feat(gateway): temporary IP ban (fail2ban) fed by rejections + honeypot/honeytoken
CI / changes (pull_request) Successful in 3s
CI / unit (pull_request) Successful in 11s
CI / integration (pull_request) Successful in 17s
CI / ui (pull_request) Successful in 53s
CI / gate (pull_request) Successful in 0s
CI / deploy (pull_request) Successful in 1m11s
CI / changes (pull_request) Successful in 3s
CI / unit (pull_request) Successful in 11s
CI / integration (pull_request) Successful in 17s
CI / ui (pull_request) Successful in 53s
CI / gate (pull_request) Successful in 0s
CI / deploy (pull_request) Successful in 1m11s
Add a prod-only, in-memory IP ban enforced at the edge, fed by three signals:
sustained rate-limiter rejections (the IP-keyed public/email/admin classes — the
user class stays the backend soft-flag's concern), a honeypot decoy-path hit (the
contour caddy tags decoys with X-Scrabble-Honeypot and routes them to the gateway),
and a honeytoken (a planted bearer, GATEWAY_HONEYTOKEN). A banned IP is refused with
429 by the abuseGuard middleware before any work — covering the Connect edge, the
live stream and the static SPA/landing the per-op limiter never gated.
The ban is off by default: it keys by the real client IP the shared-NAT test contour
does not expose, so a ban there would be self-inflicted; detection still logs in the
contour, only the ban action is gated (GATEWAY_ABUSE_BAN_ENABLED). Rejection bans last
GATEWAY_ABUSE_BAN_DURATION; tripwire/honeytoken hits are near-zero-false-positive and
earn longer fixed bans. Each ban increments gateway_abuse_banned_total{reason}.
Operators see and lift active bans on the admin console's Throttled page; the gateway
syncs its active set to the backend every 30s (POST /api/v1/internal/bans/sync,
backend/internal/banview) and applies the operator unbans the response returns.
PRERELEASE phase AG. Docs baked into ARCHITECTURE / FUNCTIONAL (+ru) / both READMEs.
This commit is contained in:
@@ -90,3 +90,41 @@ func TestRateLimitedMetric(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
t.Errorf("rate_limited counts = %v, want user=2 public=1", counts)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// TestBannedMetric records ban events through a manual reader and asserts
|
||||
// gateway_abuse_banned_total splits by reason.
|
||||
func TestBannedMetric(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
ctx := context.Background()
|
||||
reader := sdkmetric.NewManualReader()
|
||||
meter := sdkmetric.NewMeterProvider(sdkmetric.WithReader(reader)).Meter("test")
|
||||
m := newServerMetrics(meter)
|
||||
|
||||
m.recordBan(ctx, "tripwire")
|
||||
m.recordBan(ctx, "tripwire")
|
||||
m.recordBan(ctx, "honeytoken")
|
||||
|
||||
var rm metricdata.ResourceMetrics
|
||||
if err := reader.Collect(ctx, &rm); err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("collect: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
counts := map[string]int64{}
|
||||
for _, sm := range rm.ScopeMetrics {
|
||||
for _, md := range sm.Metrics {
|
||||
if md.Name != "gateway_abuse_banned_total" {
|
||||
continue
|
||||
}
|
||||
sum, ok := md.Data.(metricdata.Sum[int64])
|
||||
if !ok {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("gateway_abuse_banned_total is not an int64 sum")
|
||||
}
|
||||
for _, dp := range sum.DataPoints {
|
||||
reason, _ := dp.Attributes.Value(attribute.Key("reason"))
|
||||
counts[reason.AsString()] += dp.Value
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
if counts["tripwire"] != 2 || counts["honeytoken"] != 1 {
|
||||
t.Errorf("banned counts = %v, want tripwire=2 honeytoken=1", counts)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user