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scrabble-game/backend/internal/payments/service_intake.go
T
Ilia Denisov 4cac09c9f3
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fix(payments): drop the notification sender-IP gate; re-check on its own cadence
A real test payment on the contour exposed both problems at once. YooKassa
delivered the notification five times; all five were rejected because the
backend saw the sender as 10.77.0.1 — the contour sits behind a tunnel and
cannot observe real client addresses, the same reason the IP bans in this
repository are prod-only. The chips were not lost (the reconcile sweep would
have credited them), but the primary path was dead and the customer was left
watching an unchanged balance.

The address check is removed rather than made conditional. It never was the
security boundary — the confirming GET /v3/payments/{id} is — and the one thing
it bought is already bought earlier and far more tightly: the order is resolved
from the notification's metadata *before* any provider call, so a notification
naming no known order costs a single indexed read and stops there. Guessing a
live order id means guessing a uuid. Against that, an address check adds nothing
and breaks every deployment that cannot see real client addresses, while turning
any future change to YooKassa's published ranges into a silent degradation.

The second problem was mine. The reconcile threshold was keyed off the order
lifetime, so a lost notification cost the customer the full 30-minute TTL before
the chips landed. Those are different questions: the lifetime governs how long a
customer may take to pay, the re-check governs how soon we notice a lost
callback. Split apart — `payments.ReconcileAfter`, one minute, swept on every
reaper tick. The bound D49 was chosen for survives: the calls one order can
cause are still its lifetime divided by the sweep interval, a handful, not an
open-ended poll. Worst case for a failed notification drops from ~30 minutes to
~5; an order the customer is still paying for is left alone.

Tests: the foreign-sender test is replaced by the two properties that now carry
the load — a notification naming an unknown order makes no provider call at all,
and a genuine notification is honoured whatever address it appears to come from.
Plus one pinning that a seconds-old order is not polled.

The shared bundle budget goes 31 -> 32 KB, with the reason recorded in the
script header: every user-visible string lands in that chunk and it had been
sitting 40 bytes under the cap.

