e3c2e80a0a6b4c3d5f4913686038497c64c66b34
22 Commits
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e3c2e80a0a |
feat(payments): report income to «Мой налог»
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The direct rail runs on НПД, where the provider neither files with the tax service nor issues a receipt — so nobody was doing it. This registers each rouble purchase, annuls its receipt on a refund, and hands the buyer the receipt by email. Two properties of the (unofficial) lknpd API shape the design. Registering an income takes no idempotency key, so an error does not mean nothing happened: the service name is frozen before the call and carries a marker from the tail of the order id, and after a failure the taxpayer's income list is searched for that exact name. Found means filed; not found halts the queue for a human, because declaring an income twice is as wrong as not declaring it. And faults are classified rather than logged: a token is renewed silently, a throttle backs off, an outage retries, but three unfixable rejections take the rail out of service — a changed format must not become thousands of requests overnight. The console button and the worker share one RunBatch. Automatic mode is armed from the console, not from configuration, so the operator can watch a run go through by hand first. A daily watchdog runs whether or not it is armed, since the case it exists for is the export being off. An idle queue issues no call at all — not even an authentication. No payment path changed: the purchase letter rides the existing payment-event outbox on its own cursor, the receipt and annulment letters ride the export row. Decisions D53-D60. |
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92ba527575 |
feat(payments): settle the direct rail through YooKassa
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Replace Robokassa with YooKassa as the RUB direct-rail provider. The wallet
model is untouched: one `direct` segment, the same spend wall, the same
per-channel merchant shops (D42) and `shop` on the order (D44).
The two providers are not shaped alike, and that drives the change:
- Opening a purchase is now an outbound API call (`POST /v3/payments`,
single-stage capture, redirect confirmation). The order id is both the
`Idempotence-Key` and `metadata.order_id`, so a retried create cannot mint a
second payment and a notification always resolves to its order.
- YooKassa does NOT sign notifications, so the body is never evidence: it only
names a payment, which is re-read with `GET /v3/payments/{id}`, and only that
answer is acted on. Two guards ride on it — the payment's metadata must name
the order, and its `test` flag must match the shop's, so a test-shop payment
can never credit real chips. The sender address is checked against YooKassa's
published ranges first, which stops a forger turning each fabricated
notification into an outbound call of ours.
- A notification lost for good would leave the money taken and the chips unowed,
silently. The existing pending-order reaper now asks the provider about each
order that reached its expiry age carrying a payment id, and credits the ones
really paid — one request per order over its whole life, not polling.
- `payment.canceled` records a `failed` event, so a declined payment is finally
surfaced to the customer as PAYMENTS.md §9 already specified.
- The admin refund moves the money through `POST /v3/refunds` before recording
anything; a failed call records nothing, so the ledger cannot claim a refund
that did not happen, and the recorded id is the provider's own.
- YooKassa has no cabinet-side generic receipt: «Чеки от ЮKassa» registers one
only if the request carries it, so every payment and refund now sends an
itemized `receipt` to the D36 confirmed email. The VAT rate code is a deploy
variable; the settlement subject and method are constants.
Robokassa is retired, not deleted: the direct rail falls back to it when no
YooKassa shop is configured and no deployment sets its credentials, so reviving
it is a credentials change rather than a code change. Its variables are removed
from compose, .env.example, write-prod-env.sh and the three workflows, and
recorded in backend/internal/robokassa/README.md together with the cabinet
configuration and the revival steps. Ledger rows keep `provider = 'robokassa'`;
that literal is load-bearing for the idempotency index.
No migration and no wire change: `orders.provider_payment_id` already existed,
and the client is rail-agnostic.
Decisions D47-D51 (revising D41) and stage E12 are baked into the docs.
