419ea11b14
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User-facing Feedback screen (Settings -> Info, registered accounts only): a message (<=1024 runes) plus one optional attachment, an anti-spam gate (one unreviewed message at a time), and the operator's inline reply with a Settings/Info badge. Server-rendered admin console section (/_gm/feedback): unread/read/archived queue with per-user search, detail with read/reply/ archive/delete/delete-all, safe attachment serving (nosniff, images inline via <img>, others download-only). Introduces account_roles, the first per-account role table; feedback_banned blocks only feedback submission, granted/revoked from /users and the delete-with-block action. - migration 00004_feedback (feedback_messages + account_roles) + jetgen - backend internal/feedback (store+service), internal/account/roles.go - wire: FlatBuffers feedback.submit/get/unread; gateway guest gate (Op.NonGuest, is_guest via session resolve) -> guest_forbidden before any backend call - reply push reuses NotificationEvent with a new admin_reply sub-kind - UI: /feedback route + screen, attachment picker, badge, channel detection, i18n - tests: feedback unit (Go+UI), gateway guest-gate, inttest lifecycle, e2e - docs: PLAN stage 19, ARCHITECTURE s15, FUNCTIONAL(+ru), TESTING, READMEs
212 lines
7.2 KiB
Go
212 lines
7.2 KiB
Go
package server
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import (
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"errors"
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"net/http"
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"github.com/gin-gonic/gin"
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"github.com/google/uuid"
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"scrabble/backend/internal/account"
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)
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// The /api/v1/internal/sessions/* endpoints are gateway-only: the gateway has
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// already validated the originating credential (Telegram initData, an email
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// code, or a guest bootstrap) and forwards the result here to provision the
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// account and mint the opaque session. The backend trusts the gateway on this
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// segment (docs/ARCHITECTURE.md §12).
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// telegramAuthRequest carries the identity the connector extracted from a
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// validated initData payload. Username, FirstName and LanguageCode seed a
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// brand-new account's display name and language (first contact only).
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// ServiceLanguage is the validating bot's language tag (en/ru); it is recorded on
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// every login (the bot the user last came through) and routes their out-of-app push.
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type telegramAuthRequest struct {
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ExternalID string `json:"external_id"`
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Username string `json:"username"`
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FirstName string `json:"first_name"`
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LanguageCode string `json:"language_code"`
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ServiceLanguage string `json:"service_language"`
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}
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// handleTelegramAuth provisions (or finds) the account bound to a Telegram
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// identity and mints a session for it, seeding a new account's display name and
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// language from the supplied Telegram fields and recording the validating bot's
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// service language (updated every login) so out-of-app push routes to that bot.
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func (s *Server) handleTelegramAuth(c *gin.Context) {
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var req telegramAuthRequest
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if err := c.ShouldBindJSON(&req); err != nil || req.ExternalID == "" {
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abortBadRequest(c, "external_id is required")
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return
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}
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acc, err := s.accounts.ProvisionTelegram(c.Request.Context(), req.ExternalID, req.LanguageCode, req.Username, req.FirstName)
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if err != nil {
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s.abortErr(c, err)
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return
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}
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if err := s.accounts.SetServiceLanguage(c.Request.Context(), acc.ID, req.ServiceLanguage); err != nil {
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s.abortErr(c, err)
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return
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}
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s.mintSession(c, acc)
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}
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// pushTargetRequest asks for a user's out-of-app push routing data by account id.
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type pushTargetRequest struct {
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UserID string `json:"user_id"`
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}
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// pushTargetResponse carries what the gateway needs to route an out-of-app push:
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// the recipient's Telegram external_id (empty when they have no Telegram
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// identity, e.g. a guest or email-only account), the language that both selects the
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// delivering bot and renders the message (the account's service language, the bot
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// it last signed in through, falling back to its preferred language), and whether
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// they confined notifications to the in-app stream.
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type pushTargetResponse struct {
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ExternalID string `json:"external_id"`
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Language string `json:"language"`
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NotificationsInAppOnly bool `json:"notifications_in_app_only"`
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}
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// handlePushTarget resolves a user id to the data the gateway needs to deliver an
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// out-of-app Telegram notification — the gateway-only internal counterpart of the
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// in-app push stream. A user with no Telegram identity yields an empty external_id,
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// which the gateway treats as "no out-of-app channel".
