Refuse a client whose IP is in a curated CIDR feed with 403 in the same
abuseGuard, before the fail2ban ban. Prod-only (keys by real client IP), off by
default.
- ratelimit.Blocklist: a sorted-range IPv4 matcher (binary search) with an
allowlist checked first; ParseDROP reads the feed; ApplyRefresh keeps the
last-good feed on a transient fetch failure and drops it fail-open once stale
(better to under-block than block a legitimate client on a frozen feed). A
separate static CIDR set, not the per-IP fail2ban store.
- gateway: a refresher goroutine re-fetches every few hours (bounded fetch + size
cap); config GATEWAY_BLOCKLIST_{ENABLED,URL,ALLOW,REFRESH,MAX_STALENESS}.
IPv6 is not matched (a v6 client is still covered by fail2ban / the honeypot).
- observability: gateway_blocklist_blocked_total + entries/age gauges; a Grafana
alert warns before the feed is dropped; service-overview panels.
- deploy: compose env + write-prod-env.sh + prod-deploy/rollback wiring (opt-in
via PROD_ vars).
- docs (ARCHITECTURE, deploy/README); unit tests (match, allowlist, IPv6 skip,
parser, fault-tolerance) + a 403 abuse-guard integration test.
The Robokassa credentials reached only the test contour (ci.yaml → TEST_
secrets). The prod-deploy / prod-rollback workflows and write-prod-env.sh
never rendered BACKEND_ROBOKASSA_*, so on prod the shop login was empty and
the direct RUB rail stayed disabled — the PROD_BACKEND_ROBOKASSA_* secrets
went nowhere.
Export the shop login + Password1/Password2 (secrets) and a
BACKEND_ROBOKASSA_TEST flag (a variable, so go-live is a flag flip not a
secret rotation) from both prod workflows, and emit the four ROBOKASSA_*
vars from write-prod-env.sh (the shared deploy/rollback env renderer) so a
rollback keeps the rail up. The compose already maps ROBOKASSA_* →
BACKEND_ROBOKASSA_*. Document the new secrets/variable in the deploy README
and .env.example. Password3 (Robokassa's JWT-invoice API) is unused.
The S3 endpoint is a host only; some providers publish a separate, non-443
port. Add an optional PGBACKREST_S3_PORT (default 443) alongside the endpoint
host, wired through the prod overlay, write-prod-env.sh and both prod workflows,
and clarify in the docs that the endpoint variable takes the host alone.
Add pgBackRest-based PITR for the production database, shipped disarmed
(archive_mode and the base-backup timer gated off) so it stays inert until the
operator arms it before real payments — an un-armed deploy cannot pile WAL onto
the disk.
- Postgres now builds from a thin image carrying pgBackRest (archive_command runs
in-process); the prod overlay wires an encrypted (AES-256-CBC), path-style S3
repository with 30-day retention and a daily full base-backup systemd timer.
- Repository config/secrets flow through the PROD_PGBACKREST_* Gitea set and
write-prod-env.sh; prod-rollback re-renders the same env so a rollback cannot
disarm archiving.
- Grafana alerts watch pg_stat_archiver (failing / stalled), absent-safe on the
test contour, which never archives.
- Fix the pre-migration pg_dump to snapshot the whole database (was backend-only,
silently excluding payments).
- Document the PITR runbook, the arming sequence and the restore drill in
deploy/README.md; record the measured cost/perf assessment.
The planted honeytoken bearer trap already existed in the gateway + compose, but
no workflow fed GATEWAY_HONEYTOKEN, so it was always empty (inert). Wire the
per-contour TEST_/PROD_GATEWAY_HONEYTOKEN secret into the ci deploy, prod-deploy
and prod-rollback env (the prod path via the shared deploy/write-prod-env.sh),
document it (deploy/README + .env.example), and fix the stale compose comment.
Empty secret = trap off (no ":?" guard), so a deploy is safe before the operator
sets the value + plants the bait. On prod (IP ban on) presenting it earns a 24h
ban + alarm; on test (ban off) it logs + a ban metric.
GF_SMTP_ENABLED is enabled separately via the TEST_/PROD_GF_SMTP_ENABLED Gitea
variables (=true) — no code change.
Collapse identical TEST_/PROD_ pairs to single unprefixed Gitea entries, derive
the public URLs from PUBLIC_BASE_URL at deploy time, and share the prod env.sh
renderer between deploy and rollback.
- Collapse to one unprefixed variable: DICT_VERSION, SMTP_RELAY_HOST/PORT/TLS,
GRAFANA_SMTP_PORT, VITE_VK_APP_LINK, VITE_VK_APP_ID (one Selectel relay + one
pair of VK apps serve every contour). Secrets collapsed by the owner:
SMTP_RELAY_USER/PASS, GATEWAY_VK_APP_SECRET, GATEWAY_VK_ID_CLIENT_SECRET.
- Derive at deploy from PUBLIC_BASE_URL (no longer stored): TELEGRAM_MINIAPP_URL,
GRAFANA_ROOT_URL, VITE_VK_ID_REDIRECT_URL. Removes the prod/test asymmetry and
fills the missing test VITE_VK_APP_ID (VK web login was half-configured on test).
- Extract deploy/write-prod-env.sh + write-prod-bot-env.sh, shared by prod-deploy
and prod-rollback so the two cannot drift: a rollback now re-renders the FULL
runtime env (email / VK login / Grafana alerts previously went dark after a
rollback) and passes TELEGRAM_SUPPORT_CHAT_ID.
- Single-source DICT_VERSION (CI env + both deploys), fix the v1.3.0/v1.3.1 drift in
.env.example/README, correct the misleading honeytoken/abuse-ban compose comment,
and rewrite the deploy/README variable list (+ the previously undocumented
GATEWAY_VK_APP_SECRET and TELEGRAM_SUPPORT_CHAT_ID).
The Gitea variables are reworked via the API; the stale TEST_/PROD_ entries are
deleted after the test contour goes green.
- prod-deploy.yaml is now four visible sequential jobs (build -> deploy-main ->
deploy-bot -> verify) so the rollout stages show in the Actions UI; the
per-service rolling stays in the deploy-main log.
- prod-rollback.yaml: a separate manual workflow_dispatch. Leave target_version
blank to roll back to the previous deployed version (the host now tracks
DEPLOYED_TAG + PREVIOUS_TAG), or pick a release tag. Re-deploys an already
published image rolling + health-gated, image-only (no rebuild, no DB migration).
- prod-deploy.sh tracks the previous tag (commit_tag) for the blank-input rollback.
- Docs: ARCHITECTURE §13 + deploy/README runbook cover versioning + rollback.
Ilia Denisov