phase 3

ui/PLAN.md

@@ -353,9 +353,9 @@ Targeted tests:
   in both `chromium-desktop` and `webkit-desktop` projects;
 - intentional failure produces a Playwright trace artefact in CI.
 
-## Phase 3. Go Core: Canonical Bytes and Keypair
+## ~~Phase 3. Go Core: Canonical Bytes and Keypair~~
 
-Status: pending.
+Status: done.
 
 Goal: implement the canonical-bytes serializer and Ed25519 keypair
 management in pure Go, with bit-for-bit parity to the gateway-side
@@ -363,41 +363,65 @@ implementation. No network, no UI.
 
 Artifacts:
 
-- `ui/core/go.mod` module declared in the project Go workspace
+- `ui/core/go.mod` module `galaxy/core` declared in the project Go
+  workspace (`go.work` `use` and `replace` directives)
 - `.gitea/workflows/ui-test.yaml` and `.gitea/workflows/ui-release.yaml`
   extended to add `./ui/core/...` to the Tier 1 / Tier 2 `go test`
   command list introduced in Phase 2
 - `ui/core/canon/` canonical bytes for `galaxy-request-v1`,
   `galaxy-response-v1`, and `galaxy-event-v1`, matching
-  `docs/ARCHITECTURE.md` §15 byte-for-byte
+  `docs/ARCHITECTURE.md` §15 byte-for-byte. Server-only signers
+  (`Ed25519ResponseSigner`, PKCS#8 PEM loaders) intentionally stay
+  in `gateway/authn` — `ui/core` is verify-only on the server side
 - `ui/core/keypair/` Ed25519 generate, marshal, unmarshal helpers
-  returning opaque blobs to upper layers
-- `ui/core/types/` envelope structs and result codes
-- `ui/core/canon/testdata/` test vectors copied from gateway-side
-  canonicalisation fixtures
+  over opaque `[]byte` blobs; `Generate` accepts an injected
+  `io.Reader` so the WASM build can wire in `crypto.getRandomValues`
+- `ui/core/types/` full v1 transport-envelope structs with
+  `SigningFields()` projection helpers; result-code and
+  protocol-version constants (`ProtocolVersionV1`, `ResultCodeOK`).
+  `TraceID` is part of the request envelope but deliberately
+  excluded from the request signing input (matches §15)
+- `ui/core/canon/testdata/` golden JSON test vectors for the three
+  Phase-3 message types plus one response and one event
 - `ui/core/README.md` documenting the public API and the
-  network-free / storage-free invariant
+  network-free / storage-free / no-x509 / no-PEM / no-`os` invariant
+- `gateway/authn/parity_with_ui_core_test.go` (cross-module test)
+  proving canonical-bytes parity and bidirectional sign/verify
+  acceptance between `gateway/authn` and `galaxy/core`. The test
+  adds `require galaxy/core` to `gateway/go.mod` (test-only in
+  practice — gateway production binary does not link `ui/core`)
 
 Dependencies: Phase 1.
 
 Acceptance criteria:
 
-- canonical-bytes output matches gateway-side fixtures byte-for-byte
-  for at least three message types (`user.account.read`,
-  `user.lobby.list`, `user.games.command`);
+- canonical-bytes output matches gateway-side output byte-for-byte
+  for the three Phase-3 message types (`user.account.get`,
+  `lobby.my.games.list`, `user.games.command`);
 - a request signed by `ui/core` is accepted by the gateway's own
-  verifier in a unit test;
-- a response signed by gateway test fixtures is accepted by `ui/core`'s
-  verifier;
-- freshness window violations and tampered hashes are rejected with
-  stable error codes.
+  verifier in a unit test (`TestParityRequestSignedByUICoreAcceptedByGateway`);
+- a response signed by `gateway/authn`'s `Ed25519ResponseSigner` is
+  accepted by `ui/core`'s verifier
+  (`TestParityResponseSignedByGatewayAcceptedByUICore`); the same
+  applies to gateway-signed events;
+- tampered `payload_hash`, mismatched `request_id`, mismatched
+  `timestamp_ms`, and invalid signature length are rejected with
+  stable error codes from `ui/core/canon`. Server-side freshness
+  enforcement (the symmetric ±5 minutes around server time) stays
+  in `gateway/internal/grpcapi/freshness_replay.go` and is not
+  duplicated in `ui/core`.
 
 Targeted tests:
 
-- canonical-bytes equality tests on shared fixtures;
+- canonical-bytes equality tests on golden JSON fixtures
+  (`testdata/`) for every envelope kind;
 - round-trip sign-then-verify across all three envelope kinds;
-- negative tests: tampered `payload_hash`, wrong `request_id`, expired
-  timestamp, invalid signature length.
+- negative tests: tampered `payload_hash`, mismatched `request_id`,
+  mismatched `timestamp_ms`, invalid signature lengths (too short,
+  too long, empty), bit-flipped signature, wrong public key,
+  malformed base64 public key;
+- `gateway/authn` cross-module parity tests as listed under
+  Artifacts.
 
 ## Phase 4. ConnectRPC Support in Gateway
 

ui/core/README.md

@@ -0,0 +1,146 @@
+# ui/core — Galaxy Client Compute Module
+
+`ui/core` (Go module `galaxy/core`) is the compute boundary of the
+Galaxy cross-platform UI client. It carries v1 transport-envelope
+canonical bytes, signature verification, and Ed25519 keypair
+helpers. Network I/O and persistent storage live elsewhere on
+purpose: this module compiles unchanged to WASM (Phase 5),
+gomobile (Phase 32), and Wails-embedded native (Phase 31).
+
+The authoritative byte contract is defined in
+[`docs/ARCHITECTURE.md` §15](../../docs/ARCHITECTURE.md). The gateway
+mirrors this exact wire format in its own
+[`gateway/authn`](../../gateway/authn) package; cross-module byte
+parity and round-trip sign/verify are exercised by
+[`gateway/authn/parity_with_ui_core_test.go`](../../gateway/authn/parity_with_ui_core_test.go).
+
+## Invariants
+
+- **No network.** No `net/http`, no `net/url`, no gRPC client.
+- **No storage.** No `os` (outside `_test.go` fixtures), no SQL, no
+  filesystem, no keychain.
+- **TinyGo-friendly.** Production files do not import
+  `crypto/x509`, `encoding/pem`, or any package not supported by
+  the WASM target. PKCS#8 PEM is server-only and stays in
+  `gateway/authn`.
+- **No goroutines, no channels, no `sync` primitives** in
+  production files. Pure functions, deterministic outputs.
+- **No re-export of `crypto/ed25519` types** in the public API.
+  Callers see opaque `[]byte` blobs and `string` representations
+  so the WASM bridge can hand them across the JS boundary as
+  `Uint8Array` and string primitives.
+- **Randomness is injected.** `keypair.Generate(reader io.Reader)`
+  takes a caller-supplied reader. Production code passes
+  `crypto/rand.Reader`; tests use deterministic `bytes.NewReader`;
+  WASM later passes a `crypto.getRandomValues` adapter.
+
+## Layout
+
+```text
+ui/core/
+├── go.mod               module galaxy/core (Go 1.26.0)
+├── canon/               canonical-bytes builders and verifiers
+│   ├── canon.go         length-prefix helpers
+│   ├── request.go       galaxy-request-v1 fields and signing input
+│   ├── response.go      galaxy-response-v1 fields and verifier
+│   ├── event.go         galaxy-event-v1 fields and verifier
+│   ├── signature.go     base64 client-key request verification
+│   └── testdata/        committed JSON golden vectors
+├── keypair/             Ed25519 generate / sign / verify / marshal
+└── types/               full transport envelopes + result codes
+```
+
+## Public API
+
+### `galaxy/core/canon`
+
+- `RequestDomainMarkerV1`, `ResponseDomainMarkerV1`, `EventDomainMarkerV1`
+  — UTF-8 domain prefixes that bind a signature to a specific
+  envelope kind.
+- `RequestSigningFields`, `ResponseSigningFields`, `EventSigningFields`
+  — exact subsets of envelope fields covered by the v1 signature.
+- `BuildRequestSigningInput`, `BuildResponseSigningInput`,
+  `BuildEventSigningInput` — produce canonical bytes ready for
+  `ed25519.Sign` / `ed25519.Verify`.
+- `VerifyRequestSignature(clientPublicKey string, signature []byte,
+  fields RequestSigningFields) error` — accepts the base64
+  string form the backend stores in the device session.
+- `VerifyResponseSignature(publicKey ed25519.PublicKey, signature []byte,
+  fields ResponseSigningFields) error`,
+  `VerifyEventSignature(publicKey ed25519.PublicKey, signature []byte,
+  fields EventSigningFields) error` — used by the client to
+  validate server output.
+- `VerifyPayloadHash(payloadBytes, payloadHash []byte) error`.
+- Sentinel errors: `ErrInvalidPayloadHash`, `ErrPayloadHashMismatch`,
+  `ErrInvalidClientPublicKey`, `ErrInvalidRequestSignature`,
+  `ErrInvalidResponseSignature`, `ErrInvalidEventSignature`.
+
+### `galaxy/core/keypair`
+
+- `Generate(reader io.Reader) (privateKey, publicKey []byte, err error)`.
+- `Sign(privateKey, message []byte) ([]byte, error)` — returns a 64-byte
+  raw Ed25519 signature.
+- `Verify(publicKey, message, signature []byte) bool`.
+- `MarshalPublicKey(publicKey []byte) (string, error)` — base64
+  StdEncoding, the wire format documented in §15.
+- `UnmarshalPublicKey(value string) ([]byte, error)`.
+- `PublicKeyFromPrivate(privateKey []byte) ([]byte, error)`.
+- Sentinel errors: `ErrInvalidPrivateKey`, `ErrInvalidPublicKey`,
+  `ErrInvalidPublicKeyEncoding`.
+
+### `galaxy/core/types`
+
+- `RequestEnvelope`, `ResponseEnvelope`, `EventEnvelope` — full Go
+  envelope structs mirroring the protobuf messages in
+  `gateway/proto/galaxy/gateway/v1/`. Each exposes a
+  `SigningFields()` method to project onto the corresponding
+  `canon.*SigningFields`.
+- `ProtocolVersionV1 = "v1"`, `ResultCodeOK = "ok"` — the only
+  result string that is part of the stable client contract; any
+  other `result_code` is downstream-opaque and must not be
+  hard-coded by clients.
+
+## Testing
+
+```sh
+go test -count=1 ./ui/core/...
+```
+
+The `canon` test suite combines:
+
+- byte-equality on golden JSON fixtures under
+  `canon/testdata/` for three request types
+  (`user.account.get`, `lobby.my.games.list`,
+  `user.games.command`), one response (`ok`), and one event
+  (`gateway.server_time`);
+- mutation tests proving every signed field is bound into the
+  signature;
+- round-trip sign-then-verify across all three envelope kinds;
+- negative tests for tampered hashes, mismatched timestamps and
+  request IDs, invalid signature lengths, and bad public-key
+  encodings.
+
+Cross-module parity (gateway accepts ui/core signatures and vice
+versa) is enforced from
+`gateway/authn/parity_with_ui_core_test.go`.
+
+## What this module is **not**
+
+- Not a network client. ConnectRPC over `@connectrpc/connect-web`
+  on the TypeScript side is the only network surface (Phase 5+).
+- Not a key store. Per-platform secure storage lives in Phase 6.
+- Not a freshness gate. Server-side `±5 min` freshness checks
+  remain in `gateway/internal/grpcapi/freshness_replay.go`. The
+  client is expected to stamp its own `timestamp_ms` accurately
+  via `time.Now`, but does not enforce a window.
+- Not a FlatBuffers codec — that lands in a later phase, so the
+  module today is small on purpose.
+
+## Cross-references
+
+- [`../../docs/ARCHITECTURE.md` §15](../../docs/ARCHITECTURE.md) —
+  authoritative byte contract.
+- [`../../gateway/authn`](../../gateway/authn) — server mirror of
+  the same canonical bytes.
+- [`../PLAN.md`](../PLAN.md) Phase 3 — the staged plan that
+  describes how this module fits into the wider client.

