8 Commits

Author	SHA1	Message	Date
Ilia Denisov	92ba527575	feat(payments): settle the direct rail through YooKassa ... Replace Robokassa with YooKassa as the RUB direct-rail provider. The wallet model is untouched: one `direct` segment, the same spend wall, the same per-channel merchant shops (D42) and `shop` on the order (D44). The two providers are not shaped alike, and that drives the change: - Opening a purchase is now an outbound API call (`POST /v3/payments`, single-stage capture, redirect confirmation). The order id is both the `Idempotence-Key` and `metadata.order_id`, so a retried create cannot mint a second payment and a notification always resolves to its order. - YooKassa does NOT sign notifications, so the body is never evidence: it only names a payment, which is re-read with `GET /v3/payments/{id}`, and only that answer is acted on. Two guards ride on it — the payment's metadata must name the order, and its `test` flag must match the shop's, so a test-shop payment can never credit real chips. The sender address is checked against YooKassa's published ranges first, which stops a forger turning each fabricated notification into an outbound call of ours. - A notification lost for good would leave the money taken and the chips unowed, silently. The existing pending-order reaper now asks the provider about each order that reached its expiry age carrying a payment id, and credits the ones really paid — one request per order over its whole life, not polling. - `payment.canceled` records a `failed` event, so a declined payment is finally surfaced to the customer as PAYMENTS.md §9 already specified. - The admin refund moves the money through `POST /v3/refunds` before recording anything; a failed call records nothing, so the ledger cannot claim a refund that did not happen, and the recorded id is the provider's own. - YooKassa has no cabinet-side generic receipt: «Чеки от ЮKassa» registers one only if the request carries it, so every payment and refund now sends an itemized `receipt` to the D36 confirmed email. The VAT rate code is a deploy variable; the settlement subject and method are constants. Robokassa is retired, not deleted: the direct rail falls back to it when no YooKassa shop is configured and no deployment sets its credentials, so reviving it is a credentials change rather than a code change. Its variables are removed from compose, .env.example, write-prod-env.sh and the three workflows, and recorded in backend/internal/robokassa/README.md together with the cabinet configuration and the revival steps. Ledger rows keep `provider = 'robokassa'`; that literal is load-bearing for the idempotency index. No migration and no wire change: `orders.provider_payment_id` already existed, and the client is rail-agnostic. Decisions D47-D51 (revising D41) and stage E12 are baked into the docs.	2026-07-28 08:51:31 +02:00
Ilia Denisov	4ba9da6721	feat(edge): community IP blocklist (Spamhaus DROP) at the gateway ... Refuse a client whose IP is in a curated CIDR feed with 403 in the same abuseGuard, before the fail2ban ban. Prod-only (keys by real client IP), off by default. - ratelimit.Blocklist: a sorted-range IPv4 matcher (binary search) with an allowlist checked first; ParseDROP reads the feed; ApplyRefresh keeps the last-good feed on a transient fetch failure and drops it fail-open once stale (better to under-block than block a legitimate client on a frozen feed). A separate static CIDR set, not the per-IP fail2ban store. - gateway: a refresher goroutine re-fetches every few hours (bounded fetch + size cap); config GATEWAY_BLOCKLIST_{ENABLED,URL,ALLOW,REFRESH,MAX_STALENESS}. IPv6 is not matched (a v6 client is still covered by fail2ban / the honeypot). - observability: gateway_blocklist_blocked_total + entries/age gauges; a Grafana alert warns before the feed is dropped; service-overview panels. - deploy: compose env + write-prod-env.sh + prod-deploy/rollback wiring (opt-in via PROD_ vars). - docs (ARCHITECTURE, deploy/README); unit tests (match, allowlist, IPv6 skip, parser, fault-tolerance) + a 403 abuse-guard integration test.	2026-07-11 13:33:28 +02:00
Ilia Denisov	0a0a9e5a8d	fix(deploy): wire the Robokassa direct rail into the prod deploy + rollback ... The Robokassa credentials reached only the test contour (ci.yaml → TEST_ secrets). The prod-deploy / prod-rollback workflows and write-prod-env.sh never rendered BACKEND_ROBOKASSA_*, so on prod the shop login was empty and the direct RUB rail stayed disabled — the PROD_BACKEND_ROBOKASSA_* secrets went nowhere. Export the shop login + Password1/Password2 (secrets) and a BACKEND_ROBOKASSA_TEST flag (a variable, so go-live is a flag flip not a secret rotation) from both prod workflows, and emit the four ROBOKASSA_* vars from write-prod-env.sh (the shared deploy/rollback env renderer) so a rollback keeps the rail up. The compose already maps ROBOKASSA_* → BACKEND_ROBOKASSA_*. Document the new secrets/variable in the deploy README and .env.example. Password3 (Robokassa's JWT-invoice API) is unused.	2026-07-10 11:59:20 +02:00
