fix(deploy): wire the Robokassa direct rail into the prod deploy + rollback
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The Robokassa credentials reached only the test contour (ci.yaml → TEST_ secrets). The prod-deploy / prod-rollback workflows and write-prod-env.sh never rendered BACKEND_ROBOKASSA_*, so on prod the shop login was empty and the direct RUB rail stayed disabled — the PROD_BACKEND_ROBOKASSA_* secrets went nowhere. Export the shop login + Password1/Password2 (secrets) and a BACKEND_ROBOKASSA_TEST flag (a variable, so go-live is a flag flip not a secret rotation) from both prod workflows, and emit the four ROBOKASSA_* vars from write-prod-env.sh (the shared deploy/rollback env renderer) so a rollback keeps the rail up. The compose already maps ROBOKASSA_* → BACKEND_ROBOKASSA_*. Document the new secrets/variable in the deploy README and .env.example. Password3 (Robokassa's JWT-invoice API) is unused.
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@@ -76,6 +76,9 @@ compose binds from this directory.
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| `GM_BASICAUTH_HASH` | secret | bcrypt hash gating `/_gm` (admin console + Grafana). Generate with `docker run --rm caddy:2-alpine caddy hash-password --plaintext '<pw>'`. |
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| `TELEGRAM_MINIAPP_URL` | derived | The Mini App URL the bot hands out in deep links / buttons. The deploy derives `PUBLIC_BASE_URL + /telegram/`; set it directly only for a local run (compose still `:?`-requires it). |
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| `EXPORT_SIGN_KEY` | secret | HMAC key signing the public finished-game export download URLs (`/dl/*`). Generate with `openssl rand -base64 32`. |
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| `BACKEND_ROBOKASSA_MERCHANT_LOGIN` | secret | Robokassa shop login for the direct RUB rail. Empty leaves the rail off. |
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| `BACKEND_ROBOKASSA_PASSWORD1` / `…_PASSWORD2` | secret | Robokassa pass phrases: Password1 signs the launch request, Password2 signs/verifies the Result callback. Use the shop's **test** pair while `…_ROBOKASSA_TEST=1`, the **live** pair for real money. (Password3 — Robokassa's JWT-invoice API — is unused.) |
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| `BACKEND_ROBOKASSA_TEST` | **variable** | `1` runs test payments against the test pass phrases (no real money); empty/`0` is live. A variable, not a secret, so go-live is a flag flip + redeploy, not a secret rotation. |
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**Plus the bot token** — `TELEGRAM_BOT_TOKEN` (secret), shared by the validator (HMAC
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secret) and the bot (Bot API). It defaults to empty in compose, but both **fail at
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