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2d1fadb50c |
feat(offline): implicit net-state model, two-tier version gate, unified lobby
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Land the offline-model redesign (ANDROID_PLAN.md O1-O7): replace the explicit offline toggle with a single detected net-state machine, unify the lobby, and add a two-tier client-version gate. Contour-safe: both version vars empty => dormant, the wire change is additive, so web/pwa/vk/tg behaviour is unchanged unless the gate is deliberately configured. O1 net-state reducer (test-first). O2 store + wiring (connection/offline shims; +@capacitor/network). O3 remove the offline toggle + migrate the pref. O4 two-tier gate: hard update_required degrades to an offline Update/Play-offline notice (not terminal); soft GATEWAY_RECOMMENDED_CLIENT_VERSION -> X-Update-Recommended nudge. O5 unified lobby (device-local + greyed-from-cache server games; self-set identity; closes G-step-0). O6 create flows (with-friends online/offline segment + offline dict guard). O7 docs. Telegram/VK stay online-only (contour review): the offline model is channel-gated via offlineCapable() (native + plain web; false in the mini-apps). offlineMode.active is hard-gated on it, so the whole model (blue chrome, unified/greyed lobby, transport kill switch, device-local vs_ai/hotseat create) stays inert in Telegram/VK regardless of the detected net state (closing a version-lock path that could have flipped them offline); and New Game's with-friends hides the online/offline segment there, leaving the remote invite alone. ARCHITECTURE already declared "Telegram/VK are exempt" - this makes the code match. Deploy/CI: wire the version gate through the deploy (GATEWAY_MIN_CLIENT_VERSION + GATEWAY_RECOMMENDED_CLIENT_VERSION as plain unprefixed vars via compose + ci.yaml + prod-deploy.yaml + write-prod-env.sh + .env.example) so the gate is live when set (test-contour commit-hash version fails open; empty => dormant). Disable the manual android-build CI workflow for now (rename .disabled). Bump the app bundle budget 127->130 KB for the added always-loaded wiring. Fix the UI Docker stage (gateway/Dockerfile): install --ignore-scripts so the Alpine/musl SPA build no longer tries to native-build sharp (a local android:assets tool, unused in the image); esbuild's binary is an optional dep so Vite still builds. Tests: gateway go green (two-tier gate over a real HTTP handler); docker build of the landing + gateway targets green locally; compose --no-interpolate confirms the gateway env; two new telegram.spec.ts e2e (offline signal keeps the chrome online + quick-match opponent choice visible => server enqueue; with-friends shows no pass-and-play), RED-verified; svelte-check 0/0, vitest 617, e2e 248 (chromium + webkit), build + bundle-size 127.8/130. |
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4ba9da6721 |
feat(edge): community IP blocklist (Spamhaus DROP) at the gateway
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Refuse a client whose IP is in a curated CIDR feed with 403 in the same
abuseGuard, before the fail2ban ban. Prod-only (keys by real client IP), off by
default.
- ratelimit.Blocklist: a sorted-range IPv4 matcher (binary search) with an
allowlist checked first; ParseDROP reads the feed; ApplyRefresh keeps the
last-good feed on a transient fetch failure and drops it fail-open once stale
(better to under-block than block a legitimate client on a frozen feed). A
separate static CIDR set, not the per-IP fail2ban store.
- gateway: a refresher goroutine re-fetches every few hours (bounded fetch + size
cap); config GATEWAY_BLOCKLIST_{ENABLED,URL,ALLOW,REFRESH,MAX_STALENESS}.
IPv6 is not matched (a v6 client is still covered by fail2ban / the honeypot).
- observability: gateway_blocklist_blocked_total + entries/age gauges; a Grafana
alert warns before the feed is dropped; service-overview panels.
- deploy: compose env + write-prod-env.sh + prod-deploy/rollback wiring (opt-in
via PROD_ vars).
- docs (ARCHITECTURE, deploy/README); unit tests (match, allowlist, IPv6 skip,
parser, fault-tolerance) + a 403 abuse-guard integration test.
