5 Commits

Author	SHA1	Message	Date
Ilia Denisov	fe5a3d6d3b	fix(login): stop a rate-limit from latching a phantom offline on the login screen ... A fresh email login that hit the per-IP email rate limit stranded the user in an unrecoverable "offline" state that survived a full PWA restart, even though the network was fine. Root cause: the gateway email class (auth.email.request + auth.email.login, keyed per IP, 5/10min burst 2) trips on the third event, which in the natural "request code -> wrong code -> correct code" sequence is the correct-code login. The gateway returns ResourceExhausted; the client mapped it to 'rate_limited', which retry.ts classified as retryable + a connection code, so exec() called reportOffline(). That pushes the net-state machine into connecting, whose recovery probe is an authenticated profile.get -- but the login screen has no session, so the probe can never succeed and the machine latches offline. The transport kill switch (assertOnline) then refuses the very login that would fix it, and because the IP's email bucket refills only 1 token / 120s, each fresh attempt after a restart is rate-limited again -> offline again. Fix (client, narrow -- the trigger): - A rate-limit is no longer treated as connectivity. retry.ts no longer marks 'rate_limited' retryable or a connection code, so exec() never reports it offline; it surfaces as the existing error.rate_limited "slow down" message. Not auto-retrying it also stops the ~20s button freeze and avoids feeding the gateway's ban tripwire with 6 extra rejections per attempt. Fix (server): - Raise the email-code burst 2 -> 4 so the honest request + a mistyped code + the correct one is not throttled mid-login. Defence-in-depth over the backend's own per-code guards (5-attempt cap + 15-min TTL + send throttle). Tests: retry classification units updated to the new semantics; a gateway regression guard asserts the honest three-event email flow passes under the default policy. gateway/README.md rate-limit note updated. The deeper gap (the net-state recovery probe is session-gated, so any real transport failure on the session-less login/confirm screens still cannot self-heal) is left as a known residual, deferred by the owner.	2026-07-13 22:48:59 +02:00
Ilia Denisov	4ba9da6721	feat(edge): community IP blocklist (Spamhaus DROP) at the gateway ... Refuse a client whose IP is in a curated CIDR feed with 403 in the same abuseGuard, before the fail2ban ban. Prod-only (keys by real client IP), off by default. - ratelimit.Blocklist: a sorted-range IPv4 matcher (binary search) with an allowlist checked first; ParseDROP reads the feed; ApplyRefresh keeps the last-good feed on a transient fetch failure and drops it fail-open once stale (better to under-block than block a legitimate client on a frozen feed). A separate static CIDR set, not the per-IP fail2ban store. - gateway: a refresher goroutine re-fetches every few hours (bounded fetch + size cap); config GATEWAY_BLOCKLIST_{ENABLED,URL,ALLOW,REFRESH,MAX_STALENESS}. IPv6 is not matched (a v6 client is still covered by fail2ban / the honeypot). - observability: gateway_blocklist_blocked_total + entries/age gauges; a Grafana alert warns before the feed is dropped; service-overview panels. - deploy: compose env + write-prod-env.sh + prod-deploy/rollback wiring (opt-in via PROD_ vars). - docs (ARCHITECTURE, deploy/README); unit tests (match, allowlist, IPv6 skip, parser, fault-tolerance) + a 403 abuse-guard integration test.	2026-07-11 13:33:28 +02:00
Ilia Denisov	041106d623	feat(gateway): temporary IP ban (fail2ban) fed by rejections + honeypot/honeytoken ... Add a prod-only, in-memory IP ban enforced at the edge, fed by three signals: sustained rate-limiter rejections (the IP-keyed public/email/admin classes — the user class stays the backend soft-flag's concern), a honeypot decoy-path hit (the contour caddy tags decoys with X-Scrabble-Honeypot and routes them to the gateway), and a honeytoken (a planted bearer, GATEWAY_HONEYTOKEN). A banned IP is refused with 429 by the abuseGuard middleware before any work — covering the Connect edge, the live stream and the static SPA/landing the per-op limiter never gated. The ban is off by default: it keys by the real client IP the shared-NAT test contour does not expose, so a ban there would be self-inflicted; detection still logs in the contour, only the ban action is gated (GATEWAY_ABUSE_BAN_ENABLED). Rejection bans last GATEWAY_ABUSE_BAN_DURATION; tripwire/honeytoken hits are near-zero-false-positive and earn longer fixed bans. Each ban increments gateway_abuse_banned_total{reason}. Operators see and lift active bans on the admin console's Throttled page; the gateway syncs its active set to the backend every 30s (POST /api/v1/internal/bans/sync, backend/internal/banview) and applies the operator unbans the response returns. PRERELEASE phase AG. Docs baked into ARCHITECTURE / FUNCTIONAL (+ru) / both READMEs.	2026-06-21 08:54:20 +02:00
Ilia Denisov	8878711cf3	R3: gateway edge hardening — body cap, h2c sizing, rate-limit observability ... - GATEWAY_MAX_BODY_BYTES (1 MiB): connect WithReadMaxBytes + http.MaxBytesReader on the public mux; explicit http2.Server MaxConcurrentStreams/IdleTimeout and an http.Server ReadHeaderTimeout (R2 report follow-up). - gateway_rate_limited_total{class} counter, Debug per rejection, a rejection tracker drained every 30 s into a Warn summary per key and a report POST to /api/v1/internal/ratelimit/report (feeds the admin view + auto-flag). - The dead AdminPerMinute/AdminBurst policy now guards the /_gm mount (429), ahead of its Basic-Auth. - resolve() logs the cause of infra session-resolve failures at Warn (the transient unauthenticated dips from the R2 run); unknown tokens stay silent.	2026-06-10 01:58:48 +02:00
Ilia Denisov	408da3f201	Stage 6: gateway edge (Connect/FlatBuffers over h2c, platform/email/guest auth, sessions, rate-limit, admin passthrough, live push bridge) ... New public ingress and the first network edge. Framework + a vertical slice of operations end-to-end; remaining ops reuse the same transcode pattern in Stage 7. Contracts (new module scrabble/pkg): - push.proto (backend->gateway gRPC server-stream) + scrabble.fbs (FlatBuffers edge payloads), committed generated Go; buf/flatc Makefiles (dev-time codegen). Backend: - REST handlers on the /api/v1 groups: internal session endpoints (telegram/guest/email login -> mint, resolve, revoke) and the user slice (profile, submit_play, state, lobby enqueue/poll, chat). - internal/notify in-process Publisher hub + internal/pushgrpc gRPC server (BACKEND_GRPC_ADDR) streaming your_turn/opponent_moved/chat/nudge/match_found; emission in game.commit, social, matchmaker. - migration 00005 accounts.is_guest; guests are durable rows excluded from stats; ProvisionGuest; email-as-login (RequestLoginCode/LoginWithCode). Gateway (new module scrabble/gateway): - Connect Gateway service over h2c (Execute + Subscribe), FlatBuffers<->JSON transcode registry, Telegram initData HMAC validator (seam), session cache, token-bucket rate limiter (3 classes), push fan-out hub, backend REST + push gRPC client, admin Basic-Auth reverse proxy. go.work: use ./pkg, ./gateway + replace scrabble/pkg. CI: gateway/**, pkg/** path filters; unit build/vet/test span all three modules. Docs (PLAN, ARCHITECTURE, FUNCTIONAL+ru, TESTING, READMEs) updated; gateway/pkg unit tests + guest/email-login integration tests.	2026-06-02 22:38:24 +02:00