Decisions D48 and D49 revised.
2026-07-28 12:00:03 +02:00

324 lines
15 KiB
Go

package payments
import (
"context"
"errors"
"fmt"
"time"
"github.com/google/uuid"
)
// OrderResult is what CreateOrder returns to the transport: the created order id and the details a
// provider launch payload needs — the amount to charge and a human title for the payment.
type OrderResult struct {
OrderID uuid.UUID
Amount Money
Title string
}
// CreateOrder opens a pending order to fund a chip pack in the execution context's payment method,
// tagged with the provider that will settle it. It gate-checks the context (trusted, not the
// VK-iOS spend freeze) and that the method's funding segment is attached, prices the pack in the
// method's currency, then writes the order. The caller enforces any account-level precondition
// (e.g. the direct email anchor, D36) before calling — payments holds no cross-schema identity
// knowledge.
func (s *Service) CreateOrder(ctx context.Context, accountID uuid.UUID, cxt Context, present []Source, productID uuid.UUID, provider string) (OrderResult, error) {
if !cxt.Trusted() || cxt.vkFrozen() {
return OrderResult{}, ErrUntrusted
}
method := cxt.Kind
if !has(present, method) {
return OrderResult{}, ErrUntrusted // the funding segment is not attached to the account
}
pack, err := s.store.loadPackForOrder(ctx, productID, method)
if err != nil {
return OrderResult{}, err
}
orderID, err := uuid.NewV7()
if err != nil {
return OrderResult{}, fmt.Errorf("payments: order id: %w", err)
}
o := newOrder{
orderID: orderID,
accountID: accountID,
platform: string(method),
productID: productID,
amount: pack.price,
origin: method,
provider: provider,
shop: directShop(cxt),
}
if err := s.store.createOrder(ctx, o, s.clock()); err != nil {
return OrderResult{}, err
}
return OrderResult{OrderID: orderID, Amount: pack.price, Title: pack.title}, nil
}
// directShop returns the merchant shop (channel) a direct order is issued through — the trusted
// platform subtype for the direct rail ("web"/"android"), or "" for any other rail (the per-shop
// split is direct-only; D42/D44). Recorded on the order for the admin per-channel breakdown.
func directShop(cxt Context) string {
if cxt.Kind == SourceDirect {
return cxt.Subtype
}
return ""
}
// AttachProviderPayment records the provider's own payment identifier on a pending order, right
// after the provider mints it and before the customer has paid. Two later paths depend on it: the
// reconcile sweep, which asks the provider what became of an order no callback ever confirmed, and a
// refund, which must address the original payment. It does not credit anything and does not change
// the order status.
func (s *Service) AttachProviderPayment(ctx context.Context, orderID uuid.UUID, provider, providerPaymentID string) error {
return s.store.attachProviderPayment(ctx, orderID, provider, providerPaymentID, s.clock())
}
// OrderRef identifies a stored order to a provider: which rail settles it, that rail's own payment
// id, the merchant shop channel it was issued through, and the amount and account it belongs to. It
// is what the reconcile sweep and the refund path need without giving them the whole order.
type OrderRef struct {
OrderID uuid.UUID
AccountID uuid.UUID
Provider string
PaymentID string
Shop string
Amount Money
Status string
}
// orderRef projects a stored order onto an OrderRef.
func orderRef(o orderRow) (OrderRef, error) {
amount, err := MoneyFromMinor(o.expectedAmount, Currency(o.currency))
if err != nil {
return OrderRef{}, err
}
return OrderRef{
OrderID: o.orderID,
AccountID: o.accountID,
Provider: o.provider,
PaymentID: o.paymentID,
Shop: o.shop,
Amount: amount,
Status: o.status,
}, nil
}
// OrderProviderRef reads how an order reaches its provider — the rail, that rail's payment id and
// the shop it was issued through. The refund path uses it to call the right merchant account.
func (s *Service) OrderProviderRef(ctx context.Context, orderID uuid.UUID) (OrderRef, error) {
o, err := s.store.orderByID(ctx, orderID)
if err != nil {
return OrderRef{}, err
}
return orderRef(o)
}
// OrderByProviderPayment reads the order a provider's payment id belongs to. It resolves a provider
// event that names only its own payment — such as a refund notification — back to an order.
func (s *Service) OrderByProviderPayment(ctx context.Context, provider, providerPaymentID string) (OrderRef, error) {
o, err := s.store.orderByProviderPayment(ctx, provider, providerPaymentID)
if err != nil {
return OrderRef{}, err
}
return orderRef(o)
}
// reconcileBatch bounds one reconcile sweep, so a backlog cannot turn a periodic tick into a long
// run of provider calls.
const reconcileBatch = 50
// ReconcileAfter is how old a pending order must be before the provider is asked what became of it.
// It is deliberately NOT the order lifetime: that governs when an unpaid order is written off, which
// answers "how long may a customer take to pay", a different question from "how soon should we
