feat(gateway): temporary IP ban (fail2ban) fed by rejections + honeypot/honeytoken
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Add a prod-only, in-memory IP ban enforced at the edge, fed by three signals:
sustained rate-limiter rejections (the IP-keyed public/email/admin classes — the
user class stays the backend soft-flag's concern), a honeypot decoy-path hit (the
contour caddy tags decoys with X-Scrabble-Honeypot and routes them to the gateway),
and a honeytoken (a planted bearer, GATEWAY_HONEYTOKEN). A banned IP is refused with
429 by the abuseGuard middleware before any work — covering the Connect edge, the
live stream and the static SPA/landing the per-op limiter never gated.

The ban is off by default: it keys by the real client IP the shared-NAT test contour
does not expose, so a ban there would be self-inflicted; detection still logs in the
contour, only the ban action is gated (GATEWAY_ABUSE_BAN_ENABLED). Rejection bans last
GATEWAY_ABUSE_BAN_DURATION; tripwire/honeytoken hits are near-zero-false-positive and
earn longer fixed bans. Each ban increments gateway_abuse_banned_total{reason}.

Operators see and lift active bans on the admin console's Throttled page; the gateway
syncs its active set to the backend every 30s (POST /api/v1/internal/bans/sync,
backend/internal/banview) and applies the operator unbans the response returns.

PRERELEASE phase AG. Docs baked into ARCHITECTURE / FUNCTIONAL (+ru) / both READMEs.
This commit is contained in:
Ilia Denisov
2026-06-21 08:54:20 +02:00
parent 3fffee7817
commit 041106d623
28 changed files with 1295 additions and 19 deletions
+7
View File
@@ -150,6 +150,13 @@ services:
GATEWAY_BOTLINK_TLS_CERT: /certs/gateway.crt
GATEWAY_BOTLINK_TLS_KEY: /certs/gateway.key
GATEWAY_BOTLINK_TLS_CA: /certs/ca.crt
# Anti-abuse IP ban (fail2ban-style), fed by rate-limit rejections and the
# honeypot/honeytoken. Off by default: it bans by client IP, which is only
# real in prod — the test contour arrives as one shared NAT address, so a ban
# there would be self-inflicted (the honeypot/honeytoken still log). Prod sets
# these from PROD_ inputs; GATEWAY_HONEYTOKEN is the planted bearer trap.
GATEWAY_ABUSE_BAN_ENABLED: ${GATEWAY_ABUSE_BAN_ENABLED:-false}
GATEWAY_HONEYTOKEN: ${GATEWAY_HONEYTOKEN:-}
GATEWAY_LOG_LEVEL: ${LOG_LEVEL:-info}
GATEWAY_SERVICE_NAME: scrabble-gateway
GATEWAY_OTEL_TRACES_EXPORTER: otlp