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func (s *Server) handlePushTarget(c *gin.Context) {
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var req pushTargetRequest
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if err := c.ShouldBindJSON(&req); err != nil || req.UserID == "" {
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abortBadRequest(c, "user_id is required")
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return
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}
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uid, err := uuid.Parse(req.UserID)
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if err != nil {
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abortBadRequest(c, "user_id must be a uuid")
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return
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}
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acc, err := s.accounts.GetByID(c.Request.Context(), uid)
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if err != nil {
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s.abortErr(c, err)
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return
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}
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ext, err := s.accounts.IdentityExternalID(c.Request.Context(), uid, account.KindTelegram)
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if err != nil && !errors.Is(err, account.ErrNotFound) {
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s.abortErr(c, err)
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return
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}
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// Route by the bot the user last signed in through; fall back to the interface
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// language for an account that has never come through a tagged bot.
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language := acc.ServiceLanguage
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if language == "" {
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language = acc.PreferredLanguage
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}
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c.JSON(http.StatusOK, pushTargetResponse{
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ExternalID: ext,
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Language: language,
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NotificationsInAppOnly: acc.NotificationsInAppOnly,
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})
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}
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// handleGuestAuth provisions a fresh ephemeral guest account and mints a session.
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func (s *Server) handleGuestAuth(c *gin.Context) {
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acc, err := s.accounts.ProvisionGuest(c.Request.Context())
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if err != nil {
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s.abortErr(c, err)
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return
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}
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s.mintSession(c, acc)
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}
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// emailRequest is an email-login code request.
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type emailRequest struct {
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Email string `json:"email"`
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}
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// handleEmailRequest issues a login confirm-code to the email. It always reports
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// success once the address is well-formed, so the response does not reveal
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// whether an account already exists.
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func (s *Server) handleEmailRequest(c *gin.Context) {
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var req emailRequest
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if err := c.ShouldBindJSON(&req); err != nil || req.Email == "" {
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abortBadRequest(c, "email is required")
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return
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}
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if _, err := s.emails.RequestLoginCode(c.Request.Context(), req.Email); err != nil {
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s.abortErr(c, err)
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return
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}
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c.JSON(http.StatusOK, okResponse{OK: true})
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}
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// emailLoginRequest verifies an email login code.
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type emailLoginRequest struct {
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Email string `json:"email"`
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Code string `json:"code"`
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}
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// handleEmailLogin verifies the code and mints a session for the owning account.
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func (s *Server) handleEmailLogin(c *gin.Context) {
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var req emailLoginRequest
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if err := c.ShouldBindJSON(&req); err != nil || req.Email == "" || req.Code == "" {
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abortBadRequest(c, "email and code are required")
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return
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}
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acc, err := s.emails.LoginWithCode(c.Request.Context(), req.Email, req.Code)
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if err != nil {
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s.abortErr(c, err)
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return
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}
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s.mintSession(c, acc)
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}
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// tokenRequest carries an opaque session token.
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type tokenRequest struct {
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Token string `json:"token"`
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}
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// handleResolveSession resolves a token to its account id. The gateway calls it
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// on a session-cache miss.
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func (s *Server) handleResolveSession(c *gin.Context) {
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var req tokenRequest
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if err := c.ShouldBindJSON(&req); err != nil || req.Token == "" {
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abortBadRequest(c, "token is required")
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return
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}
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sess, err := s.sessions.Resolve(c.Request.Context(), req.Token)
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if err != nil {
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s.abortErr(c, err)
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return
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}
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// is_guest is best-effort: a transient account read must not fail an otherwise
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// valid resolve (the auth hot path), so a read error falls back to false; the
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// per-operation backend gate remains the authoritative guest check.
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resp := resolveResponse{UserID: sess.AccountID.String()}
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if acc, err := s.accounts.GetByID(c.Request.Context(), sess.AccountID); err == nil {
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resp.IsGuest = acc.IsGuest
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}
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c.JSON(http.StatusOK, resp)
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}
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// handleRevokeSession revokes the session for a token (idempotent).
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func (s *Server) handleRevokeSession(c *gin.Context) {
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var req tokenRequest
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if err := c.ShouldBindJSON(&req); err != nil || req.Token == "" {
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abortBadRequest(c, "token is required")
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return
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}
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if err := s.sessions.Revoke(c.Request.Context(), req.Token); err != nil {
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s.abortErr(c, err)
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return
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}
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c.JSON(http.StatusOK, okResponse{OK: true})
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}
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// mintSession creates a session for acc and writes the credential response.
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func (s *Server) mintSession(c *gin.Context, acc account.Account) {
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token, _, err := s.sessions.Create(c.Request.Context(), acc.ID)
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if err != nil {
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s.abortErr(c, err)
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return
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}
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c.JSON(http.StatusOK, sessionResponseFor(token, acc))
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}
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