feat(gateway): wire GATEWAY_HONEYTOKEN through the deploy
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The planted honeytoken bearer trap already existed in the gateway + compose, but
no workflow fed GATEWAY_HONEYTOKEN, so it was always empty (inert). Wire the
per-contour TEST_/PROD_GATEWAY_HONEYTOKEN secret into the ci deploy, prod-deploy
and prod-rollback env (the prod path via the shared deploy/write-prod-env.sh),
document it (deploy/README + .env.example), and fix the stale compose comment.

Empty secret = trap off (no ":?" guard), so a deploy is safe before the operator
sets the value + plants the bait. On prod (IP ban on) presenting it earns a 24h
ban + alarm; on test (ban off) it logs + a ban metric.

GF_SMTP_ENABLED is enabled separately via the TEST_/PROD_GF_SMTP_ENABLED Gitea
variables (=true) — no code change.
This commit is contained in:
Ilia Denisov
2026-07-03 21:36:23 +02:00
parent 4b4dcab9b6
commit a0021d1994
7 changed files with 21 additions and 4 deletions
+7
View File
@@ -108,3 +108,10 @@ GATEWAY_VK_APP_SECRET=
# the confidential OAuth 2.1 code exchange under this protected key. The app id + redirect URL
# come from VITE_VK_APP_ID / VITE_VK_ID_REDIRECT_URL above. All three empty disables link.vk.*.
GATEWAY_VK_ID_CLIENT_SECRET=
# --- Gateway anti-abuse ------------------------------------------------------
# Planted honeytoken bearer value: any request presenting it is flagged — a 24h IP ban
# where the IP ban is on (prod), logs + a ban metric otherwise (test). Plant the value
# somewhere an attacker would find it; empty disables the trap. Gitea
# TEST_/PROD_GATEWAY_HONEYTOKEN (secret).
GATEWAY_HONEYTOKEN=