabble-game/gateway/internal/vkauth/vkauth.go
T
Ilia Denisov 92633f935e
CI / changes (pull_request) Successful in 2s
CI / unit (pull_request) Successful in 11s
CI / integration (pull_request) Successful in 18s
CI / ui (pull_request) Successful in 1m7s
CI / conformance (pull_request) Successful in 10s
CI / gate (pull_request) Successful in 0s
CI / deploy (pull_request) Successful in 1m42s
feat(payments): trusted platform signal on the session
Record the execution platform (kind vk|telegram|direct + device subtype
ios|android|web) on each session, captured at creation and carried
gateway->backend as a trusted X-Platform header, so the upcoming
store-compliance gate has an unforgeable execution context.

- backend.sessions gains nullable platform_kind/platform_subtype columns
  (migration 00011, CHECK-constrained, jet regenerated); session.Platform
  captures them at mint, resolve returns them, middleware exposes platform(c).
  kind is derived from the establish endpoint, never a client field; the
  account-merge session mint inherits the caller's platform.
- gateway derives the platform (VK subtype from the signed vk_platform via
  vkauth, Telegram/direct best-effort from the client) and injects X-Platform
  on every authenticated backend call through the request context.
- ui submits a best-effort device subtype on the telegram/guest/email login
  requests (new FBS subtype field); VK is server-derived from the signed params.
- an unattributed session is untrusted (view-only); VK/TG self-heal on the next
  cold-start re-mint, direct/email on re-login.

Signal plumbing only, no user-visible change; X-Platform is inert until the
gate consumes it.
2026-07-08 03:31:51 +02:00

91 lines
3.5 KiB
Go

// Package vkauth verifies VK Mini App launch parameters in-process. VK signs the
// launch query string with the app's protected ("secure") key; the gateway holds that
// secret (GATEWAY_VK_APP_SECRET) and validates the `sign` itself rather than calling a
// side-service, because the check is a pure offline HMAC with no VK API round-trip
// (unlike the Telegram validator, which lives in a separate process to isolate the bot
// token). See docs/ARCHITECTURE.md §12.
package vkauth
import (
"crypto/hmac"
"crypto/sha256"
"crypto/subtle"
"encoding/base64"
"errors"
"net/url"
"strings"
)
// ErrInvalid is returned when launch params fail signature verification, are
// malformed, carry no signed vk_* parameters, or lack the vk_user_id.
var ErrInvalid = errors.New("vkauth: invalid vk launch params")
// Identity is the user extracted from verified VK launch params. ExternalID is the
// vk_user_id used as the identities external_id; Language is the vk_language hint that
// seeds a brand-new account's preferred language; Platform is the raw signed
// vk_platform value (e.g. "mobile_iphone", "desktop_web"), from which Subtype derives
// the trusted device family.
type Identity struct {
ExternalID string
Language string
Platform string
}
// Subtype maps the signed vk_platform to the trusted device family recorded on the
// session — ios (iPhone/iPad, the store-frozen case), android, or web (desktop/mobile
// web and anything unrecognised). Because vk_platform rides inside the verified
// signature, this subtype is trustworthy, unlike a client-reported one.
func (i Identity) Subtype() string {
switch {
case strings.Contains(i.Platform, "android"):
return "android"
case strings.Contains(i.Platform, "iphone"), strings.Contains(i.Platform, "ipad"):
return "ios"
default:
return "web"
}
}
// Verify checks the `sign` of a VK Mini App launch query string against secret and
// returns the launching user's identity. Per VK's documented algorithm the signature
// is HMAC-SHA256 over the vk_*-prefixed parameters — sorted by key and serialized as a
// URL-encoded query string (url.Values.Encode mirrors VK's reference serialization for
// the constrained launch-parameter charset) — under the app secret, then base64url
// without padding; the comparison is constant-time.
//
// VK launch params carry no built-in expiry (unlike Telegram's auth_date), so freshness
// is deliberately not enforced here: the gateway mints its own short-lived session, and
// a replay only re-authenticates the same vk_user_id.
func Verify(params, secret string) (Identity, error) {
values, err := url.ParseQuery(params)
if err != nil {
return Identity{}, ErrInvalid
}
sign := values.Get("sign")
if sign == "" {
return Identity{}, ErrInvalid
}
// Only vk_*-prefixed parameters are signed; any other query parameter the client
// appended is outside the signature and must be excluded from the check.
signed := url.Values{}
for k, v := range values {
if strings.HasPrefix(k, "vk_") {
signed[k] = v
}
}
if len(signed) == 0 {
return Identity{}, ErrInvalid
}
mac := hmac.New(sha256.New, []byte(secret))
mac.Write([]byte(signed.Encode()))
want := base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(mac.Sum(nil))
if subtle.ConstantTimeCompare([]byte(want), []byte(sign)) != 1 {
return Identity{}, ErrInvalid
}
externalID := values.Get("vk_user_id")
if externalID == "" {
return Identity{}, ErrInvalid
}
return Identity{ExternalID: externalID, Language: values.Get("vk_language"), Platform: values.Get("vk_platform")}, nil
}