ui/core/canon/canon.go

@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+// Package canon implements the canonical-bytes serializer for the
+// Galaxy v1 transport envelopes (galaxy-request-v1, galaxy-response-v1,
+// galaxy-event-v1). The canonical-bytes contract is documented in
+// `docs/ARCHITECTURE.md` §15 and mirrored byte-for-byte by the gateway
+// in `gateway/authn`. Drift between the two implementations is caught
+// by the parity test under `gateway/authn/parity_with_ui_core_test.go`.
+//
+// The package is network-free, storage-free, and TinyGo-friendly: it
+// does not depend on `crypto/x509`, `encoding/pem`, or `os`. Random
+// bytes are never read inside this package; the higher-level keypair
+// API in `galaxy/core/keypair` accepts a caller-supplied io.Reader so
+// the WASM build can inject `crypto.getRandomValues`.
+package canon
+
+import "encoding/binary"
+
+// appendLengthPrefixedString encodes value as uvarint(len(value))
+// followed by the raw bytes of value.
+func appendLengthPrefixedString(dst []byte, value string) []byte {
+	return appendLengthPrefixedBytes(dst, []byte(value))
+}
+
+// appendLengthPrefixedBytes encodes value as uvarint(len(value))
+// followed by the raw bytes of value.
+func appendLengthPrefixedBytes(dst []byte, value []byte) []byte {
+	dst = binary.AppendUvarint(dst, uint64(len(value)))
+	dst = append(dst, value...)
+
+	return dst
+}

ui/core/canon/event.go

@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
+package canon
+
+import (
+	"crypto/ed25519"
+	"encoding/binary"
+	"errors"
+)
+
+const (
+	// EventDomainMarkerV1 binds the v1 server event signature to the Galaxy
+	// gateway transport contract.
+	EventDomainMarkerV1 = "galaxy-event-v1"
+)
+
+// ErrInvalidEventSignature reports that a gateway stream event signature is
+// not a raw Ed25519 signature for the canonical event signing input.
+var ErrInvalidEventSignature = errors.New("invalid event signature")
+
+// EventSigningFields contains the canonical v1 stream-event fields that are
+// bound into the server signing input.
+type EventSigningFields struct {
+	// EventType identifies the stable client-facing event category.
+	EventType string
+
+	// EventID is the stable event correlation identifier.
+	EventID string
+
+	// TimestampMS carries the server event timestamp in milliseconds.
+	TimestampMS int64
+
+	// RequestID optionally correlates the event to the opening client request.
+	RequestID string
+
+	// TraceID optionally carries the client-supplied tracing correlation value.
+	TraceID string
+
+	// PayloadHash is the raw SHA-256 digest of event payload bytes.
+	PayloadHash []byte
+}
+
+// BuildEventSigningInput returns the canonical byte sequence the v1 gateway
+// stream-event signature covers. String and byte fields are length-prefixed
+// with uvarint(len(field)) followed by raw bytes, while TimestampMS is
+// appended as an 8-byte big-endian uint64.
+func BuildEventSigningInput(fields EventSigningFields) []byte {
+	size := len(EventDomainMarkerV1) +
+		len(fields.EventType) +
+		len(fields.EventID) +
+		len(fields.RequestID) +
+		len(fields.TraceID) +
+		len(fields.PayloadHash) +
+		(6 * binary.MaxVarintLen64) +
+		8
+
+	buf := make([]byte, 0, size)
+	buf = appendLengthPrefixedString(buf, EventDomainMarkerV1)
+	buf = appendLengthPrefixedString(buf, fields.EventType)
+	buf = appendLengthPrefixedString(buf, fields.EventID)
+	buf = binary.BigEndian.AppendUint64(buf, uint64(fields.TimestampMS))
+	buf = appendLengthPrefixedString(buf, fields.RequestID)
+	buf = appendLengthPrefixedString(buf, fields.TraceID)
+	buf = appendLengthPrefixedBytes(buf, fields.PayloadHash)
+
+	return buf
+}
+
+// VerifyEventSignature verifies that signature authenticates fields under
+// publicKey using the canonical v1 event signing input.
+func VerifyEventSignature(publicKey ed25519.PublicKey, signature []byte, fields EventSigningFields) error {
+	if len(publicKey) != ed25519.PublicKeySize || len(signature) != ed25519.SignatureSize {
+		return ErrInvalidEventSignature
+	}
+	if !ed25519.Verify(publicKey, BuildEventSigningInput(fields), signature) {
+		return ErrInvalidEventSignature
+	}
+
+	return nil
+}