Ilia Denisov	a58f2ce0e4	fix(deploy): support a non-standard S3 port for the pgBackRest endpoint ... The S3 endpoint is a host only; some providers publish a separate, non-443 port. Add an optional PGBACKREST_S3_PORT (default 443) alongside the endpoint host, wired through the prod overlay, write-prod-env.sh and both prod workflows, and clarify in the docs that the endpoint variable takes the host alone.	2026-07-09 01:14:05 +02:00
Ilia Denisov	e922f5f3b9	feat(deploy): continuous WAL archiving to S3 for point-in-time recovery ... Add pgBackRest-based PITR for the production database, shipped disarmed (archive_mode and the base-backup timer gated off) so it stays inert until the operator arms it before real payments — an un-armed deploy cannot pile WAL onto the disk. - Postgres now builds from a thin image carrying pgBackRest (archive_command runs in-process); the prod overlay wires an encrypted (AES-256-CBC), path-style S3 repository with 30-day retention and a daily full base-backup systemd timer. - Repository config/secrets flow through the PROD_PGBACKREST_* Gitea set and write-prod-env.sh; prod-rollback re-renders the same env so a rollback cannot disarm archiving. - Grafana alerts watch pg_stat_archiver (failing / stalled), absent-safe on the test contour, which never archives. - Fix the pre-migration pg_dump to snapshot the whole database (was backend-only, silently excluding payments). - Document the PITR runbook, the arming sequence and the restore drill in deploy/README.md; record the measured cost/perf assessment.	2026-07-09 00:58:04 +02:00
Ilia Denisov	a0021d1994	feat(gateway): wire GATEWAY_HONEYTOKEN through the deploy ... The planted honeytoken bearer trap already existed in the gateway + compose, but no workflow fed GATEWAY_HONEYTOKEN, so it was always empty (inert). Wire the per-contour TEST_/PROD_GATEWAY_HONEYTOKEN secret into the ci deploy, prod-deploy and prod-rollback env (the prod path via the shared deploy/write-prod-env.sh), document it (deploy/README + .env.example), and fix the stale compose comment. Empty secret = trap off (no ":?" guard), so a deploy is safe before the operator sets the value + plants the bait. On prod (IP ban on) presenting it earns a 24h ban + alarm; on test (ban off) it logs + a ban metric. GF_SMTP_ENABLED is enabled separately via the TEST_/PROD_GF_SMTP_ENABLED Gitea variables (=true) — no code change.	2026-07-03 21:36:23 +02:00
Ilia Denisov	7f85362288	chore(deploy): dedupe & regroup Gitea CI variables/secrets ... Collapse identical TEST_/PROD_ pairs to single unprefixed Gitea entries, derive the public URLs from PUBLIC_BASE_URL at deploy time, and share the prod env.sh renderer between deploy and rollback. - Collapse to one unprefixed variable: DICT_VERSION, SMTP_RELAY_HOST/PORT/TLS, GRAFANA_SMTP_PORT, VITE_VK_APP_LINK, VITE_VK_APP_ID (one Selectel relay + one pair of VK apps serve every contour). Secrets collapsed by the owner: SMTP_RELAY_USER/PASS, GATEWAY_VK_APP_SECRET, GATEWAY_VK_ID_CLIENT_SECRET. - Derive at deploy from PUBLIC_BASE_URL (no longer stored): TELEGRAM_MINIAPP_URL, GRAFANA_ROOT_URL, VITE_VK_ID_REDIRECT_URL. Removes the prod/test asymmetry and fills the missing test VITE_VK_APP_ID (VK web login was half-configured on test). - Extract deploy/write-prod-env.sh + write-prod-bot-env.sh, shared by prod-deploy and prod-rollback so the two cannot drift: a rollback now re-renders the FULL runtime env (email / VK login / Grafana alerts previously went dark after a rollback) and passes TELEGRAM_SUPPORT_CHAT_ID. - Single-source DICT_VERSION (CI env + both deploys), fix the v1.3.0/v1.3.1 drift in .env.example/README, correct the misleading honeytoken/abuse-ban compose comment, and rewrite the deploy/README variable list (+ the previously undocumented GATEWAY_VK_APP_SECRET and TELEGRAM_SUPPORT_CHAT_ID). The Gitea variables are reworked via the API; the stale TEST_/PROD_ entries are deleted after the test contour goes green.	2026-07-03 21:07:07 +02:00
Ilia Denisov	c59e522732	feat(deploy): visible prod-deploy jobs + manual prod-rollback ... - prod-deploy.yaml is now four visible sequential jobs (build -> deploy-main -> deploy-bot -> verify) so the rollout stages show in the Actions UI; the per-service rolling stays in the deploy-main log. - prod-rollback.yaml: a separate manual workflow_dispatch. Leave target_version blank to roll back to the previous deployed version (the host now tracks DEPLOYED_TAG + PREVIOUS_TAG), or pick a release tag. Re-deploys an already published image rolling + health-gated, image-only (no rebuild, no DB migration). - prod-deploy.sh tracks the previous tag (commit_tag) for the blank-input rollback. - Docs: ARCHITECTURE §13 + deploy/README runbook cover versioning + rollback.	2026-06-22 07:37:08 +02:00