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0a0a9e5a8d |
fix(deploy): wire the Robokassa direct rail into the prod deploy + rollback
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The Robokassa credentials reached only the test contour (ci.yaml → TEST_ secrets). The prod-deploy / prod-rollback workflows and write-prod-env.sh never rendered BACKEND_ROBOKASSA_*, so on prod the shop login was empty and the direct RUB rail stayed disabled — the PROD_BACKEND_ROBOKASSA_* secrets went nowhere. Export the shop login + Password1/Password2 (secrets) and a BACKEND_ROBOKASSA_TEST flag (a variable, so go-live is a flag flip not a secret rotation) from both prod workflows, and emit the four ROBOKASSA_* vars from write-prod-env.sh (the shared deploy/rollback env renderer) so a rollback keeps the rail up. The compose already maps ROBOKASSA_* → BACKEND_ROBOKASSA_*. Document the new secrets/variable in the deploy README and .env.example. Password3 (Robokassa's JWT-invoice API) is unused. |
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a58f2ce0e4 |
fix(deploy): support a non-standard S3 port for the pgBackRest endpoint
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The S3 endpoint is a host only; some providers publish a separate, non-443 port. Add an optional PGBACKREST_S3_PORT (default 443) alongside the endpoint host, wired through the prod overlay, write-prod-env.sh and both prod workflows, and clarify in the docs that the endpoint variable takes the host alone. |
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e922f5f3b9 |
feat(deploy): continuous WAL archiving to S3 for point-in-time recovery
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Add pgBackRest-based PITR for the production database, shipped disarmed (archive_mode and the base-backup timer gated off) so it stays inert until the operator arms it before real payments — an un-armed deploy cannot pile WAL onto the disk. - Postgres now builds from a thin image carrying pgBackRest (archive_command runs in-process); the prod overlay wires an encrypted (AES-256-CBC), path-style S3 repository with 30-day retention and a daily full base-backup systemd timer. - Repository config/secrets flow through the PROD_PGBACKREST_* Gitea set and write-prod-env.sh; prod-rollback re-renders the same env so a rollback cannot disarm archiving. - Grafana alerts watch pg_stat_archiver (failing / stalled), absent-safe on the test contour, which never archives. - Fix the pre-migration pg_dump to snapshot the whole database (was backend-only, silently excluding payments). - Document the PITR runbook, the arming sequence and the restore drill in deploy/README.md; record the measured cost/perf assessment. |
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c90331b189 |
fix(ci): prod build needs EXPORT_SIGN_KEY for compose interpolation
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The first v1.8.0 prod-deploy build job failed: `docker compose build` interpolates the WHOLE compose file, and the backend's :?-guarded EXPORT_SIGN_KEY — added with the finished-game export after the last prod release (v1.7.0), so the prod build never exercised it — was absent from the build job's env, tripping the guard before any image built. Prod was untouched (build-only failure: no image pushed, no deploy, no migration). Add EXPORT_SIGN_KEY (audited every :?-guarded compose var against the build job env — it was the only genuinely-missing one; TELEGRAM_MINIAPP_URL is derived in the run step). Verified by reproducing the build-job env + `docker compose config`. |
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a0021d1994 |
feat(gateway): wire GATEWAY_HONEYTOKEN through the deploy
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The planted honeytoken bearer trap already existed in the gateway + compose, but no workflow fed GATEWAY_HONEYTOKEN, so it was always empty (inert). Wire the per-contour TEST_/PROD_GATEWAY_HONEYTOKEN secret into the ci deploy, prod-deploy and prod-rollback env (the prod path via the shared deploy/write-prod-env.sh), document it (deploy/README + .env.example), and fix the stale compose comment. Empty secret = trap off (no ":?" guard), so a deploy is safe before the operator sets the value + plants the bait. On prod (IP ban on) presenting it earns a 24h ban + alarm; on test (ban off) it logs + a ban metric. GF_SMTP_ENABLED is enabled separately via the TEST_/PROD_GF_SMTP_ENABLED Gitea variables (=true) — no code change. |
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7f85362288 |
chore(deploy): dedupe & regroup Gitea CI variables/secrets
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Collapse identical TEST_/PROD_ pairs to single unprefixed Gitea entries, derive the public URLs from PUBLIC_BASE_URL at deploy time, and share the prod env.sh renderer between deploy and rollback. - Collapse to one unprefixed variable: DICT_VERSION, SMTP_RELAY_HOST/PORT/TLS, GRAFANA_SMTP_PORT, VITE_VK_APP_LINK, VITE_VK_APP_ID (one Selectel relay + one pair of VK apps serve every contour). Secrets collapsed by the owner: SMTP_RELAY_USER/PASS, GATEWAY_VK_APP_SECRET, GATEWAY_VK_ID_CLIENT_SECRET. - Derive at deploy from PUBLIC_BASE_URL (no longer stored): TELEGRAM_MINIAPP_URL, GRAFANA_ROOT_URL, VITE_VK_ID_REDIRECT_URL. Removes the prod/test asymmetry and fills the missing test VITE_VK_APP_ID (VK web login was half-configured on test). - Extract deploy/write-prod-env.sh + write-prod-bot-env.sh, shared by prod-deploy and prod-rollback so the two cannot drift: a rollback now re-renders the FULL runtime env (email / VK login / Grafana alerts previously went dark after a rollback) and passes TELEGRAM_SUPPORT_CHAT_ID. - Single-source DICT_VERSION (CI env + both deploys), fix the v1.3.0/v1.3.1 drift in .env.example/README, correct the misleading honeytoken/abuse-ban compose comment, and rewrite the deploy/README variable list (+ the previously undocumented GATEWAY_VK_APP_SECRET and TELEGRAM_SUPPORT_CHAT_ID). The Gitea variables are reworked via the API; the stale TEST_/PROD_ entries are deleted after the test contour goes green. |
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2c465c01d2 |
feat(account): VK ID web login to link a VK identity from a browser
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A browser has no signed VK Mini App launch params, so linking VK on the web uses
VK ID's raw OAuth 2.1 flow (PKCE, no @vkid/sdk): the SPA redirects to VK's hosted
login and returns with an authorization code, which the gateway exchanges
server-side (confidential, under the VK "Web" app's protected key) for the trusted
vk user id — then the existing link/merge machinery attaches or merges it.