ui/core/canon/event_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,162 @@
+package canon_test
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"crypto/ed25519"
+	"encoding/hex"
+	"testing"
+
+	"galaxy/core/canon"
+
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
+)
+
+func TestBuildEventSigningInputChangesWhenSignedFieldChanges(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	base := canon.EventSigningFields{
+		EventType:   "gateway.server_time",
+		EventID:     "evt-123",
+		TimestampMS: 123456789,
+		RequestID:   "request-123",
+		TraceID:     "trace-123",
+		PayloadHash: sha256Sum([]byte("payload")),
+	}
+
+	baseInput := canon.BuildEventSigningInput(base)
+
+	tests := []struct {
+		name   string
+		mutate func(canon.EventSigningFields) canon.EventSigningFields
+	}{
+		{
+			name: "event type",
+			mutate: func(fields canon.EventSigningFields) canon.EventSigningFields {
+				fields.EventType = "gateway.other"
+				return fields
+			},
+		},
+		{
+			name: "event id",
+			mutate: func(fields canon.EventSigningFields) canon.EventSigningFields {
+				fields.EventID = "evt-456"
+				return fields
+			},
+		},
+		{
+			name: "timestamp",
+			mutate: func(fields canon.EventSigningFields) canon.EventSigningFields {
+				fields.TimestampMS++
+				return fields
+			},
+		},
+		{
+			name: "request id",
+			mutate: func(fields canon.EventSigningFields) canon.EventSigningFields {
+				fields.RequestID = "request-456"
+				return fields
+			},
+		},
+		{
+			name: "trace id",
+			mutate: func(fields canon.EventSigningFields) canon.EventSigningFields {
+				fields.TraceID = "trace-456"
+				return fields
+			},
+		},
+		{
+			name: "payload hash",
+			mutate: func(fields canon.EventSigningFields) canon.EventSigningFields {
+				fields.PayloadHash = sha256Sum([]byte("other"))
+				return fields
+			},
+		},
+	}
+
+	for _, tt := range tests {
+		t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			t.Parallel()
+
+			mutated := canon.BuildEventSigningInput(tt.mutate(base))
+			assert.False(t, bytes.Equal(baseInput, mutated))
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+func TestSignAndVerifyEventSignature(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	seed := bytes.Repeat([]byte{0xBB}, ed25519.SeedSize)
+	privateKey := ed25519.NewKeyFromSeed(seed)
+	publicKey, _ := privateKey.Public().(ed25519.PublicKey)
+
+	fields := canon.EventSigningFields{
+		EventType:   "gateway.server_time",
+		EventID:     "evt-123",
+		TimestampMS: 123456789,
+		RequestID:   "request-123",
+		TraceID:     "trace-123",
+		PayloadHash: sha256Sum([]byte("payload")),
+	}
+
+	signature := ed25519.Sign(privateKey, canon.BuildEventSigningInput(fields))
+	require.NoError(t, canon.VerifyEventSignature(publicKey, signature, fields))
+
+	t.Run("rejects mutated trace id", func(t *testing.T) {
+		t.Parallel()
+
+		mutated := fields
+		mutated.TraceID = "trace-other"
+		require.ErrorIs(t,
+			canon.VerifyEventSignature(publicKey, signature, mutated),
+			canon.ErrInvalidEventSignature)
+	})
+
+	t.Run("rejects invalid signature length", func(t *testing.T) {
+		t.Parallel()
+
+		require.ErrorIs(t,
+			canon.VerifyEventSignature(publicKey, signature[:1], fields),
+			canon.ErrInvalidEventSignature)
+	})
+
+	t.Run("rejects invalid public key length", func(t *testing.T) {
+		t.Parallel()
+
+		require.ErrorIs(t,
+			canon.VerifyEventSignature(publicKey[:8], signature, fields),
+			canon.ErrInvalidEventSignature)
+	})
+}
+
+func TestEventCanonicalBytesFixture(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	var fx eventFixture
+	loadJSONFixture(t, "event_gateway_server_time.json", &fx)
+
+	fields := canon.EventSigningFields{
+		EventType:   fx.EventType,
+		EventID:     fx.EventID,
+		TimestampMS: fx.TimestampMS,
+		RequestID:   fx.RequestID,
+		TraceID:     fx.TraceID,
+		PayloadHash: mustHex(t, fx.PayloadHashHex),
+	}
+
+	require.NoError(t,
+		canon.VerifyPayloadHash([]byte(fx.Payload), fields.PayloadHash))
+
+	gotInput := canon.BuildEventSigningInput(fields)
+	assert.Equal(t, fx.ExpectedCanonicalBytesHex, hex.EncodeToString(gotInput))
+
+	seed := mustHex(t, fx.PrivateKeySeedHex)
+	require.Len(t, seed, ed25519.SeedSize)
+	privateKey := ed25519.NewKeyFromSeed(seed)
+	publicKey, _ := privateKey.Public().(ed25519.PublicKey)
+	signature := ed25519.Sign(privateKey, gotInput)
+	assert.Equal(t, fx.ExpectedSignatureHex, hex.EncodeToString(signature))
+
+	require.NoError(t, canon.VerifyEventSignature(publicKey, signature, fields))
+}

ui/core/canon/request.go

@@ -0,0 +1,88 @@
+package canon
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"crypto/sha256"
+	"encoding/binary"
+	"errors"
+)
+
+const (
+	// RequestDomainMarkerV1 binds the v1 client request signature to the Galaxy
+	// gateway transport contract.
+	RequestDomainMarkerV1 = "galaxy-request-v1"
+)
+
+var (
+	// ErrInvalidPayloadHash reports that payloadHash is not a raw SHA-256 digest.
+	ErrInvalidPayloadHash = errors.New("payload_hash must be a 32-byte SHA-256 digest")
+
+	// ErrPayloadHashMismatch reports that payloadHash does not match payloadBytes.
+	ErrPayloadHashMismatch = errors.New("payload_hash does not match payload_bytes")
+)
+
+// RequestSigningFields contains the canonical v1 request fields that are bound
+// into the client signing input. The client populates this struct from a
+// request envelope before signing; the server populates it from a received
+// envelope before verification.
+type RequestSigningFields struct {
+	// ProtocolVersion identifies the transport envelope version.
+	ProtocolVersion string
+
+	// DeviceSessionID identifies the authenticated device session bound to the
+	// request.
+	DeviceSessionID string
+
+	// MessageType is the stable downstream routing key.
+	MessageType string
+
+	// TimestampMS carries the client request timestamp in milliseconds.
+	TimestampMS int64
+
+	// RequestID is the transport correlation and anti-replay identifier.
+	RequestID string
+
+	// PayloadHash is the raw SHA-256 digest of payload bytes.
+	PayloadHash []byte
+}
+
+// BuildRequestSigningInput returns the canonical byte sequence the v1 client
+// request signature covers. String and byte fields are length-prefixed with
+// uvarint(len(field)) followed by raw bytes, while TimestampMS is appended as
+// an 8-byte big-endian uint64.
+func BuildRequestSigningInput(fields RequestSigningFields) []byte {
+	size := len(RequestDomainMarkerV1) +
+		len(fields.ProtocolVersion) +
+		len(fields.DeviceSessionID) +
+		len(fields.MessageType) +
+		len(fields.RequestID) +
+		len(fields.PayloadHash) +
+		(6 * binary.MaxVarintLen64) +
+		8
+
+	buf := make([]byte, 0, size)
+	buf = appendLengthPrefixedString(buf, RequestDomainMarkerV1)
+	buf = appendLengthPrefixedString(buf, fields.ProtocolVersion)
+	buf = appendLengthPrefixedString(buf, fields.DeviceSessionID)
+	buf = appendLengthPrefixedString(buf, fields.MessageType)
+	buf = binary.BigEndian.AppendUint64(buf, uint64(fields.TimestampMS))
+	buf = appendLengthPrefixedString(buf, fields.RequestID)
+	buf = appendLengthPrefixedBytes(buf, fields.PayloadHash)
+
+	return buf
+}
+
+// VerifyPayloadHash checks that payloadHash is the raw SHA-256 digest of
+// payloadBytes. Empty payloadBytes are valid and must use sha256.Sum256(nil).
+func VerifyPayloadHash(payloadBytes, payloadHash []byte) error {
+	if len(payloadHash) != sha256.Size {
+		return ErrInvalidPayloadHash
+	}
+
+	sum := sha256.Sum256(payloadBytes)
+	if !bytes.Equal(sum[:], payloadHash) {
+		return ErrPayloadHashMismatch
+	}
+
+	return nil
+}