// notice a lost callback". Tying the two together would make a customer wait a full lifetime for
// chips whenever the notification path fails. A minute is long enough that an order the customer is
// still paying for is not polled, and short enough that a failure costs minutes, not half an hour.
const ReconcileAfter = time.Minute
// PendingForReconcile returns the pending orders old enough to re-check that carry a provider payment
// id — the ones where the money may well have moved but no callback ever told us. The caller asks the
// provider for each one's real outcome. Orders that never reached a payment are not returned: there
// is nothing to ask about, and neither are orders younger than ReconcileAfter, so an order the
// customer is still paying for is left alone.
//
// The sweep repeats until the order settles or is written off, which bounds the provider calls one
// order can cause to its lifetime divided by the sweep interval — a handful, not an open-ended poll.
func (s *Service) PendingForReconcile(ctx context.Context) ([]OrderRef, error) {
rows, err := s.store.pendingForReconcile(ctx, int(ReconcileAfter.Seconds()), s.clock(), reconcileBatch)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
out := make([]OrderRef, 0, len(rows))
for _, r := range rows {
ref, err := orderRef(r)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
out = append(out, ref)
}
return out, nil
}
// OrderItem returns a pending order's human title and the amount it charges, in the order's own
// currency — the details a provider's item-lookup phase needs (VK's get_item). It reads the order
// and the pack title, honouring the pack even if it was later deactivated (mirrors Fund).
func (s *Service) OrderItem(ctx context.Context, orderID uuid.UUID) (title string, amount Money, err error) {
ord, err := s.store.orderByID(ctx, orderID)
if err != nil {
return "", Money{}, err
}
_, title, err = s.store.packForCredit(ctx, ord.productID)
if err != nil {
return "", Money{}, err
}
amount, err = MoneyFromMinor(ord.expectedAmount, Currency(ord.currency))
if err != nil {
return "", Money{}, err
}
return title, amount, nil
}
// Fund credits a paid order into its funded segment exactly once, from a verified provider callback
// — the single writer for every rail. It matches the order, verifies the paid amount, appends the
// fund ledger row (idempotent on (provider, provider_payment_id)), credits the balance and marks
// the order paid. A duplicate callback returns AlreadyCredited without a second credit; a valid
// callback is honoured even on an expired order (§9/D23).
func (s *Service) Fund(ctx context.Context, orderID uuid.UUID, provider, providerPaymentID string, paid Money) (FundOutcome, error) {
return s.store.fund(ctx, orderID, provider, providerPaymentID, paid, s.clock())
}
// Refund reverses a paid order's credit best-effort, exactly once — for an external refund or an
// admin-initiated one (E7). It revokes the funded chips floored at 0 (never negative, D27), records
// any unrecoverable remainder as a per-account loss and abuse flag, and appends a refund ledger row
// idempotent on (provider, providerRefundID) — distinct from the fund's payment id. A duplicate
// refund returns AlreadyRefunded. The caller records the refunded payment event and performs any
// provider-side money-back (the rails have no unsolicited refund push: Robokassa via its refund API
// / cabinet, VK via support, Telegram via refundStarPayment — all admin-triggered).
func (s *Service) Refund(ctx context.Context, orderID uuid.UUID, provider, providerRefundID string, refunded Money) (RefundOutcome, error) {
return s.store.refund(ctx, orderID, provider, providerRefundID, refunded, s.clock())
}
// Pre-checkout decline reason codes. They are language-neutral: the transport layer localises them
// to the order account's preferred language before showing the payer (the reason is displayed in the
// Telegram payment sheet).
const (
// PreCheckoutGone means no order matches — an unknown or stale invoice payload.
PreCheckoutGone = "order_gone"
// PreCheckoutAlreadyPaid means the order is already paid (a reusable invoice link paid twice).
PreCheckoutAlreadyPaid = "already_paid"
// PreCheckoutPriceChanged means the amount or currency no longer matches the order.
PreCheckoutPriceChanged = "price_changed"
)
// PreCheckoutOutcome is the pre-charge validation of a Telegram Stars order. OK approves the charge;
// otherwise Reason is a decline reason code the transport localises. AccountID is the order's account
// (for localising the reason to its preferred language); it is the zero UUID when the order is unknown.
type PreCheckoutOutcome struct {
OK bool
Reason string
AccountID uuid.UUID
}
// ValidatePreCheckout answers whether a Stars pre_checkout_query for orderID paying amount may be
// approved, before any star is charged. It approves an order that exists, is not already paid (a
// reusable invoice link paid a second time is refused here) and whose expected amount and currency
// match the invoice. A pending or honoured-expired order is approved — a late credit is honoured