- fbs LinkVKRequest{code, device_id, code_verifier}; codec + TS bindings.
- backend link.Service ConfirmVK/MergeVK/attachVK (KindVK, mirror Telegram),
handleLinkVK[Merge], routes /user/link/vk[/merge], backendclient LinkVK[Merge].
- gateway internal/vkid confidential code exchange (id.vk.com/oauth2/auth);
transcode link.vk.confirm/merge (registered only when configured) + config
GATEWAY_VK_ID_{APP_ID,CLIENT_SECRET,REDIRECT_URL} + main wiring.
- UI lib/vkid (PKCE authorize redirect + callback), Profile "Link VK" control,
boot callback handling; a merge re-authorizes for a fresh code (VK codes are
single-use). Web-only (a redirect strands a Mini App webview).
- Deploy: VITE_VK_APP_ID + VITE_VK_ID_REDIRECT_URL build args + gateway env,
ci.yaml/prod-deploy TEST_/PROD_ vars, compose/Dockerfile/.env.example/README.
- Tests: vkid exchange unit (string/number user_id, id_token fallback, errors),
transcode link.vk, backend ConfirmVK/MergeVK inttest, codec encodeLinkVK.
- Docs: ARCHITECTURE §4, FUNCTIONAL(+ru), gateway README.
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854c4b3005 |
fix(deploy): stage blackbox config + derive bare Grafana SMTP from-address
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Two contour-deploy failures from PR4: (1) the deploy did not stage deploy/blackbox/, so blackbox_exporter crash-looped on a missing config mount — add blackbox to the ci.yaml cp and the prod-deploy tar; (2) Grafana rejects the 'Name <addr>' From form the backend go-mail accepts and validates it even when SMTP is disabled, crash-looping Grafana — the deploy now splits SMTP_RELAY_SERVICE_FROM into a bare GF_SMTP_FROM_ADDRESS + GRAFANA_SMTP_FROM_NAME (handles both display and bare forms). Verified the sed split + compose render. |
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ec1bdfca00 |
fix(deploy): Grafana SMTP reuses relay host + explicit GRAFANA_SMTP_PORT
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Drop the separate GRAFANA_SMTP_HOST (it duplicated SMTP_RELAY_HOST): Grafana differs from the backend only in needing the STARTTLS port, so GF_SMTP_HOST is composed from SMTP_RELAY_HOST + GRAFANA_SMTP_PORT (an explicit per-contour var, no magic default), reusing SMTP_RELAY_USER/PASS. Wired through ci/prod/.env.example/README. |
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55f6176538 |
feat(deploy): Grafana infra alerts + blackbox cert probe + admin-alert wiring
Grafana: GF_SMTP from the shared relay (STARTTLS host:port) + alerting provisioning (contact point → SERVICE_EMAIL, route-all policy, and rules for scrape-target down, gateway internal-error rate + p99 latency, host mem/disk/cpu, postgres connections, and TLS cert < 20 days). All rules noDataState=OK so an absent metric never false-alerts. blackbox_exporter probes the edge caddy's TLS (probe_ssl_earliest_cert_expiry) — effective on prod (caddy terminates TLS; contour caddy is HTTP-only so the metric is absent). Wires the new env through compose (backend admin From/To, Grafana SMTP), ci.yaml (TEST_), prod-deploy (PROD_ + env.sh), .env.example and the README var table. |
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c702f1bdac |
fix(email): explicit TLS mode for non-standard relay ports