ui/core/canon/request_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,184 @@
+package canon_test
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"crypto/ed25519"
+	"crypto/sha256"
+	"encoding/hex"
+	"testing"
+
+	"galaxy/core/canon"
+
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
+)
+
+func TestVerifyPayloadHash(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	payloadSum := sha256.Sum256([]byte("payload"))
+	emptySum := sha256.Sum256(nil)
+	otherSum := sha256.Sum256([]byte("other"))
+
+	tests := []struct {
+		name        string
+		payload     []byte
+		payloadHash []byte
+		wantErr     error
+	}{
+		{
+			name:        "matches non-empty payload",
+			payload:     []byte("payload"),
+			payloadHash: payloadSum[:],
+		},
+		{
+			name:        "matches empty payload",
+			payload:     nil,
+			payloadHash: emptySum[:],
+		},
+		{
+			name:        "rejects digest with invalid length",
+			payload:     []byte("payload"),
+			payloadHash: []byte("short"),
+			wantErr:     canon.ErrInvalidPayloadHash,
+		},
+		{
+			name:        "rejects digest mismatch",
+			payload:     []byte("payload"),
+			payloadHash: otherSum[:],
+			wantErr:     canon.ErrPayloadHashMismatch,
+		},
+	}
+
+	for _, tt := range tests {
+		t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			t.Parallel()
+
+			err := canon.VerifyPayloadHash(tt.payload, tt.payloadHash)
+			if tt.wantErr == nil {
+				require.NoError(t, err)
+				return
+			}
+
+			require.ErrorIs(t, err, tt.wantErr)
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+func TestBuildRequestSigningInputChangesWhenSignedFieldChanges(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	base := canon.RequestSigningFields{
+		ProtocolVersion: "v1",
+		DeviceSessionID: "device-session-123",
+		MessageType:     "user.games.command",
+		TimestampMS:     123456789,
+		RequestID:       "request-123",
+		PayloadHash:     sha256Sum([]byte("payload")),
+	}
+
+	baseInput := canon.BuildRequestSigningInput(base)
+
+	tests := []struct {
+		name   string
+		mutate func(canon.RequestSigningFields) canon.RequestSigningFields
+	}{
+		{
+			name: "protocol version",
+			mutate: func(fields canon.RequestSigningFields) canon.RequestSigningFields {
+				fields.ProtocolVersion = "v2"
+				return fields
+			},
+		},
+		{
+			name: "device session id",
+			mutate: func(fields canon.RequestSigningFields) canon.RequestSigningFields {
+				fields.DeviceSessionID = "device-session-456"
+				return fields
+			},
+		},
+		{
+			name: "message type",
+			mutate: func(fields canon.RequestSigningFields) canon.RequestSigningFields {
+				fields.MessageType = "user.account.get"
+				return fields
+			},
+		},
+		{
+			name: "timestamp",
+			mutate: func(fields canon.RequestSigningFields) canon.RequestSigningFields {
+				fields.TimestampMS++
+				return fields
+			},
+		},
+		{
+			name: "request id",
+			mutate: func(fields canon.RequestSigningFields) canon.RequestSigningFields {
+				fields.RequestID = "request-456"
+				return fields
+			},
+		},
+		{
+			name: "payload hash",
+			mutate: func(fields canon.RequestSigningFields) canon.RequestSigningFields {
+				fields.PayloadHash = sha256Sum([]byte("other"))
+				return fields
+			},
+		},
+	}
+
+	for _, tt := range tests {
+		t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			t.Parallel()
+
+			mutated := canon.BuildRequestSigningInput(tt.mutate(base))
+			assert.False(t, bytes.Equal(baseInput, mutated))
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+func TestRequestCanonicalBytesFixtures(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	fixtures := []string{
+		"request_user_account_get.json",
+		"request_lobby_my_games_list.json",
+		"request_user_games_command.json",
+	}
+
+	for _, name := range fixtures {
+		t.Run(name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			t.Parallel()
+
+			var fx requestFixture
+			loadJSONFixture(t, name, &fx)
+
+			fields := canon.RequestSigningFields{
+				ProtocolVersion: fx.ProtocolVersion,
+				DeviceSessionID: fx.DeviceSessionID,
+				MessageType:     fx.MessageType,
+				TimestampMS:     fx.TimestampMS,
+				RequestID:       fx.RequestID,
+				PayloadHash:     mustHex(t, fx.PayloadHashHex),
+			}
+
+			require.NoError(t,
+				canon.VerifyPayloadHash([]byte(fx.Payload), fields.PayloadHash),
+				"payload hash must match payload bytes")
+
+			gotInput := canon.BuildRequestSigningInput(fields)
+			assert.Equal(t, fx.ExpectedCanonicalBytesHex, hex.EncodeToString(gotInput),
+				"canonical bytes drift from fixture")
+
+			seed := mustHex(t, fx.PrivateKeySeedHex)
+			require.Len(t, seed, ed25519.SeedSize)
+			privateKey := ed25519.NewKeyFromSeed(seed)
+			signature := ed25519.Sign(privateKey, gotInput)
+			assert.Equal(t, fx.ExpectedSignatureHex, hex.EncodeToString(signature),
+				"signature drift from fixture")
+
+			require.NoError(t,
+				canon.VerifyRequestSignature(fx.PublicKeyBase64, signature, fields))
+		})
+	}
+}

ui/core/canon/response.go

@@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
+package canon
+
+import (
+	"crypto/ed25519"
+	"encoding/binary"
+	"errors"
+)
+
+const (
+	// ResponseDomainMarkerV1 binds the v1 server response signature to the
+	// Galaxy gateway transport contract.
+	ResponseDomainMarkerV1 = "galaxy-response-v1"
+)
+
+// ErrInvalidResponseSignature reports that a server response signature is
+// not a raw Ed25519 signature for the canonical response signing input.
+var ErrInvalidResponseSignature = errors.New("invalid response signature")
+
+// ResponseSigningFields contains the canonical v1 response fields that are
+// bound into the server signing input.
+type ResponseSigningFields struct {
+	// ProtocolVersion identifies the transport envelope version.
+	ProtocolVersion string
+
+	// RequestID is the transport correlation identifier copied from the
+	// authenticated request.
+	RequestID string
+
+	// TimestampMS carries the server response timestamp in milliseconds.
+	TimestampMS int64
+
+	// ResultCode is the opaque downstream result code returned to the client.
+	ResultCode string
+
+	// PayloadHash is the raw SHA-256 digest of response payload bytes.
+	PayloadHash []byte
+}
+
+// BuildResponseSigningInput returns the canonical byte sequence the v1 server
+// response signature covers. String and byte fields are length-prefixed with
+// uvarint(len(field)) followed by raw bytes, while TimestampMS is appended as
+// an 8-byte big-endian uint64.
+func BuildResponseSigningInput(fields ResponseSigningFields) []byte {
+	size := len(ResponseDomainMarkerV1) +
+		len(fields.ProtocolVersion) +
+		len(fields.RequestID) +
+		len(fields.ResultCode) +
+		len(fields.PayloadHash) +
+		(5 * binary.MaxVarintLen64) +
+		8
+
+	buf := make([]byte, 0, size)
+	buf = appendLengthPrefixedString(buf, ResponseDomainMarkerV1)
+	buf = appendLengthPrefixedString(buf, fields.ProtocolVersion)
+	buf = appendLengthPrefixedString(buf, fields.RequestID)
+	buf = binary.BigEndian.AppendUint64(buf, uint64(fields.TimestampMS))
+	buf = appendLengthPrefixedString(buf, fields.ResultCode)
+	buf = appendLengthPrefixedBytes(buf, fields.PayloadHash)
+
+	return buf
+}
+
+// VerifyResponseSignature verifies that signature authenticates fields under
+// publicKey using the canonical v1 response signing input.
+func VerifyResponseSignature(publicKey ed25519.PublicKey, signature []byte, fields ResponseSigningFields) error {
+	if len(publicKey) != ed25519.PublicKeySize || len(signature) != ed25519.SignatureSize {
+		return ErrInvalidResponseSignature
+	}
+	if !ed25519.Verify(publicKey, BuildResponseSigningInput(fields), signature) {
+		return ErrInvalidResponseSignature
+	}
+
+	return nil
+}

