4cac09c9f33013e10c264929e2a8e598f37489ad
13 Commits
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4cac09c9f3 |
fix(payments): drop the notification sender-IP gate; re-check on its own cadence
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A real test payment on the contour exposed both problems at once. YooKassa
delivered the notification five times; all five were rejected because the
backend saw the sender as 10.77.0.1 — the contour sits behind a tunnel and
cannot observe real client addresses, the same reason the IP bans in this
repository are prod-only. The chips were not lost (the reconcile sweep would
have credited them), but the primary path was dead and the customer was left
watching an unchanged balance.
The address check is removed rather than made conditional. It never was the
security boundary — the confirming GET /v3/payments/{id} is — and the one thing
it bought is already bought earlier and far more tightly: the order is resolved
from the notification's metadata *before* any provider call, so a notification
naming no known order costs a single indexed read and stops there. Guessing a
live order id means guessing a uuid. Against that, an address check adds nothing
and breaks every deployment that cannot see real client addresses, while turning
any future change to YooKassa's published ranges into a silent degradation.
The second problem was mine. The reconcile threshold was keyed off the order
lifetime, so a lost notification cost the customer the full 30-minute TTL before
the chips landed. Those are different questions: the lifetime governs how long a
customer may take to pay, the re-check governs how soon we notice a lost
callback. Split apart — `payments.ReconcileAfter`, one minute, swept on every
reaper tick. The bound D49 was chosen for survives: the calls one order can
cause are still its lifetime divided by the sweep interval, a handful, not an
open-ended poll. Worst case for a failed notification drops from ~30 minutes to
~5; an order the customer is still paying for is left alone.
Tests: the foreign-sender test is replaced by the two properties that now carry
the load — a notification naming an unknown order makes no provider call at all,
and a genuine notification is honoured whatever address it appears to come from.
Plus one pinning that a seconds-old order is not polled.
The shared bundle budget goes 31 -> 32 KB, with the reason recorded in the
script header: every user-visible string lands in that chunk and it had been
sitting 40 bytes under the cap.
Decisions D48 and D49 revised.
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395a307eca |
feat(payments): reverse refunds issued outside the console
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Two holes on the refund path, both found by asking what happens when a refund does not come from our own `/_gm` button. The merchant cabinet is a second entry point. An operator can refund there, and such a refund never passes through our API — so the money went back while the chips stayed credited, silently. Handle `refund.succeeded`: the refund is re-read from the API (the notification body is no more evidence here than it is for a payment), bound back to its order through the payment id recorded when the payment was minted, and reversed through the same engine. It is idempotent on (provider, refund id), so the event for a refund the console already recorded reverses nothing twice. The reversal engine is full-refund-only by design — it revokes exactly what the pack funded and rejects any other amount — so a partial refund is recorded as nothing at all and logged loudly for an operator. There is no non-arbitrary way to decide how many chips a part-refund costs, and guessing would be worse than asking a human. Second hole: a refund can still be canceled while pending, and the ledger is append-only. Recording on any non-empty refund id therefore risked revoking a customer's chips for money that stayed with us, with no way to take the row back. The console now records only a `succeeded` refund and tells the operator to press again otherwise — the idempotency key returns the same refund rather than paying twice. Tests: unit (GetRefund, the refund notification envelope, a non-final status surfaced to the caller); integration (a cabinet refund is reversed once and a redelivery is a no-op, the event after a console refund changes nothing, a partial refund records nothing, an unconfirmed refund reverses nothing, a pending refund records nothing until it settles and then does). The suite shares one database and the ledger dedupes refunds globally, so the fake provider now mints a refund id per payment — a constant id made one test's refund look like another's duplicate. Decisions D50 (amended) and D52; the notification subscription list in the deploy docs gains refund.succeeded. |
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92ba527575 |
feat(payments): settle the direct rail through YooKassa
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Replace Robokassa with YooKassa as the RUB direct-rail provider. The wallet
model is untouched: one `direct` segment, the same spend wall, the same
per-channel merchant shops (D42) and `shop` on the order (D44).