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The 465-only implicit-TLS heuristic mis-classified Selectel's SSL port (1127), which the mailer would have dialled with STARTTLS and failed. Add BACKEND_SMTP_TLS (ssl|starttls) — empty still derives the mode from the port (implicit on 465, else STARTTLS) — and dial implicit TLS with WithSSL()+WithPort so any port works, not just 465. Wire SMTP_RELAY_TLS through compose/ci/prod/.env.example and document it (Selectel: 1127 = SSL, 1126 = STARTTLS). Unit-tested. |
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a29e00ee13 |
feat(deploy): wire the SMTP relay through every contour
Add the backend confirm-code relay env to compose (BACKEND_SMTP_HOST/PORT/ USERNAME/PASSWORD/FROM + BACKEND_PUBLIC_BASE_URL), sourced from SMTP_RELAY_* / SMTP_RELAY_FROM / PUBLIC_BASE_URL. An empty host keeps the backend on the log mailer so a contour without relay credentials still boots. Port defaults to 465 (implicit TLS). Map the TEST_ set in ci.yaml and the PROD_ set in prod-deploy.yaml (both the deploy-main env and the env.sh heredoc). Document the six variables in .env.example and the deploy README (secrets: user/pass; variables: host/port/from + the per-contour PUBLIC_BASE_URL, required whenever the relay host is set). |
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d5fbaa3034 |
feat(export): server-rendered artifacts behind one signed download URL (#160)
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The finished-game export (GCG + a new PNG of the final position) is one signed, short-lived relative URL (game.export_url; HMAC-SHA256, 10-min TTL, BACKEND_EXPORT_SIGN_KEY) resolved against the client's own origin and delivered by the best affordance each platform has (five on-device review rounds): - TG Android/desktop: native showPopup chooser -> native downloadFile dialog (bridge-only chain, activation-safe). - TG iOS: app-modal chooser -> OS share sheet with the fetched file (a popup callback cannot supply the activation the sheet needs). - VK iOS: VKWebAppDownloadFile for both formats. - VK Android: the PNG opens in VK's native image viewer, the GCG copies to the clipboard (the VK Android downloader hangs on any download, Content-Length/Range notwithstanding). - VK desktop iframe / desktop browsers: plain anchor downloads. - Mobile browsers: the OS share sheet (fetch-then-share). - Legacy TG (< Bot API 8.0): app modal + GCG clipboard, no image option. The PNG is rasterized on demand by the new internal `renderer` sidecar (node:22-slim + skia-canvas + baked Liberation/Noto Color Emoji fonts) executing the SAME ui/src/lib/gameimage.ts the ui project unit-tests; the backend rebuilds the render payload from the journal + engine.AlphabetTable, and the device date locale, IANA time zone and localized non-play labels ride the signed URL. Nothing is stored — the artifact re-derives from the immutable journal on each GET. The gateway forwards /dl/* (caddy @gateway matcher extended) behind the per-IP public rate limiter and serves bytes via http.ServeContent. Deploy: renderer service in compose + prod overlay + rolling order + prod push list; TEST_/PROD_EXPORT_SIGN_KEY secrets; the sidecar smoke runs in the ui CI job. Docs: ARCHITECTURE, FUNCTIONAL(+_ru), UI_DESIGN, TESTING, deploy/README, renderer/README. |
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5f574a765d |
feat(landing): VK entry logo + restore the Telegram channel build-arg
Add the VK Mini App logo next to the Telegram one on the landing hero,
linked via the new VITE_VK_APP_LINK build-arg (full URL, wired through
compose, CI and prod-deploy from TEST_/PROD_VITE_VK_APP_LINK).