// (§9/D23). A missing order or a mismatch is a clean decline with a reason code, not an error.
func (s *Service) ValidatePreCheckout(ctx context.Context, orderID uuid.UUID, amount Money) (PreCheckoutOutcome, error) {
ord, err := s.store.orderByID(ctx, orderID)
if errors.Is(err, ErrOrderNotFound) {
return PreCheckoutOutcome{OK: false, Reason: PreCheckoutGone}, nil
}
if err != nil {
return PreCheckoutOutcome{}, err
}
if ord.status == "paid" {
return PreCheckoutOutcome{OK: false, Reason: PreCheckoutAlreadyPaid, AccountID: ord.accountID}, nil
}
if amount.Currency() != Currency(ord.currency) || amount.Minor() != ord.expectedAmount {
return PreCheckoutOutcome{OK: false, Reason: PreCheckoutPriceChanged, AccountID: ord.accountID}, nil
}
return PreCheckoutOutcome{OK: true, AccountID: ord.accountID}, nil
}
// providerVKAds tags a rewarded-video credit from the VK ads network in the ledger (distinct from
// the "vk" Votes-purchase provider), so the daily cap counts only ad credits and the report separates
// them.
const providerVKAds = "vk_ads"
// InterstitialCooldowns reports the post-move interstitial-ad cooldowns (seconds): global, vs_ai and
// the independent hint-triggered one. The client mirrors them and self-gates (client-mirrored, D30).
func (s *Service) InterstitialCooldowns(ctx context.Context) (global, vsAi, hint int, err error) {
return s.store.interstitialCooldowns(ctx)
}
// RewardPayout reports the chips a rewarded-video view earns in the caller's context — the config
// payout in a trusted VK context with the VK segment attached, and 0 everywhere else (rewarded is
// VK-only, D28). The client uses it to gate the "watch for chips" button.
func (s *Service) RewardPayout(ctx context.Context, cxt Context, present []Source) (int, error) {
if cxt.Kind != SourceVK || !cxt.Trusted() || !has(present, SourceVK) {
return 0, nil
}
payout, _, _, err := s.store.rewardConfig(ctx)
return payout, err
}
// RewardConfig reads the rewarded-video config for the admin editor: the payout (chips per view) and
// the per-day and per-hour caps.
func (s *Service) RewardConfig(ctx context.Context) (payout, dailyCap, hourlyCap int, err error) {
return s.store.rewardConfig(ctx)
}
// SetRewardConfig updates the rewarded-video config (the payout and the two caps). All three must be
// non-negative; a 0 payout leaves rewarded inert. It is not a catalog product, so it does not mark the
// offer stale.
func (s *Service) SetRewardConfig(ctx context.Context, payout, dailyCap, hourlyCap int) error {
if payout < 0 || dailyCap < 0 || hourlyCap < 0 {
return errors.New("payments: reward payout and caps must be non-negative")
}
return s.store.setRewardConfig(ctx, payout, dailyCap, hourlyCap)
}
// CreditReward credits a rewarded-video view's chips to the VK segment, client-attested (VK Mini App
// ads expose no server verify — the client's watch result is trusted for an honest user; a forger who
// skips the ad and calls the endpoint is bounded by the config daily cap). It is idempotent on the
// client nonce and order-less. It credits nothing when rewarded is unconfigured (0 payout) or the
// daily cap is reached. Rewarded video is VK-only (D28) and is an ad view — not a purchase — so the
// VK-iOS purchase freeze does not apply; it requires a trusted VK context with the VK segment
// attached.
func (s *Service) CreditReward(ctx context.Context, accountID uuid.UUID, cxt Context, present []Source, nonce string) (RewardOutcome, error) {
if cxt.Kind != SourceVK || !cxt.Trusted() || !has(present, SourceVK) {
return RewardOutcome{}, ErrUntrusted
}
return s.store.creditReward(ctx, accountID, SourceVK, providerVKAds, nonce, s.clock())
}
// ExpireOrders marks pending orders older than the configured lifetime as expired, returning how
// many were swept. It backs the periodic pending reaper; expiry is cosmetic (a late valid callback
// still credits — see Fund).
func (s *Service) ExpireOrders(ctx context.Context) (int, error) {
ttl, err := s.store.orderTTL(ctx)
if err != nil {
return 0, err
}
return s.store.expirePending(ctx, ttl, s.clock())
}
// RecordPaymentEvent appends a payment lifecycle event (succeeded/failed/refunded) for the
// dispatcher to deliver to the user (live stream, botlink or email).
func (s *Service) RecordPaymentEvent(ctx context.Context, accountID uuid.UUID, orderID *uuid.UUID, eventType string, payload []byte) error {
return s.store.insertPaymentEvent(ctx, accountID, orderID, eventType, payload, s.clock())
}
// UndispatchedEvents returns up to limit payment events awaiting delivery. The dispatcher drains
// them and marks each delivered via MarkEventDispatched.
func (s *Service) UndispatchedEvents(ctx context.Context, limit int) ([]PaymentEvent, error) {
return s.store.undispatchedEvents(ctx, limit)
}
// MarkEventDispatched stamps a payment event as delivered so it is not re-sent.
func (s *Service) MarkEventDispatched(ctx context.Context, eventID uuid.UUID) error {
return s.store.markEventDispatched(ctx, eventID, s.clock())
}