ui/core/canon/response_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,153 @@
+package canon_test
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"crypto/ed25519"
+	"encoding/hex"
+	"testing"
+
+	"galaxy/core/canon"
+
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
+)
+
+func TestBuildResponseSigningInputChangesWhenSignedFieldChanges(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	base := canon.ResponseSigningFields{
+		ProtocolVersion: "v1",
+		RequestID:       "request-123",
+		TimestampMS:     123456789,
+		ResultCode:      "ok",
+		PayloadHash:     sha256Sum([]byte("payload")),
+	}
+
+	baseInput := canon.BuildResponseSigningInput(base)
+
+	tests := []struct {
+		name   string
+		mutate func(canon.ResponseSigningFields) canon.ResponseSigningFields
+	}{
+		{
+			name: "protocol version",
+			mutate: func(fields canon.ResponseSigningFields) canon.ResponseSigningFields {
+				fields.ProtocolVersion = "v2"
+				return fields
+			},
+		},
+		{
+			name: "request id",
+			mutate: func(fields canon.ResponseSigningFields) canon.ResponseSigningFields {
+				fields.RequestID = "request-456"
+				return fields
+			},
+		},
+		{
+			name: "timestamp",
+			mutate: func(fields canon.ResponseSigningFields) canon.ResponseSigningFields {
+				fields.TimestampMS++
+				return fields
+			},
+		},
+		{
+			name: "result code",
+			mutate: func(fields canon.ResponseSigningFields) canon.ResponseSigningFields {
+				fields.ResultCode = "denied"
+				return fields
+			},
+		},
+		{
+			name: "payload hash",
+			mutate: func(fields canon.ResponseSigningFields) canon.ResponseSigningFields {
+				fields.PayloadHash = sha256Sum([]byte("other"))
+				return fields
+			},
+		},
+	}
+
+	for _, tt := range tests {
+		t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			t.Parallel()
+
+			mutated := canon.BuildResponseSigningInput(tt.mutate(base))
+			assert.False(t, bytes.Equal(baseInput, mutated))
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+func TestSignAndVerifyResponseSignature(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	seed := bytes.Repeat([]byte{0xAA}, ed25519.SeedSize)
+	privateKey := ed25519.NewKeyFromSeed(seed)
+	publicKey, _ := privateKey.Public().(ed25519.PublicKey)
+
+	fields := canon.ResponseSigningFields{
+		ProtocolVersion: "v1",
+		RequestID:       "request-123",
+		TimestampMS:     123456789,
+		ResultCode:      "ok",
+		PayloadHash:     sha256Sum([]byte("payload")),
+	}
+
+	signature := ed25519.Sign(privateKey, canon.BuildResponseSigningInput(fields))
+	require.NoError(t, canon.VerifyResponseSignature(publicKey, signature, fields))
+
+	t.Run("rejects mutated field", func(t *testing.T) {
+		t.Parallel()
+
+		mutated := fields
+		mutated.ResultCode = "denied"
+		require.ErrorIs(t,
+			canon.VerifyResponseSignature(publicKey, signature, mutated),
+			canon.ErrInvalidResponseSignature)
+	})
+
+	t.Run("rejects invalid public key length", func(t *testing.T) {
+		t.Parallel()
+
+		shortKey := publicKey[:len(publicKey)-1]
+		require.ErrorIs(t,
+			canon.VerifyResponseSignature(shortKey, signature, fields),
+			canon.ErrInvalidResponseSignature)
+	})
+
+	t.Run("rejects invalid signature length", func(t *testing.T) {
+		t.Parallel()
+
+		require.ErrorIs(t,
+			canon.VerifyResponseSignature(publicKey, signature[:len(signature)-1], fields),
+			canon.ErrInvalidResponseSignature)
+	})
+}
+
+func TestResponseCanonicalBytesFixture(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	var fx responseFixture
+	loadJSONFixture(t, "response_ok.json", &fx)
+
+	fields := canon.ResponseSigningFields{
+		ProtocolVersion: fx.ProtocolVersion,
+		RequestID:       fx.RequestID,
+		TimestampMS:     fx.TimestampMS,
+		ResultCode:      fx.ResultCode,
+		PayloadHash:     mustHex(t, fx.PayloadHashHex),
+	}
+
+	require.NoError(t,
+		canon.VerifyPayloadHash([]byte(fx.Payload), fields.PayloadHash))
+
+	gotInput := canon.BuildResponseSigningInput(fields)
+	assert.Equal(t, fx.ExpectedCanonicalBytesHex, hex.EncodeToString(gotInput))
+
+	seed := mustHex(t, fx.PrivateKeySeedHex)
+	require.Len(t, seed, ed25519.SeedSize)
+	privateKey := ed25519.NewKeyFromSeed(seed)
+	publicKey, _ := privateKey.Public().(ed25519.PublicKey)
+	signature := ed25519.Sign(privateKey, gotInput)
+	assert.Equal(t, fx.ExpectedSignatureHex, hex.EncodeToString(signature))
+
+	require.NoError(t, canon.VerifyResponseSignature(publicKey, signature, fields))
+}

ui/core/canon/signature.go

@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+package canon
+
+import (
+	"crypto/ed25519"
+	"encoding/base64"
+	"errors"
+)
+
+var (
+	// ErrInvalidClientPublicKey reports that the provided client public key is
+	// not a base64-encoded raw Ed25519 public key.
+	ErrInvalidClientPublicKey = errors.New("client_public_key is not a valid base64-encoded Ed25519 public key")
+
+	// ErrInvalidRequestSignature reports that a request signature is not a raw
+	// Ed25519 signature for the canonical request signing input.
+	ErrInvalidRequestSignature = errors.New("invalid request signature")
+)
+
+// VerifyRequestSignature decodes the base64-encoded raw Ed25519 client public
+// key, builds the canonical v1 signing input from fields, and verifies that
+// signature authenticates the request.
+//
+// The base64 string form matches how a backend hands the client public key
+// back to the gateway after device-session resolution
+// (see docs/ARCHITECTURE.md §15).
+func VerifyRequestSignature(clientPublicKey string, signature []byte, fields RequestSigningFields) error {
+	publicKey, err := decodeClientPublicKey(clientPublicKey)
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	if len(signature) != ed25519.SignatureSize {
+		return ErrInvalidRequestSignature
+	}
+	if !ed25519.Verify(publicKey, BuildRequestSigningInput(fields), signature) {
+		return ErrInvalidRequestSignature
+	}
+
+	return nil
+}
+
+func decodeClientPublicKey(value string) (ed25519.PublicKey, error) {
+	decoded, err := base64.StdEncoding.Strict().DecodeString(value)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, ErrInvalidClientPublicKey
+	}
+	if len(decoded) != ed25519.PublicKeySize {
+		return nil, ErrInvalidClientPublicKey
+	}
+
+	return ed25519.PublicKey(decoded), nil
+}

ui/core/canon/signature_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,145 @@
+package canon_test
+
+import (
+	"crypto/ed25519"
+	"crypto/sha256"
+	"encoding/base64"
+	"testing"
+
+	"galaxy/core/canon"
+
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
+)
+
+func TestVerifyRequestSignature(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	clientPrivateKey := newTestPrivateKey("primary")
+	clientPublicKey, _ := clientPrivateKey.Public().(ed25519.PublicKey)
+	otherPrivateKey := newTestPrivateKey("other")
+	otherPublicKey, _ := otherPrivateKey.Public().(ed25519.PublicKey)
+
+	fields := canon.RequestSigningFields{
+		ProtocolVersion: "v1",
+		DeviceSessionID: "device-session-123",
+		MessageType:     "user.games.command",
+		TimestampMS:     123456789,
+		RequestID:       "request-123",
+		PayloadHash:     sha256Sum([]byte("payload")),
+	}
+
+	signature := ed25519.Sign(clientPrivateKey, canon.BuildRequestSigningInput(fields))
+
+	tests := []struct {
+		name            string
+		clientPublicKey string
+		signature       []byte
+		fields          canon.RequestSigningFields
+		wantErr         error
+	}{
+		{
+			name:            "valid signature",
+			clientPublicKey: base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(clientPublicKey),
+			signature:       signature,
+			fields:          fields,
+		},
+		{
+			name:            "tampered payload hash rejects signature",
+			clientPublicKey: base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(clientPublicKey),
+			signature:       signature,
+			fields: func() canon.RequestSigningFields {
+				mutated := fields
+				mutated.PayloadHash = sha256Sum([]byte("other"))
+				return mutated
+			}(),
+			wantErr: canon.ErrInvalidRequestSignature,
+		},
+		{
+			name:            "mismatched request id rejects signature",
+			clientPublicKey: base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(clientPublicKey),
+			signature:       signature,
+			fields: func() canon.RequestSigningFields {
+				mutated := fields
+				mutated.RequestID = "request-456"
+				return mutated
+			}(),
+			wantErr: canon.ErrInvalidRequestSignature,
+		},
+		{
+			name:            "mismatched timestamp rejects signature",
+			clientPublicKey: base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(clientPublicKey),
+			signature:       signature,
+			fields: func() canon.RequestSigningFields {
+				mutated := fields
+				mutated.TimestampMS++
+				return mutated
+			}(),
+			wantErr: canon.ErrInvalidRequestSignature,
+		},
+		{
+			name:            "wrong key rejects signature",
+			clientPublicKey: base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(otherPublicKey),
+			signature:       signature,
+			fields:          fields,
+			wantErr:         canon.ErrInvalidRequestSignature,
+		},
+		{
+			name:            "bit-flipped signature rejects",
+			clientPublicKey: base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(clientPublicKey),
+			signature: func() []byte {
+				corrupted := append([]byte(nil), signature...)
+				corrupted[0] ^= 0xFF
+				return corrupted
+			}(),
+			fields:  fields,
+			wantErr: canon.ErrInvalidRequestSignature,
+		},
+		{
+			name:            "invalid signature length rejects",
+			clientPublicKey: base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(clientPublicKey),
+			signature:       signature[:len(signature)-1],
+			fields:          fields,
+			wantErr:         canon.ErrInvalidRequestSignature,
+		},
+		{
+			name:            "empty signature rejects",
+			clientPublicKey: base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(clientPublicKey),
+			signature:       nil,
+			fields:          fields,
+			wantErr:         canon.ErrInvalidRequestSignature,
+		},
+		{
+			name:            "invalid base64 public key rejects",
+			clientPublicKey: "%%%not-base64%%%",
+			signature:       signature,
+			fields:          fields,
+			wantErr:         canon.ErrInvalidClientPublicKey,
+		},
+		{
+			name:            "invalid public key length rejects",
+			clientPublicKey: base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte("short")),
+			signature:       signature,
+			fields:          fields,
+			wantErr:         canon.ErrInvalidClientPublicKey,
+		},
+	}
+
+	for _, tt := range tests {
+		t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			t.Parallel()
+
+			err := canon.VerifyRequestSignature(tt.clientPublicKey, tt.signature, tt.fields)
+			if tt.wantErr == nil {
+				require.NoError(t, err)
+				return
+			}
+
+			require.ErrorIs(t, err, tt.wantErr)
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+func newTestPrivateKey(label string) ed25519.PrivateKey {
+	seed := sha256.Sum256([]byte("ui-core-canon-signature-test-" + label))
+	return ed25519.NewKeyFromSeed(seed[:])
+}