Also restore the landing's Telegram link itself: commit
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65c194264c |
feat(vk): embed the game as a VK Mini App
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Mirror the Telegram Mini App wrapper for VK: the SPA loads at a new /vk/ entry, authenticates from VK's signed launch parameters, and provisions a 'vk' platform identity — the minimum to run the game in VK test mode. - Gateway verifies the launch signature in-process (internal/vkauth: HMAC-SHA256 over the sorted vk_* params under GATEWAY_VK_APP_SECRET, base64url) — a pure offline check, no side-service. New auth.vk op (gated on the secret), backendclient.VKAuth, /vk/ SPA mount. - Backend: KindVK + ProvisionVK/vkSeed, /sessions/vk handler, identity kind widened to include 'vk' (migration 00005, expand-contract). - UI: src/lib/vk.ts (VK Bridge, lazy-imported), bootVK + the /vk/ boot dispatch, encodeVKLogin + authVK across transport/client/mock. VK omits the name from the signed params, so the client reads it via VKWebAppGetUserInfo as an unsigned display seed. - Deploy: /vk in the edge Caddyfile, GATEWAY_VK_APP_SECRET wired through compose + .env.example + CI (TEST_) + prod-deploy (PROD_). - Admin console: surface the VK user id (link to the VK profile) next to the Telegram id on the user card. - Docs: ARCHITECTURE §12/§13, FUNCTIONAL (+ _ru), gateway README; VK integration reference under .claude/. Signature algorithm verified against dev.vk.com plus independent Node/Python references and a %2C edge-case vector. |
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6a602aefae |
feat(telegram): bot support relay — per-user forum topics
CI / changes (pull_request) Successful in 2s
CI / unit (pull_request) Successful in 12s
CI / integration (pull_request) Successful in 16s
CI / ui (pull_request) Successful in 56s
CI / gate (pull_request) Successful in 0s
CI / deploy (pull_request) Successful in 1m20s
Users who DM the bot anything but /start are relayed into a private forum supergroup, one topic per user. Operators (the chat's admins) reply in the topic and the bot copies it back to the user; an info card opening each topic carries a Block/Unblock toggle and a Clear button. State is a small JSON file on a new /data volume — the bot host has no database. Off by default (TELEGRAM_SUPPORT_CHAT_ID=0): the prod bot is unchanged until the operator sets the chat id and adds the bot as a forum admin. - internal/support: concurrency-safe JSON store (topic map, block list, relayed message ids) with field-targeted mutators and atomic save - bot/support.go: relay both ways via copyMessage, short-TTL admin cache, callback buttons, per-user topic-create lock, loop guard (skip the bot's own posts), reopen a deleted topic on the next message - config + compose + CI/prod-deploy: TELEGRAM_SUPPORT_CHAT_ID per contour + TELEGRAM_SUPPORT_STATE_DIR; bot-state named volume; /data pre-owned by UID 65532 so a fresh volume is writable under distroless - docs: ARCHITECTURE §15 + decision record, FUNCTIONAL (+ru), README |
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c59e522732 |
feat(deploy): visible prod-deploy jobs + manual prod-rollback
CI / changes (pull_request) Successful in 2s
CI / unit (pull_request) Successful in 11s
CI / integration (pull_request) Successful in 16s
CI / ui (pull_request) Successful in 57s
CI / gate (pull_request) Successful in 0s
CI / deploy (pull_request) Successful in 1m23s
- prod-deploy.yaml is now four visible sequential jobs (build -> deploy-main -> deploy-bot -> verify) so the rollout stages show in the Actions UI; the per-service rolling stays in the deploy-main log. - prod-rollback.yaml: a separate manual workflow_dispatch. Leave target_version blank to roll back to the previous deployed version (the host now tracks DEPLOYED_TAG + PREVIOUS_TAG), or pick a release tag. Re-deploys an already published image rolling + health-gated, image-only (no rebuild, no DB migration). - prod-deploy.sh tracks the previous tag (commit_tag) for the blank-input rollback. - Docs: ARCHITECTURE §13 + deploy/README runbook cover versioning + rollback. |
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171b71b7e0 |
feat(deploy): manual prod-deploy pipeline with rolling rollback (Stage 18)
A workflow_dispatch-only rollout from master (confirm=deploy): - .gitea/workflows/prod-deploy.yaml builds + pushes the images to the registry, ships the compose/config/certs/env over SSH, deploys the main host via prod-deploy.sh, then the bot host, then verifies the public site. - deploy/prod-deploy.sh rolls the main stack one service at a time in dependency order (postgres->backend->gateway->landing->validator->caddy), health-checking after each; any failure rolls the whole stack back to the previous tag. A schema migration adds a maintenance window: the backend (sole writer) is stopped for a consistent pg_dump before migrating; image rollback stays DB-safe (expand-contract), the dump is kept for a manual restore. - prod overlay: pull the four main images from the registry by tag. - Runtime secrets reach the host via a sourced env.sh (single-quoted values keep the bcrypt hash's literal $ intact, unlike a --env-file). |