feat(account): VK ID web login to link a VK identity from a browser
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A browser has no signed VK Mini App launch params, so linking VK on the web uses
VK ID's raw OAuth 2.1 flow (PKCE, no @vkid/sdk): the SPA redirects to VK's hosted
login and returns with an authorization code, which the gateway exchanges
server-side (confidential, under the VK "Web" app's protected key) for the trusted
vk user id — then the existing link/merge machinery attaches or merges it.

- fbs LinkVKRequest{code, device_id, code_verifier}; codec + TS bindings.
- backend link.Service ConfirmVK/MergeVK/attachVK (KindVK, mirror Telegram),
  handleLinkVK[Merge], routes /user/link/vk[/merge], backendclient LinkVK[Merge].
- gateway internal/vkid confidential code exchange (id.vk.com/oauth2/auth);
  transcode link.vk.confirm/merge (registered only when configured) + config
  GATEWAY_VK_ID_{APP_ID,CLIENT_SECRET,REDIRECT_URL} + main wiring.
- UI lib/vkid (PKCE authorize redirect + callback), Profile "Link VK" control,
  boot callback handling; a merge re-authorizes for a fresh code (VK codes are
  single-use). Web-only (a redirect strands a Mini App webview).
- Deploy: VITE_VK_APP_ID + VITE_VK_ID_REDIRECT_URL build args + gateway env,
  ci.yaml/prod-deploy TEST_/PROD_ vars, compose/Dockerfile/.env.example/README.
- Tests: vkid exchange unit (string/number user_id, id_token fallback, errors),
  transcode link.vk, backend ConfirmVK/MergeVK inttest, codec encodeLinkVK.
- Docs: ARCHITECTURE §4, FUNCTIONAL(+ru), gateway README.
This commit is contained in:
Ilia Denisov
2026-07-03 17:59:33 +02:00
parent 60faa4f064
commit 2c465c01d2
36 changed files with 1131 additions and 16 deletions
+12
View File
@@ -190,6 +190,8 @@ services:
VITE_TELEGRAM_LINK: ${VITE_TELEGRAM_LINK:-}
VITE_TELEGRAM_GAME_CHANNEL_NAME: ${VITE_TELEGRAM_GAME_CHANNEL_NAME:-}
VITE_VK_APP_LINK: ${VITE_VK_APP_LINK:-}
VITE_VK_APP_ID: ${VITE_VK_APP_ID:-}
VITE_VK_ID_REDIRECT_URL: ${VITE_VK_ID_REDIRECT_URL:-}
VITE_GATEWAY_URL: ${VITE_GATEWAY_URL:-}
VITE_APP_VERSION: ${APP_VERSION:-dev}
# Go binary version (the SPA's VITE_APP_VERSION is the same git tag).
@@ -207,6 +209,14 @@ services:
# app's protected key (a pure offline HMAC, no VK API round-trip). Empty disables
# the VK auth path (auth.vk is then unregistered).
GATEWAY_VK_APP_SECRET: ${GATEWAY_VK_APP_SECRET:-}
# VK ID web login (browser VK-identity linking): the confidential OAuth 2.1 code
# exchange runs server-side under the VK ID "Web" app's protected key. This is a
# SEPARATE VK app from the Mini App above, so the credentials are distinct. The app id
# and redirect URL are the same values the SPA builds its authorize URL from (one
# source each). All three empty disables the link.vk.* ops.
GATEWAY_VK_ID_APP_ID: ${VITE_VK_APP_ID:-}
GATEWAY_VK_ID_CLIENT_SECRET: ${GATEWAY_VK_ID_CLIENT_SECRET:-}
GATEWAY_VK_ID_REDIRECT_URL: ${VITE_VK_ID_REDIRECT_URL:-}
# The reverse bot-link: the bot dials :9443 over mTLS; the backend admin relay
# reaches the gateway at :9092 (plaintext, internal). In the test contour both
# listeners stay on the internal network (the bot shares the VPN netns); in prod
@@ -264,6 +274,8 @@ services:
VITE_TELEGRAM_LINK: ${VITE_TELEGRAM_LINK:-}
VITE_TELEGRAM_GAME_CHANNEL_NAME: ${VITE_TELEGRAM_GAME_CHANNEL_NAME:-}
VITE_VK_APP_LINK: ${VITE_VK_APP_LINK:-}
VITE_VK_APP_ID: ${VITE_VK_APP_ID:-}
VITE_VK_ID_REDIRECT_URL: ${VITE_VK_ID_REDIRECT_URL:-}
VITE_GATEWAY_URL: ${VITE_GATEWAY_URL:-}
VITE_APP_VERSION: ${APP_VERSION:-dev}
restart: unless-stopped