---
name: deploy-check
description: "Use before any deploy-touching change to this repo — phrases like '/deploy-check', 'is this prod-safe', 'before we deploy', 'deploy safety review', 'проверь перед деплоем', 'это безопасно для прода'. Runs a pre-deploy checklist of this project's hard-won runtime constraints against the current diff, so the crash classes that have bitten live environments get caught before shipping instead of after."
---

# Pre-deploy runtime-constraint check

Triggered before shipping anything that touches the deploy contour (Dockerfiles,
`deploy/`, Caddyfile, compose, migrations, boot guards, the Telegram side-service,
edge config). The worst frictions in this repo were never logic bugs — they were
**environment mismatches that crashed a live env and forced a redesign**. Run this
list against the diff first; turn crash-and-redesign into a single pass.

This checklist is a prompt, **not** the source of truth. The canonical detail
lives in `deploy/README.md`, `docs/ARCHITECTURE.md`, `docs/EDGE_HTTP3.md`, and the
agent memory files referenced below — read them when an item is in play, and add a
new class here when a new incident teaches one.

## How to run it

1. `git diff <base>...HEAD --stat` to see what the change actually touches.
2. For every risk class below that the diff touches, perform the **Check** and
   report PASS / FAIL with the exact file:line to fix. Skip classes the diff does
   not touch — say which you skipped and why.
3. Remember: **deploy-job green ≠ healthy**. CI's deploy probe has historically
   passed with a dead backend (it only checked static landing+gateway). Verify the
   real feature live (`/readyz`, the actual flow) after deploy, not just the green.

## Risk classes

### 1. Container user — distroless nonroot UID 65532
- **Bit us:** TLS keys `chmod 600` for the host owner crash-looped gateway + bot at
  boot with "permission denied" — service images run UID 65532.
- **Check:** any new/changed mounted secret, key, or config file must be readable by
  UID 65532 (`0644`, not `0600`). Scan the diff for file modes, `chmod`, and new
  volume mounts. (memory: `distroless-nonroot-mounted-secrets`)

### 2. Caddy header pipeline ordering
- **Bit us:** `header_up delete` after `set` nulled the value (the honeypot tag went
  empty); it passed CI and only showed up live.
- **Check:** in any Caddyfile change, verify the `set` / `delete` / `header_up`
  ordering for every affected route, and test the tripwire/route on the live
  contour, not just CI.

### 3. Edge Alt-Svc / HTTP3
- **Bit us:** edge advertised `Alt-Svc: h3` while UDP/443 was never exposed
  (docker tcp-only + ufw tcp-only); clients cached it 30 days and stalled on dead
  QUIC before falling back to h2 — Mini App "hangs on load".
- **Check:** any edge/caddy change keeps `Alt-Svc: clear` (or only advertises h3 if
  UDP/443 is genuinely exposed). (memory: `tg-app-load-stall-dead-http3-altsvc`,
  `docs/EDGE_HTTP3.md`)

### 4. Prod caddy config recreate
- **Bit us:** prod rolling deploy did **not** recreate caddy on a config-only change
  (pinned `caddy:2-alpine` + `admin off`), so a new Caddyfile deployed GREEN but
  stayed inert until a manual `docker restart`.
- **Check:** a config-only edge change must `--force-recreate` caddy in
  `prod-deploy.sh` `roll()`; never trust deploy-green for edge config.
  (memory: `prod-deploy-caddy-config-recreate`)

### 5. DICT_VERSION / dictionary boot
- **Bit us:** an early `DICT_VERSION` refuse-boot guard was wrong and crashed the
  live env when bumped on a seeded volume; it had to be redesigned to "marker-wins".
- **Check:** any change touching `DICT_VERSION`, dict load, or the boot guard must
  keep marker-wins semantics and survive a seeded volume **and** an image rollback.
  `DICT_VERSION` is a required build-arg (no default), single-sourced. A new dict
  goes live via the admin console upload, not a redeploy. (memory:
  `dict-version-deploy-verify`, `contour-schema-change-wipe`)

### 6. Migrations — expand-contract + rollback safety
- **Bit us / risk:** a non-backward-compatible migration breaks image rollback (DB
  ahead of rolled-back code).
- **Check:** migrations must be **expand-contract** (backward-compatible). A schema
  change adds the maintenance window + a consistent `pg_dump` in prod-deploy. On the
  **test contour**, a schema/wire-label change needs `DROP SCHEMA backend CASCADE` +
  backend restart (new code vs old persisted DB), else the contour breaks. (memory:
  `contour-schema-change-wipe`)

### 7. Telegram permission model
- **Bit us:** permissions are an **AND-intersection** — default-allow with explicit
  denies, not default-deny; inverting it broke access.
- **Check:** any change to the Telegram permission / relay logic preserves the
  AND-intersection default-allow shape. (memory: `telegram-forum-relay-gotchas`)

## Output

A short PASS/FAIL table over the classes the diff touches, each FAIL with the exact
file:line and the fix. If every touched class passes, say so plainly and name the
post-deploy live check to run (not just "CI green").