ui/core/canon/testdata/event_gateway_server_time.json

@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+{
+  "event_type": "gateway.server_time",
+  "event_id": "evt-server-time-1",
+  "timestamp_ms": 1700000003000,
+  "request_id": "req-stream-1",
+  "trace_id": "trace-server-time-1",
+  "payload": "event-payload",
+  "payload_hash_hex": "f484a64a69d92ecf6c00aa2a387a7cdcee3bcf3c5944659d1fd381f4c40852f3",
+  "expected_canonical_bytes_hex": "0f67616c6178792d6576656e742d763113676174657761792e7365727665725f74696d65116576742d7365727665722d74696d652d310000018bcfe573b80c7265712d73747265616d2d311374726163652d7365727665722d74696d652d3120f484a64a69d92ecf6c00aa2a387a7cdcee3bcf3c5944659d1fd381f4c40852f3",
+  "private_key_seed_hex": "0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505",
+  "public_key_base64": "bnoc3Smwt4/ROvTFWY/v9O8qlxZuPKby5Pv8zYBQW/E=",
+  "expected_signature_hex": "5f25daad5758c7b0b25601c6b0639f6262e87a54272e01ccf5062e52b9eaef6a86f2eba96b5a94bf3ef81419d55d3e77d26a55110111465f97dbaaba8f3fb908"
+}

ui/core/canon/testdata/request_lobby_my_games_list.json

@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+{
+  "message_type": "lobby.my.games.list",
+  "protocol_version": "v1",
+  "device_session_id": "device-session-1",
+  "timestamp_ms": 1700000000500,
+  "request_id": "req-lobby-1",
+  "payload": "lobby-payload",
+  "payload_hash_hex": "c1bf5b44b0254c7aca13830c1a85de8c7ac81d9989f41a82c44332ae040ab3f2",
+  "expected_canonical_bytes_hex": "1167616c6178792d726571756573742d7631027631106465766963652d73657373696f6e2d31136c6f6262792e6d792e67616d65732e6c6973740000018bcfe569f40b7265712d6c6f6262792d3120c1bf5b44b0254c7aca13830c1a85de8c7ac81d9989f41a82c44332ae040ab3f2",
+  "private_key_seed_hex": "0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202",
+  "public_key_base64": "gTl3Dqh9F19Wo1Rmw0x+zMuNipG07jeiXfYPW4/Js5Q=",
+  "expected_signature_hex": "f8e1e382e8a95ae9d6bd297f4dd94ee252814d1fbbe62ae99859a1694c6ab1a0fc5e887d747ee1b9ba30d58d8986d7dd03af627be20f17edc5a37a495e8bc007"
+}

ui/core/canon/testdata/request_user_account_get.json

@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+{
+  "message_type": "user.account.get",
+  "protocol_version": "v1",
+  "device_session_id": "device-session-1",
+  "timestamp_ms": 1700000000000,
+  "request_id": "req-account-1",
+  "payload": "account-payload",
+  "payload_hash_hex": "c397741348585a420dafed41f7e809710bb09745889dcb699be827ed4d0f3fe8",
+  "expected_canonical_bytes_hex": "1167616c6178792d726571756573742d7631027631106465766963652d73657373696f6e2d3110757365722e6163636f756e742e6765740000018bcfe568000d7265712d6163636f756e742d3120c397741348585a420dafed41f7e809710bb09745889dcb699be827ed4d0f3fe8",
+  "private_key_seed_hex": "0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101",
+  "public_key_base64": "iojj3XQJ8ZX9UtstPLpdcspnCb8dlBIb83SIAbQPb1w=",
+  "expected_signature_hex": "8fe30c4bb14e77e22e3c81a144fd03b53bba7e76664e36bdacbfa6b0575509279b5d97247eac25e104f09664e2e787f4c3e1a47af571d10c72a92a547c78f70d"
+}

ui/core/canon/testdata/request_user_games_command.json

@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+{
+  "message_type": "user.games.command",
+  "protocol_version": "v1",
+  "device_session_id": "device-session-1",
+  "timestamp_ms": 1700000001000,
+  "request_id": "req-games-1",
+  "payload": "games-payload",
+  "payload_hash_hex": "a8322c99bf424939cd3a1e5a41b5edb67e567bff87c49e8ff229be60976960e0",
+  "expected_canonical_bytes_hex": "1167616c6178792d726571756573742d7631027631106465766963652d73657373696f6e2d3112757365722e67616d65732e636f6d6d616e640000018bcfe56be80b7265712d67616d65732d3120a8322c99bf424939cd3a1e5a41b5edb67e567bff87c49e8ff229be60976960e0",
+  "private_key_seed_hex": "0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303",
+  "public_key_base64": "7UkoxijRwsbq6QM4kFmVYSlZJzpcY/k2NsFGFKyHN9E=",
+  "expected_signature_hex": "262d5480451560d9b2ca96468b0e962e4288eabb4dff29dbc66c491a37dd92b779d2b89853083a695317f8535e49c402dcfd49a11fd2926f3af42ceb745e2b0a"
+}

ui/core/canon/testdata/response_ok.json

@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+{
+  "protocol_version": "v1",
+  "request_id": "req-response-1",
+  "timestamp_ms": 1700000002000,
+  "result_code": "ok",
+  "payload": "response-payload",
+  "payload_hash_hex": "2a9afa6f5873bca916cef860bf4902d5a665b1f01e832729eccccefe3424ea88",
+  "expected_canonical_bytes_hex": "1267616c6178792d726573706f6e73652d76310276310e7265712d726573706f6e73652d310000018bcfe56fd0026f6b202a9afa6f5873bca916cef860bf4902d5a665b1f01e832729eccccefe3424ea88",
+  "private_key_seed_hex": "0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404",
+  "public_key_base64": "ypOsFwUYcHHWe4PH/w7+gQjo7EUwV113JoeTM9vavnw=",
+  "expected_signature_hex": "c9a1b79e602b7557c13d3554cd925be555ba0c5725d81c9baea75bee4693eb6f783e6654af9adfa589b93cf762417deaf7e5e3009d00ea8029c0de8996927b0e"
+}

ui/core/canon/testdata_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
+package canon_test
+
+import (
+	"crypto/sha256"
+	"encoding/hex"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"os"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
+)
+
+// requestFixture captures one stable canonical-bytes test vector for a v1
+// authenticated request. Fixture files live under testdata/ and are
+// generated by hand using the canon package itself; they are committed as
+// golden data so every change to the canonical-bytes contract surfaces as
+// a hex diff in code review.
+type requestFixture struct {
+	MessageType               string `json:"message_type"`
+	ProtocolVersion           string `json:"protocol_version"`
+	DeviceSessionID           string `json:"device_session_id"`
+	TimestampMS               int64  `json:"timestamp_ms"`
+	RequestID                 string `json:"request_id"`
+	Payload                   string `json:"payload"`
+	PayloadHashHex            string `json:"payload_hash_hex"`
+	ExpectedCanonicalBytesHex string `json:"expected_canonical_bytes_hex"`
+	PrivateKeySeedHex         string `json:"private_key_seed_hex"`
+	PublicKeyBase64           string `json:"public_key_base64"`
+	ExpectedSignatureHex      string `json:"expected_signature_hex"`
+}
+
+type responseFixture struct {
+	ProtocolVersion           string `json:"protocol_version"`
+	RequestID                 string `json:"request_id"`
+	TimestampMS               int64  `json:"timestamp_ms"`
+	ResultCode                string `json:"result_code"`
+	Payload                   string `json:"payload"`
+	PayloadHashHex            string `json:"payload_hash_hex"`
+	ExpectedCanonicalBytesHex string `json:"expected_canonical_bytes_hex"`
+	PrivateKeySeedHex         string `json:"private_key_seed_hex"`
+	PublicKeyBase64           string `json:"public_key_base64"`
+	ExpectedSignatureHex      string `json:"expected_signature_hex"`
+}
+
+type eventFixture struct {
+	EventType                 string `json:"event_type"`
+	EventID                   string `json:"event_id"`
+	TimestampMS               int64  `json:"timestamp_ms"`
+	RequestID                 string `json:"request_id"`
+	TraceID                   string `json:"trace_id"`
+	Payload                   string `json:"payload"`
+	PayloadHashHex            string `json:"payload_hash_hex"`
+	ExpectedCanonicalBytesHex string `json:"expected_canonical_bytes_hex"`
+	PrivateKeySeedHex         string `json:"private_key_seed_hex"`
+	PublicKeyBase64           string `json:"public_key_base64"`
+	ExpectedSignatureHex      string `json:"expected_signature_hex"`
+}
+
+func loadJSONFixture(t *testing.T, name string, into any) {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	body, err := os.ReadFile(filepath.Join("testdata", name))
+	require.NoError(t, err, "read %s", name)
+	require.NoError(t, json.Unmarshal(body, into), "decode %s", name)
+}
+
+func mustHex(t *testing.T, value string) []byte {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	decoded, err := hex.DecodeString(value)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+
+	return decoded
+}
+
+func sha256Sum(payload []byte) []byte {
+	sum := sha256.Sum256(payload)
+	return sum[:]
+}

