Land the offline-model redesign (ANDROID_PLAN.md O1-O7): replace the explicit offline toggle with a single detected net-state machine, unify the lobby, and add a two-tier client-version gate. Contour-safe: both version vars empty => dormant, and the wire change is additive, so web/pwa/vk/tg behaviour is unchanged unless the gate is deliberately configured.
O1 pure net-state reducer (test-first). O2 reactive store + event wiring (connection/offline become thin shims; +@capacitor/network). O3 remove the offline toggle + migrate the pref. O4 two-tier gate: hard update_required degrades to an offline Update/Play-offline notice (not terminal); soft GATEWAY_RECOMMENDED_CLIENT_VERSION -> X-Update-Recommended nudge. O5 unified lobby (device-local + greyed-from-cache server games; self-set identity; closes G-step-0). O6 create flows (with-friends online/offline segment + offline dict guard). O7 docs (ARCHITECTURE, FUNCTIONAL +_ru, TESTING, deploy/README).
Also disable the manual android-build CI workflow for now (rename to .disabled); the Android APK release comes later.
Tests: gateway go green, svelte-check 0/0, vitest 617, e2e 122/122 (chromium + webkit).
Introduce a minimum-supported-client gate so a future incompatible wire change
can turn away installed builds too old to speak it, cleanly, instead of letting
them crash on decode. It rides the outermost stable layer (an HTTP header), never
the FlatBuffers payload.
Gateway:
- New internal/clientver: dependency-free parse + compare of the leading
MAJOR.MINOR.PATCH (a git-describe suffix is tolerated).
- GATEWAY_MIN_CLIENT_VERSION config (empty => gate dormant; validated at load).
- connectsrv checks the X-Client-Version header before decoding the payload:
Execute returns result_code="update_required" (before the registry lookup),
Subscribe returns FailedPrecondition. It fails open on an absent or garbled
header — the header is a client-controlled compatibility signal, not an access
control.
Client:
- Attach X-Client-Version on every call.
- A terminal update.svelte.ts store + a non-dismissable UpdateOverlay (native
opens VITE_STORE_URL, web reloads); retry.ts maps FailedPrecondition to the
update_required sentinel; a mock __update hook drives the e2e.
Wire-additive and contour-safe: no FBS/proto regen, no schema migration; the gate
stays dormant until GATEWAY_MIN_CLIENT_VERSION is deliberately set, so web / VK /
Telegram behaviour is unchanged. The silent reconciliation seam is deferred to the
offline-first work (its only caller). Tests: Go clientver/config/connectsrv gate
tests, retry.test.ts, Playwright update.spec.ts.
Add a prod-only, in-memory IP ban enforced at the edge, fed by three signals:
sustained rate-limiter rejections (the IP-keyed public/email/admin classes — the
user class stays the backend soft-flag's concern), a honeypot decoy-path hit (the
contour caddy tags decoys with X-Scrabble-Honeypot and routes them to the gateway),
and a honeytoken (a planted bearer, GATEWAY_HONEYTOKEN). A banned IP is refused with
429 by the abuseGuard middleware before any work — covering the Connect edge, the
live stream and the static SPA/landing the per-op limiter never gated.
The ban is off by default: it keys by the real client IP the shared-NAT test contour
does not expose, so a ban there would be self-inflicted; detection still logs in the
contour, only the ban action is gated (GATEWAY_ABUSE_BAN_ENABLED). Rejection bans last
GATEWAY_ABUSE_BAN_DURATION; tripwire/honeytoken hits are near-zero-false-positive and
earn longer fixed bans. Each ban increments gateway_abuse_banned_total{reason}.
Operators see and lift active bans on the admin console's Throttled page; the gateway
syncs its active set to the backend every 30s (POST /api/v1/internal/bans/sync,
backend/internal/banview) and applies the operator unbans the response returns.
PRERELEASE phase AG. Docs baked into ARCHITECTURE / FUNCTIONAL (+ru) / both READMEs.
- GATEWAY_MAX_BODY_BYTES (1 MiB): connect WithReadMaxBytes + http.MaxBytesReader
on the public mux; explicit http2.Server MaxConcurrentStreams/IdleTimeout and
an http.Server ReadHeaderTimeout (R2 report follow-up).
- gateway_rate_limited_total{class} counter, Debug per rejection, a rejection
tracker drained every 30 s into a Warn summary per key and a report POST to
/api/v1/internal/ratelimit/report (feeds the admin view + auto-flag).
- The dead AdminPerMinute/AdminBurst policy now guards the /_gm mount (429),
ahead of its Basic-Auth.
- resolve() logs the cause of infra session-resolve failures at Warn (the
transient unauthenticated dips from the R2 run); unknown tokens stay silent.