The two providers are not shaped alike, and that drives the change:
- Opening a purchase is now an outbound API call (`POST /v3/payments`,
single-stage capture, redirect confirmation). The order id is both the
`Idempotence-Key` and `metadata.order_id`, so a retried create cannot mint a
second payment and a notification always resolves to its order.
- YooKassa does NOT sign notifications, so the body is never evidence: it only
names a payment, which is re-read with `GET /v3/payments/{id}`, and only that
answer is acted on. Two guards ride on it — the payment's metadata must name
the order, and its `test` flag must match the shop's, so a test-shop payment
can never credit real chips. The sender address is checked against YooKassa's
published ranges first, which stops a forger turning each fabricated
notification into an outbound call of ours.
- A notification lost for good would leave the money taken and the chips unowed,
silently. The existing pending-order reaper now asks the provider about each
order that reached its expiry age carrying a payment id, and credits the ones
really paid — one request per order over its whole life, not polling.
- `payment.canceled` records a `failed` event, so a declined payment is finally
surfaced to the customer as PAYMENTS.md §9 already specified.
- The admin refund moves the money through `POST /v3/refunds` before recording
anything; a failed call records nothing, so the ledger cannot claim a refund
that did not happen, and the recorded id is the provider's own.
- YooKassa has no cabinet-side generic receipt: «Чеки от ЮKassa» registers one
only if the request carries it, so every payment and refund now sends an
itemized `receipt` to the D36 confirmed email. The VAT rate code is a deploy
variable; the settlement subject and method are constants.
Robokassa is retired, not deleted: the direct rail falls back to it when no
YooKassa shop is configured and no deployment sets its credentials, so reviving
it is a credentials change rather than a code change. Its variables are removed
from compose, .env.example, write-prod-env.sh and the three workflows, and
recorded in backend/internal/robokassa/README.md together with the cabinet
configuration and the revival steps. Ledger rows keep `provider = 'robokassa'`;
that literal is load-bearing for the idempotency index.
No migration and no wire change: `orders.provider_payment_id` already existed,
and the client is rail-agnostic.
Decisions D47-D51 (revising D41) and stage E12 are baked into the docs.
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eef90a152e |
feat(payments): per-channel Robokassa shops on the direct rail
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Split the single Robokassa direct rail into one merchant shop per channel (web / android; ios later), chosen by the trusted X-Platform subtype, while every shop still credits the one `direct` wallet — merchant-account separation for accounting and receipts, not a new wallet. - config: a channel-keyed shops registry (web seeds from the legacy vars or _WEB_*, android from _ANDROID_*); an empty shop leaves the rail dormant; per-shop validation. - intake: the order picks its shop by subtype (unknown falls back to web); the per-shop Result callback is verified by that shop's own Password2 at /pay/robokassa/result/<channel> (the gateway extracts the channel; Caddy's /pay/* glob already forwards it — no Caddyfile change). - persistence: an additive `shop` column on the order (migration 00015), recorded from the payment context, surfaced per entry in the admin report. - standalone apps sign in by email only, so a direct purchase keeps its email anchor. - docs: PAYMENTS (+ru) topology, deploy env vars + compose mapping, the decisions log (D41 revised for the ИП / 54-ФЗ move; D42-D44), the plan. Contour-safe: dormant until shops are configured; the migration is additive (no wipe); no client wire change. Fiscalization (Receipt/Email) and the gateway `direct/android` subtype follow when the ИП / RuStore are live. |
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eb7fa98426 |
feat(payments): edit the rewarded-ads config from the admin catalog page
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The "watch for chips" rewarded payout and its per-day / per-hour caps live in the shared payments.config row and had no admin surface — they could only be changed by SQL, contrary to D32 (the rewarded rate is meant to be admin-configurable). Add a "Rewarded ads" form on the /_gm/catalog page: RewardConfig / SetRewardConfig on the service (non-negative validated), a setRewardConfig store writer (the singleton config row), the consoleSetReward handler + POST /_gm/catalog/reward route, and the form pre-filled from the current config. No migration — the columns already exist. The reward rate is a config value, not a sellable catalog atom (so a "no-ads forever" style product is still out of scope by D32/D33). Test: an integration test sets the config, checks the page pre-fill, and refuses a negative value. |