ui/core/go.mod

@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+module galaxy/core
+
+go 1.26.0
+
+require github.com/stretchr/testify v1.11.1
+
+require (
+	github.com/davecgh/go-spew v1.1.1 // indirect
+	github.com/pmezard/go-difflib v1.0.0 // indirect
+	gopkg.in/yaml.v3 v3.0.1 // indirect
+)

ui/core/go.sum

@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+github.com/davecgh/go-spew v1.1.1 h1:vj9j/u1bqnvCEfJOwUhtlOARqs3+rkHYY13jYWTU97c=
+github.com/davecgh/go-spew v1.1.1/go.mod h1:J7Y8YcW2NihsgmVo/mv3lAwl/skON4iLHjSsI+c5H38=
+github.com/pmezard/go-difflib v1.0.0 h1:4DBwDE0NGyQoBHbLQYPwSUPoCMWR5BEzIk/f1lZbAQM=
+github.com/pmezard/go-difflib v1.0.0/go.mod h1:iKH77koFhYxTK1pcRnkKkqfTogsbg7gZNVY4sRDYZ/4=
+github.com/stretchr/testify v1.11.1 h1:7s2iGBzp5EwR7/aIZr8ao5+dra3wiQyKjjFuvgVKu7U=
+github.com/stretchr/testify v1.11.1/go.mod h1:wZwfW3scLgRK+23gO65QZefKpKQRnfz6sD981Nm4B6U=
+gopkg.in/check.v1 v0.0.0-20161208181325-20d25e280405 h1:yhCVgyC4o1eVCa2tZl7eS0r+SDo693bJlVdllGtEeKM=
+gopkg.in/check.v1 v0.0.0-20161208181325-20d25e280405/go.mod h1:Co6ibVJAznAaIkqp8huTwlJQCZ016jof/cbN4VW5Yz0=
+gopkg.in/yaml.v3 v3.0.1 h1:fxVm/GzAzEWqLHuvctI91KS9hhNmmWOoWu0XTYJS7CA=
+gopkg.in/yaml.v3 v3.0.1/go.mod h1:K4uyk7z7BCEPqu6E+C64Yfv1cQ7kz7rIZviUmN+EgEM=

ui/core/keypair/keypair.go

@@ -0,0 +1,108 @@
+// Package keypair provides Ed25519 keypair generation and signing helpers
+// over opaque []byte blobs. The package is network-free, storage-free,
+// and TinyGo-friendly: it does not import `crypto/x509`, `encoding/pem`,
+// or `os`. Random bytes are not read internally; callers pass an io.Reader
+// (typically `crypto/rand.Reader` on host builds, or a `crypto.getRandomValues`
+// adapter on WASM).
+//
+// Public APIs return raw byte blobs (32-byte public keys, 64-byte private
+// keys, 64-byte signatures) so the WASM bridge in later phases can hand
+// them back and forth across the JS boundary as Uint8Array. The package
+// never re-exports `crypto/ed25519` types in its surface.
+package keypair
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"crypto/ed25519"
+	"encoding/base64"
+	"errors"
+	"fmt"
+	"io"
+)
+
+var (
+	// ErrInvalidPrivateKey reports that a private key blob does not have the
+	// required Ed25519 private-key length.
+	ErrInvalidPrivateKey = errors.New("private_key must be a 64-byte Ed25519 private key")
+
+	// ErrInvalidPublicKey reports that a public key blob does not have the
+	// required Ed25519 public-key length.
+	ErrInvalidPublicKey = errors.New("public_key must be a 32-byte Ed25519 public key")
+
+	// ErrInvalidPublicKeyEncoding reports that a marshaled public key is not a
+	// strict base64 encoding of a 32-byte Ed25519 public key.
+	ErrInvalidPublicKeyEncoding = errors.New("public_key is not a valid base64-encoded Ed25519 public key")
+)
+
+// Generate reads 32 seed bytes from reader and derives an Ed25519 keypair.
+// The returned slices are independent copies; callers may retain or zero
+// them without affecting subsequent calls.
+func Generate(reader io.Reader) (privateKey, publicKey []byte, err error) {
+	if reader == nil {
+		return nil, nil, errors.New("keypair.Generate: reader must not be nil")
+	}
+
+	pub, priv, err := ed25519.GenerateKey(reader)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("keypair.Generate: %w", err)
+	}
+
+	return bytes.Clone(priv), bytes.Clone(pub), nil
+}
+
+// Sign returns the raw 64-byte Ed25519 signature of message under privateKey.
+func Sign(privateKey, message []byte) ([]byte, error) {
+	if len(privateKey) != ed25519.PrivateKeySize {
+		return nil, ErrInvalidPrivateKey
+	}
+
+	signature := ed25519.Sign(ed25519.PrivateKey(privateKey), message)
+	return bytes.Clone(signature), nil
+}
+
+// Verify reports whether signature authenticates message under publicKey.
+// It returns false if any input has the wrong length.
+func Verify(publicKey, message, signature []byte) bool {
+	if len(publicKey) != ed25519.PublicKeySize || len(signature) != ed25519.SignatureSize {
+		return false
+	}
+
+	return ed25519.Verify(ed25519.PublicKey(publicKey), message, signature)
+}
+
+// MarshalPublicKey returns the base64 (StdEncoding) representation of the raw
+// 32-byte Ed25519 public key. The encoding matches docs/ARCHITECTURE.md §15:
+// the backend stores client public keys in this exact form and the gateway
+// reads them out of session cache as base64 strings.
+func MarshalPublicKey(publicKey []byte) (string, error) {
+	if len(publicKey) != ed25519.PublicKeySize {
+		return "", ErrInvalidPublicKey
+	}
+
+	return base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(publicKey), nil
+}
+
+// UnmarshalPublicKey decodes a strict base64 (StdEncoding) representation of
+// a raw 32-byte Ed25519 public key.
+func UnmarshalPublicKey(value string) ([]byte, error) {
+	decoded, err := base64.StdEncoding.Strict().DecodeString(value)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, ErrInvalidPublicKeyEncoding
+	}
+	if len(decoded) != ed25519.PublicKeySize {
+		return nil, ErrInvalidPublicKey
+	}
+
+	return decoded, nil
+}
+
+// PublicKeyFromPrivate extracts the Ed25519 public key embedded in privateKey.
+// The returned slice is an independent copy.
+func PublicKeyFromPrivate(privateKey []byte) ([]byte, error) {
+	if len(privateKey) != ed25519.PrivateKeySize {
+		return nil, ErrInvalidPrivateKey
+	}
+
+	pub, _ := ed25519.PrivateKey(privateKey).Public().(ed25519.PublicKey)
+	return bytes.Clone(pub), nil
+}

