feat(gateway): wire GATEWAY_HONEYTOKEN through the deploy
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The planted honeytoken bearer trap already existed in the gateway + compose, but no workflow fed GATEWAY_HONEYTOKEN, so it was always empty (inert). Wire the per-contour TEST_/PROD_GATEWAY_HONEYTOKEN secret into the ci deploy, prod-deploy and prod-rollback env (the prod path via the shared deploy/write-prod-env.sh), document it (deploy/README + .env.example), and fix the stale compose comment. Empty secret = trap off (no ":?" guard), so a deploy is safe before the operator sets the value + plants the bait. On prod (IP ban on) presenting it earns a 24h ban + alarm; on test (ban off) it logs + a ban metric. GF_SMTP_ENABLED is enabled separately via the TEST_/PROD_GF_SMTP_ENABLED Gitea variables (=true) — no code change.
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@@ -335,6 +335,9 @@ jobs:
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# for the server-side confidential code exchange — a SEPARATE VK app from the Mini
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# App above. One VK ID "Web" app serves every contour -> unprefixed secret.
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GATEWAY_VK_ID_CLIENT_SECRET: ${{ secrets.GATEWAY_VK_ID_CLIENT_SECRET }}
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# Planted honeytoken bearer: presenting it flags the caller (logs + a ban metric on
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# test where the IP ban is off; a 24h IP ban on prod). Per-contour secret; empty = trap off.
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GATEWAY_HONEYTOKEN: ${{ secrets.TEST_GATEWAY_HONEYTOKEN }}
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# Signs the finished-game export download URLs (backend + compose interpolation).
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EXPORT_SIGN_KEY: ${{ secrets.TEST_EXPORT_SIGN_KEY }}
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# Transactional email via the shared Selectel relay: one account for every
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@@ -98,6 +98,9 @@ jobs:
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# derived from PUBLIC_BASE_URL in deploy/write-prod-env.sh.
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VITE_VK_APP_ID: ${{ vars.VITE_VK_APP_ID }}
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GATEWAY_VK_ID_CLIENT_SECRET: ${{ secrets.GATEWAY_VK_ID_CLIENT_SECRET }}
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# Planted honeytoken bearer: presenting it earns a 24h IP ban + a high-severity alarm.
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# Per-contour secret; empty = trap off. Rendered by deploy/write-prod-env.sh.
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GATEWAY_HONEYTOKEN: ${{ secrets.PROD_GATEWAY_HONEYTOKEN }}
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# Signs the finished-game export download URLs (backend BACKEND_EXPORT_SIGN_KEY).
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EXPORT_SIGN_KEY: ${{ secrets.PROD_EXPORT_SIGN_KEY }}
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# Transactional email via the shared Selectel relay (confirm-codes): one account for
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@@ -63,6 +63,7 @@ jobs:
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GATEWAY_VK_APP_SECRET: ${{ secrets.GATEWAY_VK_APP_SECRET }}
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VITE_VK_APP_ID: ${{ vars.VITE_VK_APP_ID }}
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GATEWAY_VK_ID_CLIENT_SECRET: ${{ secrets.GATEWAY_VK_ID_CLIENT_SECRET }}
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GATEWAY_HONEYTOKEN: ${{ secrets.PROD_GATEWAY_HONEYTOKEN }}
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EXPORT_SIGN_KEY: ${{ secrets.PROD_EXPORT_SIGN_KEY }}
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SMTP_RELAY_USER: ${{ secrets.SMTP_RELAY_USER }}
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SMTP_RELAY_PASS: ${{ secrets.SMTP_RELAY_PASS }}
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