feat(gateway): temporary IP ban (fail2ban) fed by rejections + honeypot/honeytoken
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Add a prod-only, in-memory IP ban enforced at the edge, fed by three signals:
sustained rate-limiter rejections (the IP-keyed public/email/admin classes — the
user class stays the backend soft-flag's concern), a honeypot decoy-path hit (the
contour caddy tags decoys with X-Scrabble-Honeypot and routes them to the gateway),
and a honeytoken (a planted bearer, GATEWAY_HONEYTOKEN). A banned IP is refused with
429 by the abuseGuard middleware before any work — covering the Connect edge, the
live stream and the static SPA/landing the per-op limiter never gated.

The ban is off by default: it keys by the real client IP the shared-NAT test contour
does not expose, so a ban there would be self-inflicted; detection still logs in the
contour, only the ban action is gated (GATEWAY_ABUSE_BAN_ENABLED). Rejection bans last
GATEWAY_ABUSE_BAN_DURATION; tripwire/honeytoken hits are near-zero-false-positive and
earn longer fixed bans. Each ban increments gateway_abuse_banned_total{reason}.

Operators see and lift active bans on the admin console's Throttled page; the gateway
syncs its active set to the backend every 30s (POST /api/v1/internal/bans/sync,
backend/internal/banview) and applies the operator unbans the response returns.

PRERELEASE phase AG. Docs baked into ARCHITECTURE / FUNCTIONAL (+ru) / both READMEs.
This commit is contained in:
Ilia Denisov
2026-06-21 08:54:20 +02:00
parent 3fffee7817
commit 041106d623
28 changed files with 1295 additions and 19 deletions
+50
View File
@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ package config
import (
"testing"
"time"
pkgtel "scrabble/pkg/telemetry"
)
@@ -45,3 +46,52 @@ func TestLoadMaxBodyBytes(t *testing.T) {
t.Fatal("Load: expected an error for a non-positive body cap, got nil")
}
}
// TestLoadAbuseDefaults verifies the anti-abuse ban defaults: disabled (prod-only),
// the agreed thresholds, and no honeytoken.
func TestLoadAbuseDefaults(t *testing.T) {
c, err := Load()
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Load: %v", err)
}
want := DefaultAbuse()
if c.Abuse != want {
t.Errorf("Abuse = %+v, want %+v", c.Abuse, want)
}
if c.Abuse.BanEnabled {
t.Error("ban must default to disabled (enabled only in prod)")
}
}
// TestLoadAbuseOverrides verifies the anti-abuse environment variables are parsed.
func TestLoadAbuseOverrides(t *testing.T) {
t.Setenv("GATEWAY_ABUSE_BAN_ENABLED", "true")
t.Setenv("GATEWAY_ABUSE_BAN_THRESHOLD", "50")
t.Setenv("GATEWAY_ABUSE_BAN_WINDOW", "90s")
t.Setenv("GATEWAY_ABUSE_BAN_DURATION", "30m")
t.Setenv("GATEWAY_HONEYTOKEN", "deadbeef")
c, err := Load()
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Load: %v", err)
}
want := AbuseConfig{
BanEnabled: true,
BanThreshold: 50,
BanWindow: 90 * time.Second,
BanDuration: 30 * time.Minute,
Honeytoken: "deadbeef",
}
if c.Abuse != want {
t.Errorf("Abuse = %+v, want %+v", c.Abuse, want)
}
}
// TestLoadAbuseRejectsBadThreshold verifies an enabled ban with a non-positive
// threshold fails validation.
func TestLoadAbuseRejectsBadThreshold(t *testing.T) {
t.Setenv("GATEWAY_ABUSE_BAN_ENABLED", "true")
t.Setenv("GATEWAY_ABUSE_BAN_THRESHOLD", "0")
if _, err := Load(); err == nil {
t.Fatal("Load: expected an error for an enabled ban with a zero threshold, got nil")
}
}