ui/core/keypair/keypair_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,143 @@
+package keypair_test
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"crypto/ed25519"
+	"crypto/rand"
+	"encoding/base64"
+	"testing"
+
+	"galaxy/core/keypair"
+
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
+)
+
+func TestGenerateProducesIndependentCopies(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	priv, pub, err := keypair.Generate(rand.Reader)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	require.Len(t, priv, ed25519.PrivateKeySize)
+	require.Len(t, pub, ed25519.PublicKeySize)
+
+	// Mutating the returned slices must not affect a fresh call.
+	priv[0] ^= 0xFF
+	pub[0] ^= 0xFF
+	priv2, pub2, err := keypair.Generate(rand.Reader)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	assert.NotEqual(t, priv[:8], priv2[:8])
+	assert.NotEqual(t, pub[:8], pub2[:8])
+}
+
+func TestGenerateIsDeterministicForFixedSeed(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	seed := bytes.Repeat([]byte{0x42}, ed25519.SeedSize)
+
+	priv1, pub1, err := keypair.Generate(bytes.NewReader(seed))
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	priv2, pub2, err := keypair.Generate(bytes.NewReader(seed))
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+
+	assert.Equal(t, priv1, priv2)
+	assert.Equal(t, pub1, pub2)
+}
+
+func TestGenerateRejectsNilReader(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	_, _, err := keypair.Generate(nil)
+	require.Error(t, err)
+}
+
+func TestSignRoundTrip(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	priv, pub, err := keypair.Generate(rand.Reader)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+
+	message := []byte("ui-core-roundtrip")
+	signature, err := keypair.Sign(priv, message)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	assert.Len(t, signature, ed25519.SignatureSize)
+
+	assert.True(t, keypair.Verify(pub, message, signature))
+	assert.False(t, keypair.Verify(pub, []byte("tampered"), signature))
+	tampered := append([]byte(nil), signature...)
+	tampered[0] ^= 0xFF
+	assert.False(t, keypair.Verify(pub, message, tampered))
+}
+
+func TestSignRejectsInvalidPrivateKey(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	_, err := keypair.Sign([]byte("short"), []byte("message"))
+	require.ErrorIs(t, err, keypair.ErrInvalidPrivateKey)
+}
+
+func TestVerifyRejectsInvalidLengths(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	priv, pub, err := keypair.Generate(rand.Reader)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	signature, err := keypair.Sign(priv, []byte("message"))
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+
+	assert.False(t, keypair.Verify(pub[:8], []byte("message"), signature))
+	assert.False(t, keypair.Verify(pub, []byte("message"), signature[:8]))
+}
+
+func TestMarshalUnmarshalPublicKeyRoundTrip(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	_, pub, err := keypair.Generate(rand.Reader)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+
+	encoded, err := keypair.MarshalPublicKey(pub)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	require.NotEmpty(t, encoded)
+
+	// Encoding must be base64 StdEncoding to match docs/ARCHITECTURE.md §15.
+	expected := base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(pub)
+	assert.Equal(t, expected, encoded)
+
+	decoded, err := keypair.UnmarshalPublicKey(encoded)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	assert.Equal(t, pub, decoded)
+}
+
+func TestMarshalPublicKeyRejectsInvalidLength(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	_, err := keypair.MarshalPublicKey([]byte("short"))
+	require.ErrorIs(t, err, keypair.ErrInvalidPublicKey)
+}
+
+func TestUnmarshalPublicKeyRejectsBadEncoding(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	_, err := keypair.UnmarshalPublicKey("%%%not-base64%%%")
+	require.ErrorIs(t, err, keypair.ErrInvalidPublicKeyEncoding)
+}
+
+func TestUnmarshalPublicKeyRejectsWrongLength(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	_, err := keypair.UnmarshalPublicKey(base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte("short")))
+	require.ErrorIs(t, err, keypair.ErrInvalidPublicKey)
+}
+
+func TestPublicKeyFromPrivate(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	priv, pub, err := keypair.Generate(rand.Reader)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+
+	derived, err := keypair.PublicKeyFromPrivate(priv)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	assert.Equal(t, pub, derived)
+
+	_, err = keypair.PublicKeyFromPrivate([]byte("short"))
+	require.ErrorIs(t, err, keypair.ErrInvalidPrivateKey)
+}

ui/core/types/envelope.go

@@ -0,0 +1,94 @@
+// Package types defines the v1 transport envelopes carried over the
+// wire between the Galaxy client and gateway. Envelope shapes mirror
+// the protobuf messages in `gateway/proto/galaxy/gateway/v1/`, but are
+// kept as plain Go structs here so the UI client can read and produce
+// them without depending on the protobuf runtime in WASM and gomobile
+// builds.
+//
+// Each envelope exposes a SigningFields method that returns the subset
+// of fields covered by the v1 signature (see canon.RequestSigningFields,
+// canon.ResponseSigningFields, canon.EventSigningFields and
+// docs/ARCHITECTURE.md §15). The TraceID field on a request envelope is
+// intentionally not part of the request signing input.
+package types
+
+import "galaxy/core/canon"
+
+// RequestEnvelope is the full client-side request envelope. PayloadBytes
+// is hashed into PayloadHash; PayloadHash and the remaining envelope
+// fields above Signature are bound by the v1 request signature.
+type RequestEnvelope struct {
+	ProtocolVersion string
+	DeviceSessionID string
+	MessageType     string
+	TimestampMS     int64
+	RequestID       string
+	PayloadBytes    []byte
+	PayloadHash     []byte
+	Signature       []byte
+	TraceID         string
+}
+
+// SigningFields projects the envelope onto the canonical request signing
+// fields. TraceID is deliberately excluded: the v1 contract does not bind
+// TraceID into the request signature.
+func (e RequestEnvelope) SigningFields() canon.RequestSigningFields {
+	return canon.RequestSigningFields{
+		ProtocolVersion: e.ProtocolVersion,
+		DeviceSessionID: e.DeviceSessionID,
+		MessageType:     e.MessageType,
+		TimestampMS:     e.TimestampMS,
+		RequestID:       e.RequestID,
+		PayloadHash:     e.PayloadHash,
+	}
+}
+
+// ResponseEnvelope is the full server-side response envelope. PayloadBytes
+// is hashed into PayloadHash; PayloadHash and the remaining envelope
+// fields above Signature are bound by the v1 response signature.
+type ResponseEnvelope struct {
+	ProtocolVersion string
+	RequestID       string
+	TimestampMS     int64
+	ResultCode      string
+	PayloadBytes    []byte
+	PayloadHash     []byte
+	Signature       []byte
+}
+
+// SigningFields projects the envelope onto the canonical response signing
+// fields.
+func (e ResponseEnvelope) SigningFields() canon.ResponseSigningFields {
+	return canon.ResponseSigningFields{
+		ProtocolVersion: e.ProtocolVersion,
+		RequestID:       e.RequestID,
+		TimestampMS:     e.TimestampMS,
+		ResultCode:      e.ResultCode,
+		PayloadHash:     e.PayloadHash,
+	}
+}
+
+// EventEnvelope is the full server-side push event envelope.
+type EventEnvelope struct {
+	EventType    string
+	EventID      string
+	TimestampMS  int64
+	RequestID    string
+	TraceID      string
+	PayloadBytes []byte
+	PayloadHash  []byte
+	Signature    []byte
+}
+
+// SigningFields projects the envelope onto the canonical event signing
+// fields.
+func (e EventEnvelope) SigningFields() canon.EventSigningFields {
+	return canon.EventSigningFields{
+		EventType:   e.EventType,
+		EventID:     e.EventID,
+		TimestampMS: e.TimestampMS,
+		RequestID:   e.RequestID,
+		TraceID:     e.TraceID,
+		PayloadHash: e.PayloadHash,
+	}
+}

ui/core/types/envelope_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,81 @@
+package types_test
+
+import (
+	"testing"
+
+	"galaxy/core/canon"
+	"galaxy/core/types"
+
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
+)
+
+func TestRequestEnvelopeSigningFieldsExcludesTraceID(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	envelope := types.RequestEnvelope{
+		ProtocolVersion: types.ProtocolVersionV1,
+		DeviceSessionID: "device-session-1",
+		MessageType:     "user.account.get",
+		TimestampMS:     1_700_000_000_000,
+		RequestID:       "req-1",
+		PayloadBytes:    []byte("payload"),
+		PayloadHash:     []byte("01234567890123456789012345678901"),
+		Signature:       []byte("ignored"),
+		TraceID:         "trace-1",
+	}
+
+	assert.Equal(t, canon.RequestSigningFields{
+		ProtocolVersion: envelope.ProtocolVersion,
+		DeviceSessionID: envelope.DeviceSessionID,
+		MessageType:     envelope.MessageType,
+		TimestampMS:     envelope.TimestampMS,
+		RequestID:       envelope.RequestID,
+		PayloadHash:     envelope.PayloadHash,
+	}, envelope.SigningFields())
+}
+
+func TestResponseEnvelopeSigningFields(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	envelope := types.ResponseEnvelope{
+		ProtocolVersion: types.ProtocolVersionV1,
+		RequestID:       "req-1",
+		TimestampMS:     1_700_000_000_000,
+		ResultCode:      types.ResultCodeOK,
+		PayloadBytes:    []byte("payload"),
+		PayloadHash:     []byte("01234567890123456789012345678901"),
+		Signature:       []byte("ignored"),
+	}
+
+	assert.Equal(t, canon.ResponseSigningFields{
+		ProtocolVersion: envelope.ProtocolVersion,
+		RequestID:       envelope.RequestID,
+		TimestampMS:     envelope.TimestampMS,
+		ResultCode:      envelope.ResultCode,
+		PayloadHash:     envelope.PayloadHash,
+	}, envelope.SigningFields())
+}
+
+func TestEventEnvelopeSigningFieldsIncludesTraceID(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	envelope := types.EventEnvelope{
+		EventType:    "gateway.server_time",
+		EventID:      "evt-1",
+		TimestampMS:  1_700_000_000_000,
+		RequestID:    "req-1",
+		TraceID:      "trace-1",
+		PayloadBytes: []byte("payload"),
+		PayloadHash:  []byte("01234567890123456789012345678901"),
+		Signature:    []byte("ignored"),
+	}
+
+	assert.Equal(t, canon.EventSigningFields{
+		EventType:   envelope.EventType,
+		EventID:     envelope.EventID,
+		TimestampMS: envelope.TimestampMS,
+		RequestID:   envelope.RequestID,
+		TraceID:     envelope.TraceID,
+		PayloadHash: envelope.PayloadHash,
+	}, envelope.SigningFields())
+}

ui/core/types/result_codes.go

@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+package types
+
+const (
+	// ProtocolVersionV1 is the only supported transport envelope version.
+	ProtocolVersionV1 = "v1"
+
+	// ResultCodeOK is the stable success result code returned by the gateway
+	// for accepted authenticated commands. All other result_code strings are
+	// downstream-opaque and must not be hard-coded by clients.
+	ResultCodeOK = "ok"
+)