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13be7c3d9a |
feat(ads): VK post-move interstitial + retire deprecated hint_balance/paid_account
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Interstitial video after a confirmed play or a hint, VK-only, offline banner-only. The gate is client-mirrored: the backend puts the config cooldowns (global 5m / vs_ai 30m / hint 1m) and a suppressed flag (the no-ads / no_banner gate, same as the banner) on Profile.ads via adsFor; the client self-gates on a per-kind last-shown time in localStorage, with the VITE_ADS_STUB contour "ad fired" toast. Never fires after a pass, exchange or resign. maybeShowInterstitial + vkShowInterstitial; the codec and gateway transcode carry the ads block. Also retires the deprecated accounts.hint_balance / paid_account domain usage (expand-contract, code only — the columns stay for a later DROP so image rollback stays DB-safe): drop the Account fields and their scan, the dead account.SpendHint, account.GrantHints and the admin grant-hints action; the in-game hint display now comes wholly from the payments hint benefit. Banner eligibility and account merge no longer read the legacy flags. Tests: ads.test.ts (the client-mirrored gate), the codec ads round-trip, the gateway ads transcode test, and a profile ads-config integration test (cooldowns + suppressed under no-ads / no_banner). Docs: PAYMENTS §10 (+ru) interstitial, the decision amends, backend README, the plan. |
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dbd76d53e8 |
feat(ads): rewarded video (VK) — client-attested credit + daily/hourly caps
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The first ads slice: a voluntary rewarded video credits chips. VK Mini App ads (VKWebAppShowNativeAds) expose only a client-side watch result — no server-to-server verify — so the credit is client-attested, guarded by a server daily + hourly cap (config reward_daily_cap / reward_hourly_cap, default 50 / 10). The caps are both anti-abuse (bounding a forger who skips the ad and calls the endpoint directly) and an economic conversion lever (limiting free chips so a player who wants more buys). D29 amended to VK's reality. Backend: CreditReward (VK-only, order-less, idempotent on a client nonce, floored by the caps; payout from config rewarded_payout_chips, default 0 = off) + the wallet.reward edge op returning the updated wallet (reward_chips gates the "watch for chips" CTA). Additive migration (two config columns). Client: the ads-network abstraction (lib/ads.ts, VK impl) + the VK bridge (vkRewardedReady / vkShowRewarded) + the Wallet CTA + i18n. A contour test stub (VITE_ADS_STUB -> a toast instead of a real ad; prod always real) and a temporary diagnostic that logs the raw VK data, so we confirm on the contour exactly what VK returns (harden to signature-verify if it carries one). Tests: backend integration (credit, nonce idempotency, hourly cap, disabled, non-VK refusal) + codec unit (reward wire). Docs: PAYMENTS(+ru) §10, D29 amend, PLAN E6. Bundle: shared budget 30->31 (reward i18n strings). |
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21fb14facf |
feat(payments): refund engine (best-effort revoke, never negative)
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The last money-intake slice: reverse a paid order best-effort, exactly once. All refunds are admin-triggered (E7) — no rail pushes an unsolicited refund (Robokassa via its refund API / cabinet, VK via support, Telegram via refundStarPayment), so this ships the engine they all converge on, not a webhook. The Refund method matches the paid order, appends a refund ledger row (idempotent on (provider, provider_refund_id) — distinct from the fund's payment id, so both coexist), and revokes the funded chips floored at 0 (never negative — D27, balances_chips_chk). When the chips were already spent, the unrecoverable remainder is recorded as a per-account loss + abuse flag in the new additive payments.account_risk table (read by the E7 report). The refund ledger row's chip delta is what was actually reclaimed (the ledger stays reconcilable); the full reversal rides in the snapshot; the order stays paid. Additive migration (a new table only) -> rollback-safe, no contour wipe. Robokassa refund-status polling is deferred (a worker not worth it at low chargeback volume); failed events are not wired (no rail signals a hard post-charge server decline). Tests: integration (full revoke; revoke-after-spend = floor-0 + loss + abuse; duplicate idempotent; unpaid-order guard). Docs: PAYMENTS(+ru) §9, PLAN (E5 -> DONE). |
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6e03ce0131 |
feat(payments): Telegram Stars payment rail
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Accept real money via Telegram Stars (XTR) — the third intake rail alongside Robokassa (direct) and VK Votes. Only the bot reaches Telegram, so the rail funnels through the reverse mTLS bot-link: - the gateway mints the invoice on a CreateInvoice command (the bot calls createInvoiceLink, XTR; the link goes to WebApp.openInvoice); - the bot gates each pre_checkout_query via a ValidatePreCheckout unary (the order must exist, be still creditable and not already paid — the reusable-invoice double-pay guard; the decline reason is localised to the order account's language); - a completed successful_payment is queued in a durable pure-Go SQLite outbox and forwarded via a ForwardPayment unary, credited once (idempotent on telegram_payment_charge_id, honours an expired order), re-driven on restart and every 30s. The rail is wired by TELEGRAM_STARS_OUTBOX_DIR (default /data) but stays inert until a chip pack carries an XTR price, so seeding a Stars price in the admin is the go-live. Tests: backend integration (order->forward->credit once, duplicate, pre_checkout gate) + bot outbox unit (idempotent, restart re-drive) + executor createInvoice. Docs: PAYMENTS(+ru) §9, ARCHITECTURE, the platform/telegram README, PLAN. |
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3bb9f10fad |
feat(payments): VK Votes payment rail
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Wire the VK Mini Apps ("голоса") rail end to end, reusing the intake engine. The
wallet.order endpoint branches by rail: a VK context opens a pending order
(provider vk) and returns its id, which the client passes to VKWebAppShowOrderBox.
VK's two-phase payment callback is verified at the gateway with the app protected
key (GATEWAY_VK_APP_SECRET) and proxied to a backend intake handler: get_item
returns the ordered pack's title and vote price; a chargeable order_status_change
credits the vk segment exactly once (the same Fund, idempotent on VK's own order
id) and records a succeeded event, so the dispatcher push refreshes the wallet.
Integration test for the VK order->credit path.
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3367cc2bf1 |
feat(payments): payment-event dispatcher + the provider-return UX
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Deliver payment_events to connected clients as an in-app wallet-refresh push: a background dispatcher drains undispatched events and publishes a KindNotification "payment" signal, marking each delivered; the client bumps a wallet-refresh counter the open Wallet screen watches, re-fetching in place. A return-focus refetch is the fallback. The Robokassa Success/Fail return now serves a self-closing page (the payment opens in a separate window) so the customer drops back into the live app instead of a cold start. Integration test for the event drain/mark queue. |
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36a5730e52 |
feat(payments): direct-rail order + intake handlers, config and reaper
Wire the Robokassa direct rail into the backend transport. POST /api/v1/user/wallet/order (walletGate + a D36 confirmed-email gate for the direct rail) opens a pending order and returns the signed Robokassa payment URL. The internal, gateway-only /payments/robokassa/result endpoint verifies the Result signature, credits the matched order exactly once via Fund (honoured even if expired), records a succeeded payment event, and answers Robokassa's "OK<InvId>". Add the Robokassa env config, an account HasConfirmedEmail check (D36), the payment_events writer, and a periodic pending-order reaper. The routes register only when a Robokassa merchant login is configured. |
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7860efce48 |
feat(payments): order-flow and fund credit engine + the Robokassa adapter
Add the payment-intake write path (provider-agnostic) and the Robokassa direct-rail glue, both unit-tested; transport, wire and UI follow. - payments: extend the ledger insert to thread order_id/provider/ provider_payment_id (spend/grant pass nil); add the order store (create/read/expire + a pack-price loader) and the fund credit — a fund ledger row + a guarded balance upsert + mark-paid in one tx, idempotent on the (provider, provider_payment_id) unique index, cache invalidated after commit. A valid callback is honoured even on an expired order. Service CreateOrder/Fund/ExpireOrders; Money.Major for the provider amount field. - robokassa: build the signed hosted-payment URL (SHA-256, order id via Shp_order, InvId unused) and verify the Result callback signature (Password2), extracting the order and amount. Receipt/fiscalisation is configured shop-side, so no Receipt parameter is sent. |